



edited by Geoffrey C. Bowker and Paul N. Edwards





The Cultural Work of Standing In
DYLAN MULVIN
© 2021 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This work is subject to a Creative Commons CC- BY- NC- ND license.
Subject to such license, all rights are reserved.
The open- access edition of this book was made possible by generous funding from 
Arcadia— a charitable fund of Lisbet Rausing and Peter Baldwin.
This book was set in Adobe Garamond Pro and Berthold Akzidenz Grotesk by Westchester 
Publishing Ser vices. 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Mulvin, Dylan, author.
Title: Proxies : the cultural work of standing in / Dylan Mulvin.
Description: Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2021] |  
 Series: Infrastructures series | Includes bibliographical references and index. 
Identifiers: LCCN 2020050161 | ISBN 9780262045148 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: Simulation methods—History. | Standardization—Social aspects— 
 History. | Analogy. 
Classification: LCC T57.62 .M85 2021 | DDC 003—dc23 






 1 SAMPLES OF THE WORLD OUT THERE:  
THE SURROGATE LOGIC OF PROXIES 1
 2 HOW TO CLEAN A KILOGRAM: STANDARDS, DATA HYGIENE,  
AND THE THEATER OF OBJECTIVITY 35
 3 THE VISUAL CULTURE OF IMAGE ENGINEERS  
(OR THE LENA IMAGE, PART 1) 73
 4 PROXY JUSTICE (OR THE LENA IMAGE, PART 2) 113
 5 LIVING PROXIES: THE STANDARDIZED PATIENT PROGRAM 145







My work is indebted to the care and curiosity of my friends, family, teach-
ers, and colleagues. This work began at McGill University, where Jonathan 
Sterne and Carrie Rentschler have created a home for humane and original 
scholarship. Jonathan is my mentor, collaborator, and friend and he dem-
onstrates how kindness is possible within academia and beyond. I strive to 
be for others what he is to so many people in our community. Carrie is the 
best teacher and reader I have known, and I am a better thinker and person 
for knowing her, her power, her compassion, and her lack of bullshit. Car-
rie showed me that this was a project about labor.
The Department of Art History and Communication Studies is a 
unique place to study. Thank you to Jenny Burman, Will Straw, and Darin 
Barney for their teaching and service to that academic community, and 
to Darin for never once letting me win at squash. At SFU, Zoë Druick 
provided guidance and mentorship when it was needed, and I am always 
in her debt.
At McGill, I was surrounded by amazing people and am lucky to 
count Joceline Andersen, Anna Candido, Li Cornfeld, Paul Fontaine, Amy 
Hasinoff, Jess Holmes, Rafico Ruiz, and Abi Shapiro among my friends. 
From Somerville– Cambridge, Devin Kennedy, Gili Vidan, and Marc Aidi-
noff have become crucial correspondents about, basically, everything.
A special appreciation is owed to the people who read parts of this 
work charitably and discovered facets that were hidden to its author. Thank 
you to Nancy Baym, Biella Coleman, T. L. Cowan, Tarleton Gillespie, Anna 
x  Acknowledgments
Lauren Hoffmann, Tom LaMarre, Cait McKinney, Sharif Mowlabocus, 
Andrew Piper, and Fred Turner. Thank you, as well, to Robin Lynch for the 
research correspondence.
At Microsoft Research, Nancy Baym, Tarleton Gillespie, and Mary 
Gray have created their own unique place for inquiry and intellectual cross- 
pollination. For two years, I had the ridiculous privilege of thinking through 
this project, and many other things, with them, Dan Greene, and our resi-
dents and visitors. There, and elsewhere, I am grateful for conversations with 
Meryl Alper, Mike Ananny, Dalida María Benfield, Rena Bivens, Jack Bratich, 
André Brock, Robyn Caplan, Nick Couldry, Kate Crawford, Stephanie Dick, 
Kevin Driscoll, Stefanie Duguay, Michaelanne Dye, Nathan Ensmenger, 
Megan Finn, Ysabel Gerrard, Jack Gieseking, Sarah T. Hamid, Caroline Jack, 
Steve Jackson, Elena Maris, Shannon McGregor, Mara Mills, Sue Murray, 
Lisa Parks, Genevieve Patterson, Chris Persaud, Jill Walker Rettberg, Craig 
Robertson, Nick Seaver, Hannah Spaulding, Lana Swartz, T. L. Taylor, Bill 
Thies, Nanna Bonde Thylstrup, Penny Trieu, Anjalie Vats, Kelly Wagman, 
Meredith Whitaker, Ben Woo, and Ming Yin.
The students at the London School of Economics (LSE) have inspired 
many new ideas, and I can’t wait to work on the next project with you. And 
I am fortunate to be surrounded by inspiring and warm colleagues in Lon-
don. I am grateful to Sarah Banet- Weiser, for making my landing easier and 
helping me find the space to finish this work. My colleagues set an excep-
tionally high bar for their work, but, more important, they have provided 
friendship at a time when it was sorely needed. My gratitude goes espe-
cially to Nick Anstead, Omar Al- Ghazzi, Cath Bennett, Bart Cammaerts, 
Julia Corwin, James Deeley, Simidele Dosekun, Lee Edwards, Seeta Peña 
Gangadharan, Nicole Garnier, Ellen Helsper, Sonia Livingstone, Bingchun 
Meng, Jean- Christophe Plantin, and Alison Powell for helping me make 
London home.
Audiences at the University of Toronto, University of Indiana, Univer-
sity of Colorado, Denver, Harvard, Northwestern, and the Copenhagen 
Business School asked hard questions and helped me refine this project 
over the years. Thank you to the University of Maryland and Matthew 
Kirschenbaum for hosting me during my research in DC.
xi  Acknowledgments
There is no scholarly work without the people who work to maintain the 
traces of history in archives, libraries, and institutions. I need to thank the 
staff who let me in their doors and were always patient with my admittedly 
strange requests. Equally, I am thankful for the support staffs at McGill, 
Microsoft Research, and the LSE for their knowledge, expertise, and con-
sideration. This work was also aided by the financial support of the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Media@McGill, and 
the Wolfe Chair in Scientific and Technological Literacy. This project was 
also completed because of the life- altering labor of the people at Bigelow 
Cooperative Daycare, Osprey Daycare, LSE Nursery, and Heathbrook Pri-
mary, as well as Yulia Salnikova, Trista Charron, and Taylor Doyle.
At the MIT Press, I have had the pleasure of working with Katie Helke 
and Justin Kehoe, who brought this project into the press and urged it 
over the finish line. My gratitude goes to them, to the three very gener-
ous and persuasive anonymous reviewers, and to Geof Bowker and Paul 
Edwards. Final manuscript assistance came from Meichen Waxer, indexing 
from Jason Begy, and photography and cardboard skills from Lewis Bush.
My parents, Tania and Robert, made it possible for me to be a student 
for several decades— I am grateful for their love and care. Thank you to 
Jesse and Stephanie, and the cousins, for your love from afar; and to Susan 
Christensen for all of your love and support. The friendship of Lee, Karl, 
and Dominique makes me homesick— and of Tali and Brian, homesick for 
that other place. Thank you to Tarleton for all the rides and everything else. 
Thank you, Sharif, for friendship and much more. Thank you R. R., for all 
the art, both in this book and everywhere else.
Cait McKinney is a great friend, teammate, and intellect and is some-
how one of my oldest friends and my closest collaborator. Every bit of this 
project was refracted through our conversations. Thanks, C.
Alice and Ida, thank you for making these lives together.

What, then, is contained in the as if ?
— Hans Vaihinger1
YODAVILLE
There is a small town in the desert of Arizona’s southwestern edge, thirty- five 
miles southeast of Yuma and fewer than six miles from the US- Mexico bor-
der. The buildings in the town, mostly one story, are distributed through-
out small neighborhoods and laid out across eight axes. There is one road 
in and out of town. The town’s official name is Urban Target Complex 
(R- 2301- West), but everyone knows the place by its nickname, “Yodaville,” 
a name given to honor Floyd “Yoda” Usry, a now- retired colonel from the 
US Marine Corps. No one lives in Yodaville because Yodaville was never 
meant to be lived in. Instead, it is a fabricated test city, a bombing range 
constructed in the late 1990s to train Marine Corps pilots in attacking cit-
ies and supporting ground troops at war in urban settings. The houses and 
buildings of this test city are made of shipping containers and empty bomb 
canisters. The inhabitants are stick figures made of metal.2
In the early 1990s, during the intervention of the United Nations 
(UN) in the Somali Civil War, the US military undertook an operation 
in the capital city of Mogadishu. The operation ended with hundreds of 
Somali casualties and nineteen deaths among American special forces. 
Memorialized in 1999 by journalist Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down: A 
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Story of Modern War and a 2001 Hollywood film based on that book, the 
battle of Mogadishu is widely regarded as a failure of the US military to 
prepare for a new kind of urban warfare.3 Yodaville was built by the mili-
tary to respond to the failures of Mogadishu.
In a RAND report on urban warfare from 2006, the authors begin 
with the American deaths in Mogadishu.4 They draw a direct connection 
between the battle and the construction of Yodaville:
The desperate October 1993 fighting on the streets of Mogadishu triggered 
U.S. Army development of a new type of urban training facility, one designed 
to be less like the pristine villages of northwest Europe and more akin to the cha-
otic environments found in densely populated areas of the developing world. The 
Marine Corps built “Yodaville,” an innovative training site in Arizona that 
vividly replicates the difficulties of engaging urban targets from aircraft.5
The American deaths in Mogadishu (the Somali deaths go unmentioned) 
were partly attributable to their military training, and as the RAND report 
argues, this was a symptom of institutional failures of imagination in the 
design of training simulations. The implication is that these were not poor 
fighters; instead, they were people trained on untimely representations of 
faraway threats designed for a bygone era. The soldiers could not picture 
their new battleground because their references were askew. Having based 
their simulated fighting on the “pristine” architecture of northwest Europe, 
the US military was unprepared for the landscapes (to use RAND’s termi-
nology) of a “chaotic” and developing world. The remedy came in the form 
of a new training site that was meant to be more akin to the sites of conflict 
in the changing landscape of the American empire.6
By adjusting the environment of their training site to a not- yet- named- 
but- immanently- chaotic elsewhere, the military hoped that their new sim-
ulations would be commensurate with the likely arenas of future conflict 
and the embodied experience of targeting, attacking, and escaping those 
places. The look, shape, and feel of European villages were inscribed in the 
institutional memory of the military’s training protocols, so a disaster like 
the battle of Mogadishu forced a rupture with the past; what followed was 
a new set of inscriptions.7 The battle of Mogadishu left traces that were 
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archived in the building of  Yodaville (figure 1.1), which acts as both a memo-
rial to past failures and a fortification against future ones.
In the attempt to recalibrate US imperialism after a moment of break-
down, the US Marine Corps built a fake town to replicate the imagined 
shape, texture, and feel of an emergent enemy territory. Once built, Yoda-
ville quickly became a proxy city for simulating a new kind of warfare. It 
was a territory for practicing the enforcement of an empire and the chang-
ing character of that empire’s boundaries. As a proxy, Yodaville could rep-
resent and materialize this new enemy territory through a basic logic: by 
approximating emergent combat zones, the armed forces could act as if 
they were in combat. Soldiers could be trained and tested on surrogate tar-
gets that reflected their eventual ones, and a new standard of combat could 
be established, learned, and embodied.
Figure 1.1
An artist’s rendering of a frame from the video Marines Fire on Yodaville (2015), viewed on 
Military . com . Yodaville is seen here from behind the shoulder of a gunner aboard a US Marine 
Corps UH- 1Y Venom gunship. The buildings (shipping containers) radiate out from the center 
of Yodaville. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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PROXIES
Yodaville is a proxy for any number of places in the world. This simulated 
town was constructed to be a flexible stand- in for many potential places 
(emergent battlegrounds) while still being coherently a single place (Yoda-
ville) so that it could be used as a shared testing site for training and evalu-
ation. Placed pointedly on the border of the continental United States, 
Yodaville is the materialized stand- in for a limited and controllable enemy 
territory. It is part of a chain of US military encampments along the 
 US- Mexico border, it is situated within the occupied traditional territories of 
the Quechan and Cocopah, and it adjoins the Fort Yuma Indian Reserva-
tion.8 As such, Yodaville is used as a stand-in while simultaneously serving 
as an instrument for sustained foreign and domestic occupation. By serv-
ing this double function, it embodies a very specific fantasy: “to become 
without becoming,”9 meaning it can, momentarily, become a foreign war 
zone without risking any of its actual territorial occupations. This is the 
promise of proxies and the promise of creating controllable renditions of 
an unpredictable and unknowable world.
Proxies function as the necessary forms of make- believe and surrogacy 
that enable the production of knowledge. Such knowledge production 
relies on accessible representations of the world, and proxies are the people, 
artifacts, places, and moments invested with the authority to represent the 
world. To interrogate the use of proxies is to ask: to whom or to what do we 
delegate the power to represent the world? To answer that question, I trace the 
lives of long- lasting, entrenched, and thoroughly standardized delegates— 
proxies— and the cultural work that people undertake to act as stand- ins 
and keep these stand- ins viable. This includes the moments of genesis, when 
communities of practitioners ask themselves what they would use as a del-
egate for the world, and the moments, later in the lives of these proxies, 
when the use of alternative delegates seems unimaginable. This is the path-
way by which a proxy becomes common sense. People work with proxies to 
produce knowledge, maintain measurement systems, evaluate performance, 
and engage in a series of practices that are made possible only by investing 
certain materials with the power to represent an unpredictable world.10
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As a component of the internetwork of knowledge infrastructures, 
proxification is a culturally conditioned practice of consistently using some 
things to stand in for the world.11 Proxies are intermediaries— they mediate 
between the practicality of getting work done and the collective, aesthetic, 
and political work of capturing the world in an instant. As Yodaville attests, 
the choice and development of a proxy for the world often constitute an 
attempt to wrangle and control the unpredictable. Every proxy comes to 
exist in singular ways and represents one method that experts have used 
to evoke a world and, by evoking a world, bring it to be. But even where 
proxies have idiosyncratic origins, they share in their reliance on the cul-
tural work of standing in. Culture consists, following Marilyn Strathern, 
of the ways that people draw analogies between things, “in the way certain 
thoughts are used to think others.”12 This definition ought to orient us 
toward proxies as analogies, as the material for making connections (as 
the stuff for thinking), and the ways in which such materials both animate 
communities and reveal their exclusions. The cultural work of standing 
in, then, is the work of both analogizing and maintaining the relationship 
between that which is and that which works as if.
Almost like religious relics, proxies are saturated in meaning— and their 
further use only reinvigorates the idea that these things, these people, 
and these places are special: they are imbued with the power to stand in. Through 
the stories of three proxies that have historically evoked this enchantment— 
the International Prototype Kilogram (IPK), the “Lena” test image, and the 
standardized patient program— this book traces the ways that communities 
of scientific and technical professionals engage in the theatrical enactment of 
objectivity through the embodied use and upkeep of proxies. We will look at 
the guidelines for how much manual pressure to employ when scrubbing an 
official kilogram clean; the frantic moment when an electrical engineer tore a 
centerfold from a Playboy magazine to create a now- canonical test image for 
digital image processing; and the ways that medical actors (so- called standard-
ized patients) are trained to embody the typical symptoms of diseases in order 
to train physicians.
By beginning with strict bodily protocols for cleaning kilograms and 
ending with protocols for transforming human bodies to make them better 
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stand- ins, this book charts a path from the eighteenth century to the near- 
present. It begins with a moment in which a belief took hold that the natu-
ral sciences could expose so- called invariants of nature and use them as the 
basis of universal standards; it ends with the  twentieth- century belief that 
illness could be adequately codified such that it could be reproduced in a 
performer. These proxies are vital to the work of standardizing knowledge, 
and they themselves also become standardized, eventually entrenching as 
infrastructural and pregiven conditions for making sense of the world. But 
this work never happens in a vacuum: proxies shape and are shaped by 
the politics of representation and delegation. Test images have historically 
reproduced a racist and sexist visual culture that codes white femininity as 
a prototype; standardized patients rely on actors who wear disability as a 
masquerade; and these standards, in turn, shape the capacities that people 
have to build their own worlds.
Standardization is a process of forgetting. As Andrew Russell says, stan-
dardization is “a social process by which humans come to take things for 
granted.”13 Just as we could not imagine our world without its fundamental 
systems (including the metric system, digital image transmission, and the 
medical profession), it is impossible to imagine these systems without the 
use of their proxies. Where people share common references, to exchange 
knowledge and compare experiences of the world, they will produce and 
maintain proxies. But if the success of standardization is marked by for-
getting the work of documenting the process requires one to recover the 
memory of how we got here. This examination is built on the idea that any 
notion of the “circuit of culture” ought to include practices of standardiza-
tion, in addition to the conventional nodes of identity, production, rep-
resentation, regulation, and consumption.14 Standardization shows how 
ideas are formalized, but it also takes place in a cultural context in which 
those involved are themselves consumers whose identity positions bear on 
their work.
> > >
What is required to take a proxy for granted? Think of Yodaville: for it to 
stand in for the many potential battlefields of the US military, one must 
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take for granted that the United States occupies the territory known as 
Arizona; that it can do with it what it pleases (including using it as a stag-
ing ground of simulated warfare); that the deserts of Arizona are similar 
enough to the deserts of other places to provide sufficient comparison; and 
that one soldier’s performance in that desert is comparable to another’s. 
These are the suspensions of disbelief that can transform some shipping 
containers outside Yuma into a durable stand- in for a world of potential 
battlegrounds.
We can recognize proxies all around us. When we invest something 
with the power to represent something else, we are engaged in the logics 
of surrogacy and vicarity, however minor. Cut out a template for a sewing 
project and you’ve made a ready- to- hand proxy; adjust your television or 
computer monitor using color bars and you’ve used a built- in proxy for 
the broadly expected formal qualities of digital screens. We have other, 
familiar proxies too: the proxy vote of a shareholder, a power of attorney 
document, and the proxy logic of representative democracy; these are all 
standardized and complex apparatuses for designating other human beings 
as our proxies in key moments of decision- making. These people, docu-
ments, and things are trusted delegates that social convention allows to 
serve as surrogates.
Delegation is a vital part of how institutions survive and constitutes 
one of the most basic relationships between people and technology.15 For 
Bruno Latour, for instance, people delegate labor to nonhumans to script 
desired results: concrete speed bumps are delegated a function of police 
officers when they are enlisted with the goal of slowing down traffic.16 But 
a speed bump is never only a speed bump, and neither is it only a lump of 
concrete made to condition behavior.17 Delegation is a primary means of dis-
placing social relations, and the delegate is, inescapably, an artifact of those 
relations.18 Only some people possess the power to delegate core functions 
of the state to things, and marginalized and minoritized populations are 
more likely to be the targets of control: whether it’s the vision of the state 
delegated to a security camera or a person’s prospects for employment del-
egated to a credit score. Delegation is a political means of distributing the 
possibilities of living a flourishing and secure life.19
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Delegation is a fragile process, entirely dependent on a network of 
trust between the delegator and the delegate (will you be a faithful repre-
sentative?), as well as those with an interest in the power of a proxy to stand 
in for its counterpart. Through the histories of proxies, I show how people, 
places, and things come to be taken for granted, what happened when they 
were challenged, and how their trustworthiness as delegates was once again 
rebuilt. By building a catalog of proxies that centers on human bodies and 
human labor, I make the following arguments:
• Proxies are bodily: this is visible in the work of measurement and train-
ing that relies on finely tuned embodied and relational practices.
• Proxies are both sticky and permeable: though proxies are built as labor- 
saving devices to stand in for worldly phenomena, they inevitably 
carry and leave traces of their cultural milieus and the places where 
they’ve traveled.
• Proxies rely on suspended disbelief : the scientific and technical exper-
tise underlying them is formed and repeated through scenes of perfor-
mance, where participants must act as if a stand- in were the real thing 
for the purposes of getting work done.
THE MATERIAL LIFE OF STAND- INS
“All sciences must deal with the problem of selecting and constituting 
‘working objects,’” write Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison.20 And prox-
ies are no different. As simplified representations meant to be pregiven, 
ready at hand, easily called into action, and unquestioned, proxies are sub-
ject to many of the rules of working objects. The history of science and 
technology is strewn with studies of working objects, from the use of the 
fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster in genetics research, to the use of mice in 
biomedical research, to the use of chess in artificial intelligence testing, to 
the use of human surrogates in automobile crash testing.21 All these exam-
ples are meant, ultimately, as practical solutions to the problem of need-
ing usable models of a “too plentiful and too various” world.22 As Steven 
Shapin writes, “All testimony about states of affairs stands in a metonymic 
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relationship to those states of affairs, and the condition of your knowing 
about these things— otherwise unavailable to you— is your accepting the 
legitimacy of that relationship.”23 A geneticist probably doesn’t have any 
natural affinity for fruit flies but may have an affinity for the community 
they share with people who work with fruit flies, as well as an investment 
in the idea that fruit flies can stand in for (some) other living organisms: 
“the local and the specific are not the point of these experiments . . .  but in 
order for specific findings to be about the atmosphere or about the universe 
the credibility of these standing- for relationships have to be accepted.”24 
In other words, the legitimacy of an experiment, a model organism, or a 
statement about how the world works hinges on both a metonymic rela-
tionship (i.e., something stands in for something else) and the credibility 
of the stand- ins (i.e., someone believes it) to act for other phenomena that 
are not or could not be made present.
And yet: the local and the specific do matter, and no part of this arrange-
ment is simple. The bonds of cultural, social, and professional norms are 
pulled taut every time an equivalence is made. We can examine these bonds 
over time and between spaces to investigate the tension between the thing 
standing in and the thing being stood for, or the person making the con-
nection and the person being asked to believe it. Proxies are the product of 
creative decisions to design and maintain trusted delegates of a too- plentiful 
and various world, and a focus on the cultural labor of standing in shifts the 
analytic emphasis from the singular choice of a potential metonym (e.g., a 
fly is like other living organisms) to the training and the ongoing work that 
maintain proxies as credible and, ultimately, indispensable.
Proxies are instrumental to developing “group- licensed ways of see-
ing,”25 and they are crucial to the ways we learn how to participate in our 
communities by training ourselves through common references, by com-
ing to see problems as akin, and by taking for granted that others in our 
community share those references and those ways of seeing. Broadly, this 
process has many artifacts– – tacit knowledge, canons, hidden curricula, 
inside jokes26– – only some of which take the material form of common 
instruments for knowledge production. When Thomas Kuhn revised The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he added a new focus on “exemplars” to 
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show how membership in a scientific community could not be explained 
merely through a shared set of rules. He used these exemplars to respecify 
what he meant by a scientific paradigm: “Shared examples of successful 
practice could . . .  provide what the group lacked in rules. Those examples 
were its paradigms, and as such essential to its continued research.”27
In a related fashion, Michelle Murphy calls particular representations 
of quantification like graphs of gross domestic product (GDP) phantasma-
grams, speaking to the power of such instruments to far surpass their mere 
utility. The phantasmagraphic power of some quantitative practices means 
that they are “enriched with affect, propagate imaginaries, lure feeling, 
and hence have supernatural effects in surplus of their rational precepts.”28 
Exemplars, working objects, and phantasmagrams, though each is distinct, 
are kindred ways of understanding how surrogate logics shape and bind dis-
ciplinary communities: they work through articulation, by drawing connec-
tions between things, through routine and practice, and through the shared 
bonds that communities form with particular problems and examples. But 
these concepts risk placing too much emphasis on the “objects” of labora-
tories and classrooms and not enough emphasis on the labor and affective 
commitments that proxies inspire. They also risk displacing the ways that 
human bodies must carry the traces of this work, either through the repeti-
tive use of a narrow set of exemplars or the psychological and physical toll 
that the work might take. For instance, test images (discussed in chapters 
3 and 4) are often singled out for their representational injustices on gen-
dered and racialized grounds. But as compulsory instruments used in sci-
entific, industrial, and classroom settings, their users often have little power 
to refuse their use or to question their credibility as stand- ins.
The “objectness” of working objects also appears especially brittle 
when we consider how many shared proxies are alive. Not just flies, rats, 
and mice, but living humans who work as test subjects, model patients, or 
make up case studies. Take the standardized patient program (discussed in 
chapter 5), in which laypersons are taught to embody the normal symp-
toms of diseases that they don’t have in order to train and test physicians 
in diagnostic techniques. As proxies, these individuals must suppress their 
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own idiosyncrasies (including any actual maladies they might carry) to 
elevate their common status as humans with the capacity for sickness. Not 
only would it be dehumanizing to describe standardized patients as “work-
ing objects,” it would fail to account for the ways that choosing and main-
taining shared proxies entail much more than agreeing on an adequately 
typical exemplar. It would miss the sinuous work that analogies perform 
and it would erase the human labor involved in working as a stand- in. 
Or take a more conventional example from the world of science: chapter 
2 deals at length with the protocols for cleaning and washing the IPK by 
hand. For more than a century, the IPK stood in for the concept of mass 
across the globe. In many ways, the IPK and other standard kilograms 
are classic working objects: platinum- iridium facsimiles of a cubic deci-
meter of water, they are made to be both inordinately precise and readily 
accessible. Yet, to be credible stand- ins, they require highly choreographed, 
manual cleaning with an ether- ethanol solution and a chamois cloth. This 
cleaning is so fundamental to the viability of the IPK as a standard that it 
was added to the official definition of mass within the metric system.
What distinguishes the histories of proxies in this book from histories of 
working objects, then, is the focus on embodied labor and performance as 
indispensable to the maintenance of knowledge infrastructures.29 The clean-
ing of the IPK was not supplemental to the meaning of mass within the met-
ric system; it is fundamental to what made it a viable standard. A larger set 
of affective and cultural practices binds people to their proxies as compulsory 
tools, binds communities to their shared representations, and tasks other peo-
ple with the labor of making, using, and maintaining those representations.
As proxies travel to new sites and persist as “interscalar vehicles,” the 
arbitrariness of their relationship to the world out there can appear in stark 
relief.30 Seen in the wrong light by an ungenerous audience, what once 
seemed like a credible stand- in for the world starts to look threadbare, 
anachronistic, idiosyncratic, or outright unjust. There is no natural corre-
spondence between shipping containers in southwestern Arizona and any 
potential target of the US military. It is people who must constantly reas-
sert that correspondence, agree to it, and keep it coherent. It is also people 
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who must embody that correspondence, either as the workers tasked with 
making and maintaining standards and infrastructures or as people who 
must make do within conditions not of their own choosing.31 I therefore 
follow an approach to infrastructural labor that is attuned to the ways that 
infrastructure is manifested in human practices. The knowledge labor that 
I trace is material and affective work, constituted in practices that, as Cait 
McKinney puts it, “assemble people, information, and technologies toward 
social goals.”32 And to follow Jacqueline Wernimont, this is an attempt 
to rematerialize test data, “to make it into something that one can touch, 
feel, own, give, share, and spend time with.”33 This is all to say that my 
approach is interested in the materialization of ideas in things and assumes 
that things are ineluctably made up of relationships.
A WORLD OF PROXIES
I live in England, but there are times that I might need to watch Canadian 
television. A virtual private network (VPN) can make my computer appear 
as if it was in Canada when contacting Canadian servers— it does this by 
masking my Internet Protocol (IP) address through something called a “proxy 
server.” Because IP addresses are often a trusted stand- in for location, I can 
exploit a network of makeshift signifiers to bypass geofenced content (hypo-
thetically). When Ari Luotonen and Kevin Altis published their foundational 
1994 paper on web proxies, they introduced the technology through the labor- 
saving potential of proxies: “A proxy allows client writers to forget about the tens 
of thousands of lines of networking code necessary to support every protocol 
and concentrate on more important client issues.”34 This is the sense in which 
proxies can act as standardized infrastructure: they allow us to forget. There are 
other ways of establishing a computer user’s location, but proxies can act as 
sufficient delegates when needed. Representative democracy is in some ways 
just such a labor- saving device. It’s a technique meant to save the population 
of eligible voters from having to cast votes directly for each new policy of the 
government. In each case, it is trust that allows people to use proxies as suf-
ficient delegates, and trust that binds people to proxies as faithful stand- ins.35
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The work that proxies do to make systems function is invisible and 
easily forgotten by design. There is now a prevailing understanding of what 
is meant by “infrastructure” that is echoed here, where infrastructure is 
an expansive category that includes the taken- for- granted conditions and 
resources that allow the day- to- day operations of the world to take place— 
including not only the pipes, roads, and cables that act as conduits for 
information and goods, but the people, paperwork, standards, and proto-
cols that give it all sense and shape.36 Running a VPN and electing some-
one to represent your geographical district have very different stakes, and 
the consequences of “forgetting” about these proxies are also unequal. The 
project then becomes a matter of remembering and further documenting 
the consequences of delegating to proxies the power to represent the world. 
We are surrounded by proxies, but some proxies matter more than others.
Consider the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and its market basket of 
goods, which acts as a stand- in for consumption habits and their costs. The 
market basket of goods contains a selection of everyday commodities used 
to measure and communicate the economic changes that people feel the 
most, such as inflation. The CPI basket is an inordinately powerful proxy 
that establishes, among other things, a benchmark for wages and social 
program funding. It does this by measuring the current and changing costs 
of everything from food, housing, and medical care to clothing, cars, and 
education. Determining the composition of the market basket is a precise 
and arduous task, full of conflict and disagreement.
While fighting inflation in the early twentieth century, statisticians pro-
duced relative price indices for a “subset of goods purchased by working- 
class families” and then calculated the difference between the ratios of 
expenditure.37 Although they agreed that the market basket of goods could 
act as a proxy for consumption habits (and “working class”– ness could act 
as a stand- in for the health of the nation), they disagreed on what goods 
should be included in the basket and what year should act as the baseline.38 
While proxification wasn’t in question, the specific character of the proxy 
was. In the ongoing maintenance of the CPI basket, economists and stat-
isticians must decide which products to track and how to measure their 
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costs based on a range of factors, including the place they were purchased 
and the time of year. They also debate how and when to replace items in 
the basket in order to reflect the cost of living most accurately. Here’s a real 
question: how can one account for changes in cars every year when changes 
to the quality of manufacturing are difficult to separate from the clutter of 
marketing?39
When the CPI came under criticism in the 1990s, some economists 
argued that the difficulty of calculating it was related to the increased com-
plexity of modern life: “a larger fraction of what is produced and con-
sumed in an economy is harder to measure than decades ago when a larger 
fraction of economic activity consisted of a smaller number of easier to 
measure items such as hammers and potatoes.” 40 This is a claim about the 
changing quality of American consumerism, but it’s also a claim about 
the limits of proxification; as we graduate from hammers and potatoes to 
three- dimensional printers and a wide array of complex carbs, we can also 
see the ways that standardized proxies meet their capacities to be faithful 
delegates. There are few proxies with either the scope or the influence of the 
CPI’s market basket, but without frameworks for interrogating proxies, we 
have very few tools at our disposal to question this vital instrument from 
our vantage point outside the field of economics.
The legal system is also full of proxies. From law school forward, law-
yers are trained through moot courts to imagine and simulate the course of 
argumentation, and mock juries are regularly used to anticipate and predict 
the results of trials. Perhaps the most common legal proxy is the use of the 
“reasonable person” standard— what Mayo Moran calls “the common law’s 
most enduring fiction.” 41 The reasonable person has a number of siblings, 
including the “man of business,” the “officious bystander,” “the reasonable 
juror properly directed,” and the “fair- minded and informed observer,” 
all of whom form a “select group of personalities who inhabit our legal 
village.” 42 The reasonable person is a projection of a proxy: an imagined, 
rational member of the community who interacts with the world in ways 
that judges and juries imagine that a reasonable, rational person ought 
to. In English courts of the late Victorian era, the reasonable person was 
referred to as “the man on the Clapham Omnibus”— a name that is still 
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a synonym for the reasonable person.43 Because Clapham was a suburb of 
London and a likely site of imagined English averageness in the late nine-
teenth century, the analogy was concretized by situating the reasonable 
person (a fiction) in a definite “typical” place. As Moran writes, the “unique 
blend of subjective and objective qualities forms the conceptual foundation 
for the reasonable person and is the source of his utility.” 44
We find the reasonable person everywhere, including regulations regard-
ing workplace harassment (part of the subject of chapters 3 and 4). The US 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s guidelines on workplace 
harassment state that for harassment to be unlawful, the “conduct must 
create a work environment that would be intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
to reasonable people.” 45 It is no surprise, then, that in cases of persistent 
abuse, the debate often shifts from a consideration of the behavior of the 
accused to a consideration of the accuser’s reasonableness. These are the 
political stakes of proxies, as they establish the standard by which a chaotic 
world will be adjudicated and harm might be recognized.
Yodaville may be a fabricated city in the Arizona desert, but real cit-
ies are frequently transformed into proxies for “average,” “ideal,” or “typi-
cal” samples of a larger population. Robert and Helen Lynd used Muncie, 
Indiana, as the basis of their “Middletown studies,” published in 1929 and 
1937, which were meant to provide a sociological portrait of life in the 
United States in the early twentieth century.46 As Sarah Igo describes, the 
choice of Muncie for the Middletown studies was actually itself quite pecu-
liar because the city had a disproportionately small population of African 
Americans and nonwhite ethnic minorities.47 The Lynds further compro-
mised the accuracy of Muncie as a trustworthy proxy by limiting their 
informants to the American- born, white residents of the city, claiming that 
this choice was a useful means of simplification.48
This decision to crop out an already misrepresented minority from 
their portrait of American life had long- lasting consequences. While the 
Lynds may have selected Muncie for its perceived middleness, this imag-
ined feature was quickly transformed— through the press and in the recep-
tion of their research— into a new kind of cultural ideal.49 There is often an 
ideological slippage between the “average,” the “normal,” and the “ideal,” 
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and in the reception of the Middletown studies, the disproportionate number 
of white, American- born residents in Muncie was treated as a feature instead 
of a bug. Instead of acknowledging this quirk as an aspect of Muncie that 
compromised its accuracy as a stand- in for something like “middle America,” 
it was this whiteness that was said to make Muncie special— closer to an 
American ideal. This is a form of norm- swapping, where a slippage occurs 
when a person, place, or thing is connected to a calculated averageness, but 
which comes to be treated as a prototype, ideal, or expected norm. This swap 
happens frequently in the history of proxies, especially in cases where their 
prolonged use lends a kind of enchantment to a proxy.
Middletown is not alone, either. For media and communications 
scholars, we must contend with the fact that Paul Lazarsfeld and his col-
laborators also appealed to the “averageness” of certain Midwest US cities 
as a warrant for their ability to stand in for other places. Buried deep in the 
appendix of 1955’s Personal Influence, which Lazarsfeld cowrote with Elihu 
Katz, is the justification of the choice of Decatur, Illinois, over seventeen 
other possible candidates for their investigation of opinion leaders. Lazars-
feld and Katz say that the “Middle West” of America was preferred because 
“that part of the country is least characterized by sectional peculiarities.”50 
That is the only time that the phrase “sectional peculiarities” appears in 
Personal Influence. And I wonder about this phrase. Is the obvious inference 
that a place with fewer sectional peculiarities is more homogenous— and 
therefore easier to find and to sample stand- ins for the larger popula-
tion? What are the benefits of homogeneity? And what happens when the 
conclusions drawn from such a place are generalized to somewhere more 
peculiar or more sectional ? After narrowing their choices to Decatur, Terre 
Haute (Indiana), and Springfield (Ohio), they write a single declarative 
phrase, “We chose Decatur,”51 with no further explanation.
What are the consequences of this decision, how might it have been 
different, and how has the field been shaped by these and similar choices of 
proxies? Inevitably, the choice of Decatur and the choice of Muncie leave 
traces, just as the choice to include or exclude particular demographics from 
those places had unaccountable effects. The use of a proxy always requires 
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that some likeness to the world is elevated and other features suppressed. 
Decisions about experimental settings, as well as proxies, are never episte-
mologically neutral— but each will be specific in its nonneutral peculiarity.52 
The task, then, is to investigate the history of proxies to recuperate the deci-
sion to choose particular places, people, and things, and to understand— at 
the very least— how they came to act as delegates for a larger world.
> > >
The cultural practices I’ve described so far include the selection of things 
(e.g., baskets of goods), people (e.g., imagined rational members of the 
community, pretend jury members), and places (e.g., midsize American 
cities) that stand in for apparently “typical” or “average,” and sometimes 
“ideal,” representations of the world. This world of objects, people, and 
practices is not meant to point toward a global theory of proxies. Instead, 
it is meant to argue for local, uneven, and nonlinear understandings of 
the power of proxies. I advocate for an investigation of the local and pecu-
liar conditions that shape a proxy, lend it credibility, and enable it to last. 
All the preceding proxies are entrenched and widely discussed examples of 
stand- ins that institutions, disciplines, and occupations have developed to 
make work possible. They are, in this way, infrastructural analogies at the 
core of complex knowledge systems;53 each came about through a deliber-
ate process of development; and each has undergone revision and repair, as 
both insiders and outsiders have challenged the suitability of these artifacts 
to act as stand- ins for a fluid and vernacular world.54
These proxies are “fixed points.”55 The metric system, for instance, 
is originally based on measurements taken at the end of the eighteenth 
century by French scientists trying to estimate the Earth’s circumference 
using a meridian running from Dunkirk to Barcelona through Paris. Why? 
Because previous fixed points used in setting systems of weights and mea-
sures had been based on features like the arm length of a sovereign, so they 
were open to redefinition at a whim. Standard lengths and weights had a 
tendency to vary by jurisdiction, discrepancies between which were ripe 
for exploitation by a local and powerful elite who could impose their own 
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conversions. Thus, at the height of the Enlightenment, it was thought that 
the metric system could fix all of this by introducing a new, universal sys-
tem based on a value unlikely to change: the size of the planet.
The original meter was a stand- in for a fraction of the Earth’s meridian, 
but subsequent meters were all based on the length of the original, proto-
type meter, the metric system’s initial fixed point. Standardized systems con-
tain these nested references: a fraction of the Earth (an “invariant of nature”) 
becomes the standard meter (an invariant made of metal), which becomes 
the meter stick in a classroom (a local, invariant reference). As a result, the 
proxies that enable standardization embody a conventional materialism as 
they are artifacts that are chosen, used, and shared by agreement, not out of 
natural necessity. As Martha Lampland and Susan Leigh Star write, “A great 
deal of work is conducted to make the standard possible, and then this must 
be followed up by agents committed to implementation and oversight.”56 The 
ongoing work to maintain fixed points continually shores up the material 
basis of proxies so that their legitimacy isn’t called into question— and with 
it the legitimacy of a standard. In the case of well-entrenched fixed points, a 
whole world builds up around these benchmarks as references for future users.
By using benchmarks here, I want to draw on the term’s origins in the 
nineteenth century as a noun instead of a verb. “Bench marks: in surveying, 
fixed points left on a line of survey for reference at a future time, consist-
ing of cuts in trees, pegs driven into the ground, etc.”57 This definition 
(which predates its contemporary usage as a measure of computer proces-
sor speed) is especially apt because it captures the makeshift materiality of 
benchmarking as a process of shared representation: cuts, pegs, and lines 
drawn in stone are all physical traces left with the faith that such marks are 
useful and another surveyor will need them one day. They are highlights 
of everyday surfaces that become legible as representations for those who 
share a model of framing the world. These marks act like citations, leaving 
a trail of references that show where a shared reference point has traveled, 
who has used it, and why. They are the communal instruments that create 
shared understandings across space and time.
Through use, shared representations become something that can be 
taken for granted. Like the shorthand and inside jokes that mark you as 
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close to your family, friends, or colleagues, proxies— as benchmarks— must 
be maintained to forge the bonds of community. Like those inside jokes, 
there is an affective dimension to the cultural work of proxies: we recog-
nize others through their recognition of our shared references. To question 
those references would not only threaten the coherence of the knowledge 
that we’ve produced using a set of proxies, it also would threaten the coher-
ence of our community.
Again, to whom or to what do we delegate the power to represent the 
world? The implication of the question is that proxies are entwined in a 
politics of representation.58 These politics are often obscured by the neces-
sity and ordinariness of using stand- ins. There is an obligation to choose 
something, anything, as a fixed point, so long as it is used consistently. The 
idea that proxies are chosen with discretion but maintained out of neces-
sity is a kind of “arbitrary precision” (they are arbitrary, and then precise). 
Such choices are absolutely necessary for producing scientific and technical 
knowledge, and the history of proxies shows how fissures in the authority 
of proxies are shored up through community bonds, repeated use, and the 
affective ties that keep people and their tools working in concert.
To take proxies for granted as benchmarks that are ready at hand, they 
must become ordinary. “The world must be regained every day, in repeti-
tion, regained as gone.”59 In this sense, ordinariness is an aspiration to feel 
some control over one’s surroundings— to see some piece of the world as 
preordained. Proxies operate at the hinge of ordinariness in imagining and 
building the world as a controllable space, and the locations of their use 
become potential sites of struggle and refusal to accept that ordinariness. 
Rethinking our common proxies, as the basic reference points of knowledge 
infrastructures, can be a way of intervening in and reinventing the represen-
tational practices that shape standardized systems.60 The politics of proxies 
demand that we understand as much as possible about their representa-
tional relationships, about the dynamic movement from the world out there 
to the world in here: How does something come to stand in for something 
else? Who gets to choose a proxy? Who gets to use it? And what it is used 
for? The politics of proxy representation also mean that we have to account 
for how proxies are maintained and who carries out that maintenance.61
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The dichotomous thinking that insists on a boundary between out there 
(the unpredictable world) and in here (the controlled space of knowledge 
production) is an always permeable fiction. Proxies are useful because they 
can travel across this boundary and mediate between these imaginaries.62 
As witnesses for the world out there, proxies are paradigmatic media, acting 
as the “means by which experience is supplied to others who lack the origi-
nal.” 63 The division between interiority and exteriority isn’t natural— it is 
arbitrary, political, and circumstantial; it’s a division that is performed and 
reperformed through daily practices and institutionalized protocols. But 
the artifice doesn’t lessen its power or its hold. As the fulcrum of the two 
imaginaries of in here and out there, proxies can vouch for the world of phe-
nomena while being stable enough to also vouch for the predictable, repeat-
able practices of knowledge production.
REALITY PRACTICES
Return to Arizona: when Yodaville first opened in 1999, its usefulness 
was connected to its plasticity. In the San Diego Union- Tribune, a journal-
ist wrote of the town’s capacity to stand in for any number of potential 
battlegrounds: “For the Marine Corps, Yodaville is Mogadishu, Somalia; 
Port- au- Prince, Haiti; or Pristina, Kosovo. Just name a city in one of the 
world’s trouble spots, and Yodaville can be it.” 64 This notion, that one small 
test city in the Arizona desert could represent any city that the American 
military might need to fight in, reflects a common, if paradoxical, ideal 
often attached to the use of proxies: that they can be both universal and 
particular. It’s also an invitation (“Just name a city”) to imagine a limit-
less horizon for the pursuits of the American military. The development 
of Yodaville was driven by the fact that not all cities are the same (not all 
cities look American or Western European), but Yodaville was also built 
with the belief that it is possible to create a model that is sufficiently similar 
to enough places in the world that it could be called upon to stand in as 
required. Proxies exist because of this exact tension between the universal 
and the particular, by the need to trust models based on real things, from 
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which generalizable knowledge can be created. The proxy city will be just 
plastic enough and will have features that make it like many places, but also 
enough specific qualities that make it usable for a specific kind of testing, 
training, and standardization.65 In this case, Yodaville is not Anytown in the 
USA, or AnyVillage in Northwestern Europe, but crucially, it could be AnyCity 
in the Developing World’s Trouble Spots.
By 2006, there was less ambiguity about where the United States 
would be at war and less uncertainty about the cities that Marine Corps 
pilots would be targeting. The US armed forces had been at war in Afghan-
istan for five years and Iraq for three, with several other engagements and 
invasions on the horizon. In the Yuma Proving Ground, adjacent to Yoda-
ville, the military built new proxy encampments called Little Baghdad, 
K9 Village, and Bedouin Village— places built for the purpose of practic-
ing moving through desert towns, looking for targets, accompanying dogs, 
and detecting improvised explosive devices.66 These simulation towns, like 
Yodaville itself, are not simple models. They are experiential engines for a 
technology meant to entrain bodies in the look and feel of combat and mil-
itary occupation. All simulation is a form of practice and using simulated 
towns to train military personnel is a way of gauging preparedness and a 
way of encoding bodies with an analogic experience that prepares them for 
the actual event. The simulated towns of the Yuma Proving Ground are 
built to be immersive and to produce inscriptions— to get into the mus-
cles, the retina, the senses, and the memories of the soldiers trained there.67
If Yodaville was built to be a portable stand- in for any number of 
possible targets, its usefulness was now reimagined through the reality of 
American warfare in the twenty- first century. During an expansion of the 
Yuma Proving Ground in the early 2000s, Yodaville was updated to accom-
modate new training requirements. According to Colonel Ben Hancock, 
who commanded the Air Station at Yuma in this period, the early 2000s 
were the busiest time in the history of the base. The reason for this activity 
was directly wedded to qualitative similarities between the Arizona desert 
and the Iraq desert, as well as the experiential similarities of simulating war 
in the test cities of Yuma and the real cities of Iraq and Afghanistan. What 
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had been a latent feature of Yodaville— the fact that it was situated in a 
desert— became a focal point of its potential as a stand- in for ongoing 
wars. In the words of Hancock, “If a pilot can drop a bomb and hit a target 
in Yuma, he can drop a bomb and hit a target in Iraq. . . .  They got heat. We 
got heat. . . .  It is the ideal place to train.” 68
Yodaville is functioning as a workable sample of a process (warfare in a 
desert) that simultaneously frames, represents, and stands in for that process 
and can further be used to imagine the possibilities of transforming that 
process. Yodaville was a site for testing and evaluating Marine performance 
in a situation similar enough to the actual arenas of warfare, and Hancock 
enunciated how blunt that commensurability could be. It is rendered as a 
set of test data, a “final check on whether the expert’s conception of reality 
conforms to the physical world at hand.” 69 These material similarities join 
war in Iraq and simulation war in Yuma.70 Hancock’s justification speaks to 
the way Yodaville’s surrogacy for real cities was based on isolating particular 
characteristics (its heat, its layout, its familiarity) as useful analogs. When 
Yodaville stood for anywhere, its potential was immanent; when it stood 
for somewhere, its potential was realized in morbid terms.
While proxies may always have a tenuous relationship to the realities 
for which they stand in, they have a definite relationship to the reality 
practices of the people who make and use them. In one sense, it does not 
matter if Yodaville is actually like Iraq (at least, its likeness is secondary). 
What matters is that its users see it as similar and highlight certain of its 
features to create commonality. These reality practices link disparate places, 
things, or people in the production of standardized knowledge. The per-
ceived likeness of Yodaville to Iraqi villages and cities becomes a condition 
of possibility for the production of standardized soldiers.
Hancock’s optimism about the transferability of skills learned in and 
on Yodaville encapsulates the usefulness of test cities and highlights many 
of the most important aspects of proxies, including the work that they per-
form in producing institutional knowledge. But proxies also break down, 
and Yodaville is no different. Not only does it undergo constant bom-
bardment from inert matériel and require upkeep to maintain its tattered 
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structures, its relationship to its real- world referents needs constant shoring 
up. To make the fake city seem enough like a real city takes work— both 
the physical, reparative work of fixing structures and the ongoing, cultural 
work of enunciating an analogy: how this thing is like that thing. Over time, 
the representational failures of Yodaville have been thrown into relief: the 
scale is off, the buildings don’t produce realistic heat or electromagnetic 
readings, and “from the ground it looks like stacks of shot- up shipping 
containers; from the air, it looks convincingly urban.” These are issues of 
embodied perspective that demonstrate how the standpoint from which 
one encounters a proxy— whether it’s from the air, the ground, or through 
its rendering as light or radiation— changes its claim to being a veridical 
representation of the world (figure 1.2).71
The work that proxies must perform to act as sufficient surrogates of 
the outside world is especially complicated because they are both in and 
of the real world. Yodaville is a city and a set of shipping containers and 
a target and a military resource and a workplace and a classroom; it was 
also Mogadishu and Port- au- Prince, and later Mosul and Kandahar. Like 
an actor on stage, there is a suspension of disbelief that allows proxies to 
be both a bunch of stuff and usable surrogates. The suspension of disbe-
lief that enables participation and appreciation of theatrical texts allows 
us to understand the actor as simultaneously a human, a performer, and a 
character. In terms of performance theory, they are not the character while 
simultaneously being not not the character they play.72 Yodaville is not 
Mosul; but for the Marine Corps, it is vitally, empirically not not Mosul. 
Likewise, Yodaville is not just a bunch of shipping containers and empty 
bomb casings; but for the pilot who has to shoot at it, it is not not those 
things either. This is a productive contradiction and a necessary aspect of 
what makes proxies so useful to institutions trying to wrest the world into 
a system of usable samples.
Yodaville makes plain the logic of proxies and the process of making 
instruments that represent the world in usable ways. It operates at the nexus 
of a problem (i.e., American deaths in Mogadishu resulting from an appar-
ent lack of training using properly analogous cities) and a solution (i.e., 
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updating the military’s operative analogies to build more accurate proxies 
for training and evaluating pilots). Among the ways that the US military 
sought to remediate the damage to its reputation and self- perception as a 
result of the deaths of its soldiers in Somalia was a better standard, which 
materialized in the building of a test city and training programs surround-
ing that city. This is not a small thing. Yodaville is a conspicuous material-
ization of the US military’s imagined vision of the world in the twenty- first 
century, and more specifically a materialization of the ways that it has most 
recently honed that vision. The power to represent the world as a usable 
proxy can be an imperial power: the capacity to lay claim to a controllable 
version of a chaotic and unknown exterior within a managed interior. In 
the case of actual military imperialism, this process is put into relief; we can 
see how proxies lay claim to a representation of the world as both a substi-
tute and a preparation for laying claim to the actual world.
Figure 1.2
An artist’s rendering of Yodaville as seen from the ground following its renovation. The town, 
made of containers, is billowing smoke as a helicopter hovers above. The image portrays a day 
in September 2016 during an air support exercise. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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THE POLITICS OF “AS IF”
Proxies are the necessary and practical products of suspended disbelief. To 
see them this way is to see their usefulness as practical analogies. Institu-
tions need proxies that stand in for real phenomena as if they were the 
real thing. In the early twentieth century, the German philosopher Hans 
Vaihinger published The Philosophy of “As If,” 73 in which he referred to the 
most important of these kinds of analogies as “fictions.” We willingly accept 
fictions, says Vaihinger, because the world is otherwise too chaotic and irra-
tional to explain and manage. His general thesis was that many important 
ideas, around which institutions and disciplines form, are strictly and logi-
cally contradictory.74 Nonetheless, we accept them as true enough because 
they are useful untruths.
Vaihinger didn’t think that it was necessary to reject fictions as simple 
falsehoods— to be a pure skeptic— but rather to understand them as the 
inescapable artifacts of human thought. He writes, “It must be remem-
bered that the object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal 
of reality— this would be an utterly impossible task— but rather to provide 
an instrument for finding our way about more easily in the world.”75 And 
here, we find a glimpse of the cultural work surrounding proxies. Prox-
ies, as fictions, are instruments that draw their power from repetition and 
reiteration, through the ways that they form particular habits of use and 
reference, and through the ways that communities affectively bond to these 
collective practices of make- believe. We can look to the material and cul-
tural settings of their genesis, circulation, maintenance, contestation, and 
repair to understand why they persist. In other words, proxies are necessary 
untruths that nonetheless operate as if they are true “because it is useful for 
some purpose to do so.” We must turn to the politics of “as if ” to under-
stand the uses and purposes of suspended disbelief.76
Vaihinger singles out the homme moyen (the average man) from the 
nineteenth- century work of Lambert “Adolphe” Jacques Quetelet as an 
especially important example of a useful statistical fiction, what he calls 
a “fictitious mean.”77 The nineteenth century was a boom time for the 
average. As William Stanley Jevons wrote in 1874, the average “enables us 
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to make a hypothetical simplification of a problem, and avoid complexity 
without committing error.”78 The average man was just one such simplifi-
cation: a composite, abstract figure that represented the distribution of sev-
eral attributes of the population of a given country according to a binomial 
curve (also known as a normal distribution, or “bell curve”), which could 
then come to serve as the “type” of the nation and “the representative of a 
society in social science comparable to the center of gravity in physics.”79 
The average man, and the calculation of frequencies that came with it, was 
fundamental to the development of statistical science and state population 
management– – and a building block of eugenics– – in the nineteenth cen-
tury and beyond.80
Building on his development of the average man, Quetelet undertook 
a lifelong study of human traits and activities, leading to the development 
of “moral statistics” that sought to identify the “propensity” of particular 
classes of people to, for example, commit crime— a criminology based in 
race science and statistical averages. Bolstered by the fact that the average 
man was, for Quetelet, both a national and a racial type, the average man 
became an instrument to tie a particular quantification of whiteness to a 
national identity and to criminalize those who were not reflected in its 
idealizations.
For Quetelet’s early contemporaries, it was necessary that the use of 
the average man was only theoretical, and any suggestion otherwise was 
met with ridicule.81 But for Quetelet, the average man was far from a mere 
fiction.82 His great innovation was turning the assumptions undergirding 
normal distribution on their head: instead of thinking of statistical prob-
abilities as the composite product of real phenomena, Quetelet imagined 
that if a normal distribution curve were a natural law, it could be harnessed 
in the production of more normal populations. The average man was not 
just an instrument for thinking through statistical norms, but also an 
instrument for making normalcy incarnate; as averageness could become 
a template, decisions about social management could be directed toward 
maximizing the reproduction of such an ideal. This is borne out in the his-
tory of the average man’s journey from the domain of probability to the 
development of a science of populations.
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The average man’s legacy has lasted nearly three centuries, during 
which time it has continued to act as a wellspring of norms and standards. 
In time, the usefulness and versatility of the average man helped the con-
cept spread to domains beyond statistical science, with particularly long- 
lasting and pernicious effects in criminology and medicine. With this came 
new disciplinary and eugenic categorizations of human physiology, ability, 
sexuality, and behavior.83 But the average man was only half of the neces-
sary scaffolding for a eugenicist project; the other half was the introduction 
of state practices meant to adjust and hone the attributes of actual humans 
in order to keep them within the bounds of normalcy.84 “It began to turn 
statistical laws that were merely descriptive of large- scale regularities into 
laws of nature and society that dealt in underlying truths and causes.”85 As 
averageness was equated with normalness, and even idealness, the average 
man transcended its use as a composite calculation and became a prescrip-
tive tool.86
The history of proxies is flecked with moments of incarnation, where 
the usefulness of proxies for conducting some limited, domain- specific task 
(like a sociological study of a small Midwestern city) leaks out into the 
wild and assumes the power and reputation of a prescriptive template. The 
study of proxies exposes how their users may try to portray a fiction as only 
a fiction, to hide its origins, or to obscure its definite connection with the 
materiality of the world out there. But Middletown is always also Muncie. 
The reasonable person incarnates as a nineteenth- century man commut-
ing from a London suburb. Proxies are inescapably material, leaky, and 
porous. Seeing proxies as useful fictions does help us chart a path to their 
use in the day- to- day routines of professionals. But it does little to account 
for the phantasmagramic power that some proxies accrue when they are 
transformed from samples into sought- after ideals.
Instead, pragmatist and performative approaches to proxies can help 
to better illustrate how some useful untruths take on the role of “recipes 
for reality.”87 For example, in the case of the average man, what started 
as fictionalism (it was a useful untruth that worked as an instrument for 
particular calculations) soon came to look like a pragmatic phenomenon 
(things that were felt to be real had real effects).88 And though we may have 
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outgrown the brute averages of Quetelet, the damaging effects of swapping 
an average for a norm persist. For instance, though anthropomorphic mod-
els have been used to test the outcomes of car crashes for nearly seventy 
years, it’s only in the past decade that the predominant use of an “average 
man” model has been shown to lead to disproportionate rates of injury 
and fatality for people whose bodies don’t conform to that model.89 This is 
an obvious (and deadly) way in which averageness is made incarnate in a 
proxy for human bodies, with distinct and negative outcomes for anyone 
whose body is not captured by a dominant template.90
Vaihinger admitted that fictions were popular tools because they were 
useful instruments— but he limited himself to the usefulness of such fic-
tions in their proper domains and the few cognate fields they might overlap 
with. For pragmatists, usefulness and truthfulness are more capacious: what 
matters is who takes an idea to be true, in what context, and with what 
consequences.91 This is why the Middletown studies, for example, could 
go from a limited, focused study of an unnamed American city to Mun-
cie becoming a celebrated stand- in for ideal Americanness. Despite what 
Robert and Helen Lynd wished, the popularity of the Middletown studies 
transformed Muncie from a proxy for averageness to a model of American 
life; the city’s subsequent use and reuse reaffirmed (in circular fashion) its 
accuracy as an ideal template. Another way of saying this: once the aver-
age man, or the Middletown studies, or Yodaville, or any well- entrenched 
proxy is perceived as ideal or normal, new realties will be developed in 
accordance with this redefinition. As Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh 
Star put it, “If someone is taken to be a witch, and an elaborate technical 
apparatus with which to diagnose her or him as such is developed, then 
the reality of witchcraft obtains in the consequences— perhaps death at 
the stake.”92 What this pragmatic perspective reveals is the productivity of 
fictions, the politics of representation, and the ways that power both condi-
tions and constrains who gets to define a useful idea and for what purpose.
When we use proxies, we do not just willingly partake in the world of 
ideas, using and reproducing knowledge through deliberate speech acts. 
Participation is compulsory in a world standardized through the pragmat-
ics of technical and scientific systems and through norms and normate 
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templates.93 Here, this book often returns to gender, disability, and perfor-
mance theories and the advised use of the phrase “suspended disbelief” to 
understand the ways that many people must engage, professionally and as 
laypersons, with proxies as compulsory fictionalizations of the world. Prox-
ies are not transparent representations of the “world out there.” Rather, 
they are representations laden with cultural baggage and they are indel-
ibly marked by the standpoints of their production and use. The daily and 
standardized ways of making and maintaining analogies for life out there 
constrain— though never fully determine— the ways that we can come to 
understand our place in the world.94 The move from fictionalism to prag-
matism, and then to performativity, provides us with three ways of under-
standing proxies: as useful instruments, as analogies turned incarnate, and 
as the conditions of epistemic labor that must be occupied by and through 
human bodies. A proxy may begin as a make- believe surrogate for the world 
out there, but what happens when it starts to act not as if, but as the world? 
Whose labor, and whose body, is called on to maintain that fantasy?
THE SCOPE OF PROXIES
In a posthumously published essay, On Truth and Lie in an Extra- Moral 
Sense, Friedrich Nietzsche turns to the maintenance of coinage to explicate 
his understanding of truth. “Truths are illusions,” he writes, “about which 
one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out 
and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now 
matter only as metal, no longer as coins.”95 Nietzsche’s analogy contrasts 
elegantly with the history of proxies. Just as we might think of standards as 
a social process for taking things for granted or the idea that proxy servers 
allow one to “forget” the work they perform, Nietzsche sees truth as a con-
ventional artifact, where the traces of its arbitrariness have been scrubbed 
away and forgotten— and, usefully, he turns to a standardized artifact as 
his exemplar.
Let’s fill in the blanks of this analogy. If “truth” becomes truth through 
a process of naturalization— a process of forgetting— it does so by wearing 
down the human, conventional, and arbitrary context of its origins. This is 
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how norms operate: by vanishing from view, by seeming common sense, 
by going unmarked and unnamed. Proxies gain authority through the same 
process. Through wear— the result of repetition, handling, and circulation— 
they come to seem obvious, and (at least some of ) their users become oblivi-
ous to their arbitrary origins. The source of this power is not predetermined. 
Some proxies function because they achieved priority and benefit from the 
effects of path dependence, while others work by international agreement, 
legal enforcement, or the entrenched power relations of gender, sexuality, 
race, ability, and other strata of difference that condition the selection of 
some surrogates over others. What follows in this book is a series of stories 
about proxies that foreground their histories of use, wear, and circulation, as 
well as the moments when communities responded to claims that a proxy’s 
tenuous connection to the world was difficult to maintain.
Chapter 2 tells the story of the International Prototype Kilogram, 
which until recently was the last remaining physical artifact used as a stan-
dard in the metric system. Here, I approach the lifespan of a basic measure-
ment proxy by examining the protocols for keeping the kilogram clean, as 
a fundamental aspect of its stability. Data hygiene, this chapter argues, is a 
necessary condition of maintaining proxies (and technology more gener-
ally) that need to stay coherent as shared reference points. Data hygiene is 
a practice visible in protocols for database management (“a clean data set”) 
and finance (“money laundering”), as well as the larger world of hygiene 
within cultural texts (e.g., the “clean” version of an explicit song). As a fun-
damental unit in the metric system and a basic component of one of the 
earliest and farthest- reaching attempts at international standardization, the 
IPK and its associated protocols capture the messy, bodily, and makeshift 
aspects that animate the lives of proxies.
In the next two chapters, I undertake to tell the history of one of the 
most widely used test images in existence, the Lena image (also known as 
“Lenna”). This image was integral to the development of digital imaging 
techniques and practices of automated image analysis. Through repeated 
use, it became a central reference point in the development of digital image 
processing, and eventually an icon of the discipline. The image itself is a 
cropped 512 by 512– pixel picture of a woman in a hat, which engineers at 
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the University of Southern California (USC) cropped from the November 
1972 centerfold of Playboy magazine.
Chapter 3 examines the institutional setting of digital image process-
ing at USC. I document the environment in which the Lena image could 
seem like a possible solution to a range of test image problems: the need for 
a human face, the need for complex images, the need for new images, and 
to the apparent problem of an overabundance of so- called boring images. 
Here, I look at how all of these “needs” became cover for importing main-
stream, soft- core pornography into the earliest days of networked image 
transmission, and examine the work that early image engineers were doing 
at USC on image detection and transmission.
Chapter 4 turns to the late twentieth century, looking in particular 
at the early 1990s, a time when the graphical World Wide Web was on 
the horizon. This was also a time when digital image processing was dis-
tinguishing itself from the cognate fields of optical engineering and signal 
processing. Following a feminist media studies approach to this history— 
one invested in a politics of change and a commitment to reducing and 
redressing injustice— this chapter looks at moments of resistance to the 
alienating and often abusive environments of computer science and image 
engineering, tying conflicts in these environments directly to the visual 
culture of test images. Together, chapters 3 and 4 argue that the methods 
of “seeing like an engineer” that produced the Lena image are a product 
of institutionalized, professional vision, inescapably tied to the practices of 
decoding and instrumentalizing women’s bodies as test data.96
These two chapters serve two historical purposes: first, to tell the under-
explored story of the earliest days of digital image processing and the attempts 
to get digitally processed and compressed images onto ARPANET— the 
direct predecessor of the internet; and second, to write the history of the cre-
ation, circulation, and canonization of a Playboy centerfold as a test image. 
I examine how gendered practices shaped image engineering labs and how 
the very concept of gender was performed and reencoded in image analy-
sis practices and techniques.97 Methodologically, the chapters draw on an 
archive of journals, working papers, and gray literature. This includes unof-
ficial reports that documented the work that many engineers, students, and 
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workers did to contest the sexist settings of computer science and engineer-
ing throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Chapter 5 contains a history of the standardized patient program, 
which began at USC (again!) in the 1960s and transformed, over forty years, 
into a necessary part of medical accreditation in Canada and the United 
States. It tells a story in which the surrogate logic of standing in was extended 
to include human beings as standardized proxies. In the standardized patient 
program, actors embody the typical symptoms of a disease and trainee physi-
cians diagnose them while honing their bedside manner. Begun as a bridge 
between the dissection of cadavers and living anatomy class, the standardized 
patient program functioned as a “living cadaver” lesson.
Through the refinement of the program, standardized patients became a 
technique for training doctors in diagnosis and the emotional management 
of patient interaction— techniques intentionally engineered to help physi-
cians avoid malpractice lawsuits. In spite of the fact that actual patients are 
both vulnerable and unpredictable, standardized patients are meant to be 
neither— since to be either would threaten the testing scenario they enable. 
Despite this, it is their shared humanity, the immanent possibility of them 
becoming patients, that allows them to stand in. As “patients,” they act as 
a gauge, recording the accuracy and affect of their trainee physicians; for 
medical educators, they act as a consistent test scenario that can be used to 
compare students. Yet, unlike the kilograms and test images of the previ-
ous chapters, standardized patients talk back: they emote, they adjust, they 
feel pain, they are prejudiced, they mask their own traumas, and they bring 
with them a lifetime of interactions with the medical establishment.
Whereas the other artifacts examined in this book manifest in things 
like pieces of metal, paper, and pixels, standardized patients are maintained 
not only through the bodies of workers, but within them. Standardized 
patients reveal a limit for the surrogate logic of proxies, as they chafe at the 
ability to create predictable and reproducible testing scenarios and show 
how messy encoding a stand- in can be. But all proxies are messy, and each 
of the histories included here contains contingent, makeshift, and ritual-
ized forms of labor that workers use to justify and maintain the use of 
certain materials over others. This labor aims to conceal and suppress the 
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arbitrary nature of scientific and technical decision- making. The messiness 
of standardized patients simply brings these issues to the foreground. The 
book concludes with a recurrent theme: the inescapable fact that the natu-
ralization of infrastructure and standards requires a great deal of labor to be 
successful. The argument, I hold, is that the seams in interwoven techno-
logical systems need to undergo constant concealment to appear smooth. 
By looking through the lenses of artistic appropriation and through critical 
infrastructure studies as a form of perspectival denaturalization, I offer a 
methodological detour suggesting how the history of proxies might map 
another way of surfacing the relationships that hold technologies together.
> > >
When issues appear with proxies, it is not in the form of some sudden, 
catastrophic failure; instead, issues appear as issues only when the fabric 
of communal referencing strains under the pressure of some other social 
demand. In the stories included here, these demands include the instability 
of platinum- iridium; the politics of gendered representation; the rigidity of 
copyright ownership; the legal consequences of bad medical care; and the 
capacity to speak about one’s own pain.
The resolution to these problems will not simply arrive as new and bet-
ter proxies. These are not merely struggles over the arbitrariness of picking 
one fixed point over another; they are struggles over the power to pick any 
fixed point, the ability to contest the circumstances of one’s work, and the 
very possibilities of standardization. The power of proxy logic resides in 
our imaginative capacity to inscribe and realize a vision of the world and to 
fabricate scenarios where people, places, and things can reside in measur-
able comparison. The power to determine proxies, therefore, is nothing less 
than the power to determine the grounds of difference.98 Who makes that 
difference, ultimately, is always open to debate.

2 HOW TO CLEAN A KILOGRAM:  
STANDARDS, DATA HYGIENE,  
AND THE THEATER OF OBJECTIVITY
THE CONVERSATION ROOM
It is October 22, 2018, and I am sitting in the Conversation Room at 
the Royal Institution of Great Britain (RI). The RI is a venerated site of 
public science education made famous through the exhibition of new dis-
coveries and technologies, including Michael Faraday’s demonstrations of 
electromagnetism, Guglielmo Marconi’s demonstrations of wireless com-
munication, and Nikola Tesla’s spectacular demonstrations of alternating 
current. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, public events 
at the RI were often written up in the press, and represented the site of an 
idealized middle- class audience, as Carolyn Marvin describes.1 For over 
two hundred years, the RI has served as the place where theoretical and 
scientific insights can become consumable events, and where the public 
can see how those insights will affect everyday life. It’s a theater for sharing 
emergent scientific ideas with a privileged audience. Tonight, I am here 
to see Michael de Podesta, an experimental physicist and employee of the 
National Physical Laboratory (NPL).2 He is scheduled to give a talk called 
“The Measure of Science: Redefining the Kilogram.”
As the crowd quiets, de Podesta begins with a simple statement on the 
nature of measurement: “Measurement is an incredible idea; it’s a very, very 
simple idea,” he says.3 There are roughly a hundred people in the Conver-
sation Room. I am here because, for the past six years, I’ve been studying 
the management of the metric system and the methods that scientists and 
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technicians have developed for maintaining standard kilograms as proxies 
for the idea of “mass” (figure 2.1). The title of de Podesta’s talk refers to the 
fact that the definition of “mass” is about to change. Mass has been based 
on one physical artifact— the International Prototype Kilogram (IPK)— 
but now it will shift to a definition based on a numerical constant. Right 
now, I don’t really think that measurement is very simple. But it’s a rare 
opportunity to see the changing definition of a standard, and the deliber-
ate end- of- life planning of a proxy—one that has persisted for an inordi-
nate 130 years.4
Then de Podesta continues:
Measurement is just this thing where you notice things; you notice that one 
thing’s bigger than another. And, after a while, you stop just noticing one thing’s 
bigger than another, and you do something like you pick up a standard stick 
and you say, “This is the one I’m going to use to measure whether that plant’s 
bigger than that one”: you put it against one and you measure it; and you put 
it against the other and you measure it. People have being doing this since 
time immemorial.5
Figure 2.1
Clean, official kilograms under bell jars. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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And there it is: at the heart of de Podesta’s simplification of measurement is 
a proxy— in this case, a standard stick— that becomes a fixed point through 
which comparison is made possible and systematic. For de Podesta, and the 
metrological community more generally, having a communal standard is 
foundational to the very idea of measurement. When pressed for the pithiest 
of definitions for what measurement is, de Podesta says, “What is measure-
ment? I’ve thought rather long and hard, and I’ve come up with this two- 
word definition: quantitative comparison. Or quantitative comparison (of an 
unknown quantity with a standard).” 6 The shared standards that de Podesta 
describes— those common benchmarks— are some of the oldest and most 
pervasive of proxies: stand- ins for ideas like “length” or “mass” that are fixed 
points, ready- at- hand, and against which other things can be compared.
Finally, he reached his thesis:
The key to our understanding the world around us is the fact that we can 
measure. And so the key thing I’d like you to realize is: the only way we know 
anything about the world is by measuring things. And it’s measurement that 
makes science scientific; it is not mathematics.7
How did a presentation in the Conversation Room about kilograms lead 
to a statement about “the only way we know anything”? We live in an era 
of unprecedented quantification and comparison. New standards abound 
to measure and classify people, behaviors, and phenomena. Some of this is 
engineered for profit, and some for the control of populations— the long 
hangover of the so- called average man— but all of it relies on the “very 
simple idea” that things can be compared if there is a shared benchmark. 
This is an ideological way of seeing the world as revealed through com-
parison. And whether or not we accept this view as legitimate, we have to 
reckon with the traction it attains and the manifold ways that benchmarks 
structure and distort our lives.
Fast- forward a few months: in May 2019, the definition of mass in 
the metric system was officially revised, and the IPK was replaced with a 
new standard— a standard that stipulates a recipe for creating or calculat-
ing a kilogram under strict conditions, based on the value of the Planck 
constant.8 The IPK was replaced by a calculated value meant to provide a 
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new, more stable base for the measurement of mass. But the convoluted 
replacement process occurred despite the fact that the original system was 
working just fine. As Terry Quinn, the former head of the International 
Bureau of Weights and Measures, argues, “There is no evidence of there 
ever having been a problem with mass measurement or measurement of 
any other physical quantity whose unit depends on the kilogram that could 
be attributed to defects in the system.”9
Prior to this redefinition, the metric system’s definition of mass was 
equivalent to the mass of the IPK— a cylindrical piece of platinum- iridium 
held in a vault in the suburbs of Paris. By basing the measurement stan-
dard of mass on a literal piece of metal, both the standard and the object 
were defined only with reference to themselves. This meant that without 
external checks, strict protocols were required to keep the kilogram as static 
as possible. To do this, the IPK needed to be compared with other, sib-
ling kilograms— but only after washing and cleaning. In other words, the 
common standard that Michael de Podesta identified as foundational to 
the idea of measurement, relied on the human, manual, and embodied 
practice of hygiene. This was a curious and ad hoc process that reveals the 
haphazard, often fluky ways that proxies persist because they have been 
deemed fixed points.10
This chapter examines the IPK through the rituals that made it a via-
ble fixed point. The IPK was born via ritual and returned to ritual forms of 
maintenance throughout its existence. Ritual, in this instance, is a way of dis-
tinguishing some objects as sacred, and it is best understood as a way of con-
struing a protocol or an act so as to invest it with importance and meaning.11 
To understand the ritual labor of making and maintaining proxies, I trace two 
converging trajectories. The first considers data hygiene as a set of techniques 
and practices for keeping knowledge and information systems orderly. With 
particular focus on the ways that order is attained through embodied and 
manual protocols, data hygiene provides a heuristic for seeing the pervasive 
cultural labor that exists in the maintenance of knowledge infrastructures. The 
second trajectory follows the study of standards as specific examples of knowl-
edge infrastructures by building on existing studies of standards as sociopoliti-
cal artifacts and “recipes for reality.”12
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Bringing these two together, this chapter uses the IPK to illustrate some 
common features of proxies, as well as the protocols and rituals of main-
tenance and repair that make standards possible. Proxies are both porous 
(they absorb their surroundings) and sticky (they pick up pieces and leave 
traces of wherever they travel), leaving them marked by their institutional 
management and the communities of use where they circulate. To play off 
of another use of “fixed point” and to follow Ludwig Wittgenstein: “The 
axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but around the fixed 
point of our real need.”13 If we let cultural labor and the politics of embod-
ied performance be our fixed points as we examine the IPK, then we can 
situate the attempts to mitigate its porousness and stickiness as attempts 
to render the visible invisible and the detectable undetectable— to erase, in 
other words, the markings of its history, its emplacement, and its use.
DATA HYGIENE
Everyone has purity rituals: some people wash their hands in sinks, others 
douse themselves in alcohol- based hand sanitizer, we purge with fire, or 
we cleanse our bodies with specialized diets. In every case, dirt is shunned 
through learned, practiced, and embodied techniques.14 “Dirt is essentially 
disorder,” Mary Douglas writes. “If we shun dirt, it is not because of craven 
fear, still less dread of holy terror. Nor do our ideas about disease account for 
the range of our behavior in cleaning or avoiding dirt. Dirt offends against 
order.”15 Treating dirt as a category instead of as a natural thing allows us to 
see the social practices behind hygienics, including the fluid and changing 
boundaries of what constitutes dirt. It also allows us to view and analyze 
the technologies, protocols, and rituals that bring the category of dirt into 
being.
If dirt- as- category includes all forms of disorder that need to be cleansed, 
then it is also consistent with the norms and rituals that pervade in infor-
mation and knowledge systems for maintaining “clean data,” where data 
scrubbing and cleaning are both “accepted and unexceptional.”16 Anyone 
working with collections of data, whether large or small, will recognize the 
importance of maintaining a clean data set. Cleaning in this case involves 
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the removal of extraneous, erroneous, or inconvenient elements from a data-
base to create usable and verifiable data. In financial operations, for instance, 
data scrubbing or data cleansing might be as simple as rendering the data in 
the same unit (e.g., gold, silver, or a national currency). This practice of bring-
ing disparate data points into relation, finding common units, and scrub-
bing unwanted information (to remove disorder) is a manual and repetitive 
process.17
In a database, a valid data set “must look pristine at the end of its pro-
cessing.”18 To enable comparison and commensuration, certain features of 
data must be brought into focus (polished), while others are scrubbed clean 
away. Dirty or unclean data are not bad in and of themselves, but they do 
represent a threat to the coherence and usability of a data set, technology, 
or system, where eliminating dirt “is not negative movement, but a posi-
tive effort to organize the environment.”19 Data hygiene, then, is a way of 
describing the cultural work of articulation and disarticulation that bring 
data into accordance with their intended function by keeping “dirt” at bay.
Laundering
In the early 1970s, anyone following the Watergate scandal could add a 
new term to their lexicon when they learned that money could be “laun-
dered.” Specifically, they learned that President Richard Nixon’s former 
commerce secretary, Maurice Stans, in his new role as finance chairman of 
the Committee to Reelect the President (CRP for short, CREEP for fun), 
had laundered illegal campaign donations through a Mexico City bank— 
donations that eventually went, among other places, to bribe the Watergate 
burglars and to buy First Lady Pat Nixon a pair of diamond- studded ear-
rings.20 The term “money laundering” did not appear in a major American 
newspaper until 1972, and throughout the Watergate scandal it usually 
appeared in scare quotes. In All the President’s Men Bob Woodward and 
Carl Bernstein describe how Martin Dardis, the chief investigator for the 
state attorney’s office in Dade County, Florida, linked the flow of money 
from a Mexican bank to Nixon’s campaign for reelection. “It’s called ‘laun-
dering,’” Dardis said. “You set up a money chain that makes it impossible 
to trace the source. The Mafia does it all the time.”21 Dardis was right about 
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what had occurred with the president, and his apparent familiarity with the 
term “laundering” indicates that both the practice and term predated the 
scandal, although they had yet to penetrate common parlance.
Why would the Mafia, or a finance committee, want to launder money?22 
In each case, the aim is to clean money (as data) of the traces left by suspect 
and illegal sources; currency may be fungible, but the records of money’s 
exchange are not. The traces left by money as an exchange medium can form 
their own record of what Lana Swartz calls a “transactional community”: the 
set of relations that are produced by, through, and around transactions.23 In 
the case of ill- gotten or ill- spent money, laundering is an attempt to camou-
flage this community. We can imagine money launderers like Stans— who 
kept the records of Nixon’s laundered money— bent over their ledgers, decid-
ing what bare minimum of data was necessary to keep for their own records 
and what needed to be effaced to conceal their transactional community. This 
is also a laborious memory practice of deciding what sufficient and plausible 
set of traces could conceal an illegitimate or dubious past.24 We might also 
imagine ourselves staring at a spreadsheet of grades, ethnographic research, 
or bibliographic metadata to carry out the time- consuming practice cleaning 
data, pecking away at the DELETE and TAB and ENTER keys until order 
has been restored.
Voiding
In the simplest understanding, hygiene is a necessary and laborious part of 
making data commensurable and usable. But this assumes that we know 
and agree on what constitutes the extraneous or erroneous information 
that needs cleansing. “There is no such thing as absolute dirt,” Douglas 
writes; “it exists in the eye of the beholder.”25 Take, for example, the US 
Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling on the maintenance program for Ohio’s voter 
lists (Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute). At issue was the purging of 
voter lists that was done ahead of the November 2016 elections. Registered 
voters in Ohio who had not voted for six years and who had not returned 
a postcard that they were sent were removed from the eligible voters’ list.26 
Ohio was not alone; across the United States, many jurisdictions were 
eliminating voters from their rolls in similar ways. The states purging voters 
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claim that such data hygiene is necessary to prevent voter fraud, though it 
appears to be a naked attempt to suppress votes by sowing confusion at the 
polls and excluding otherwise eligible voters from participation.
The technique has clear origins in the interpretive flexibility of existing 
laws, identified and exploited by conservative activists. In 2014, the Heri-
tage Foundation, a conservative think tank, published a fearmongering 
report titled A Primer on “Motor Voter”: Corrupted Voter Rolls and the Justice 
Department’s Selective Failure to Enforce Federal Mandates.27 The primer, 
written by a lawyer at the Virginia- based Election Law Center, instructs 
potential activists on how to exploit the 1993 National Voter Registra-
tion Act (NVRA), or “Motor Voter Law,” to reduce their voter lists. The 
techniques rely on a selective reading of the NVRA’s mandate. The primer 
states, “The third goal of the law was to impose a minimal obligation on 
states and local election officials to maintain clean voter rolls through the 
implementation of a list maintenance program.”28 This was a politicized 
interpretation of what constitutes a “clean” voter roll, which has allowed 
some states to remove less frequent voters, as opposed to only those who 
have died or moved away. The Supreme Court ruled 5– 4 in favor of Ohio’s 
list maintenance program, upholding the state’s interpretation of what 
could constitute a clean voter roll and paving the way for future voter- 
suppression techniques.
At the forefront of voter suppression in the United States is an oppor-
tunistic interpretation of what constitutes “dirt” in a data set, as well as 
conflicting norms over hygienic protocols for maintaining clean data. Evi-
dent in this case is the fact that the meaning of extraneous data is a con-
tested area; there is a political stake in categorizing list items, and political 
actors develop highly choreographed rituals to justify these categorizations. 
The ruling in Husted confirmed the legitimacy of a scripted performance 
of citizenship, in which an unreturned postcard combined with a pattern 
of nonparticipation could transform a person’s name into a political com-
modity, where deletion became a gain for some and a loss for others– – 
though, we should stipulate, the easy deletion of anyone’s name is a loss for 
everyone with a vested interest in supporting access to electoral democracy.
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Sanitizing
In the development of contemporary information professions, as Michelle 
Murphy writes, office buildings were “machines designed to encourage the 
buzz of ‘information’ work inside and to produce a clean, orderly corporate 
world sealed off from both the polluted outdoors and the dangerous fac-
tory floor.”29 Likewise, in the early twentieth century, filing cabinets were 
promoted and adopted as technologies for compressing documents, man-
aging an overwhelming amount of paperwork, and responding to the cor-
responding demands for the storage and retrieval of information.30 Vertical 
filing cabinets sat on floors, but manufacturers would offer “sanitary legs” 
that could hold the cabinets several inches above the ground, permitting a 
cleaner to sweep under them.31 In the case of the office, then, there are nested 
understandings of cleanliness that cannot be easily separated: the informa-
tion in the office needs to be processed to be clean— well organized, easy to 
recall, and free of extraneous data— but this is possible only if the environ-
ment is itself free of contamination.
In homes and sites of leisure, we are also surrounded by familiar hygienic 
protocols. And just as the office contains nested understandings of clean-
liness, homes are also characterized by the interdependence of systems for 
maintaining order. Ruth Schwartz Cowan documents the changing character 
of housework as gendered labor and in doing so makes the case against the 
separation of any one task (e.g., cooking, cleaning, shopping, caring) from 
any other— since each will rely on the other.32 In the case of data hygiene, 
we might focus on those practices that are exerted on domesticated media 
texts: acts of censoring, cropping, dubbing, bleeping, moderating, flagging, 
filtering, blocking, and deleting content that allow texts to cross the threshold 
between the public and the private. The Motion Picture Production Code, 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), and social media content modera-
tion policies are all top- down methods of trying to control media content and 
to enforce normative conceptions of acceptable representation in the public 
sphere.33 To view these policies and regulations as practices of data hygiene 
is to understand them as techniques for managing the contested boundary 
between clean and dirty, as protocols for performing hygienic labor, and as 
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ways of making a public media experience commensurable within prevailing 
and hegemonic standards of decency.
For media texts, Raiford Guins draws a distinction between cleaning 
and sanitizing. The term “sanitizing,” according to Guins, refers to the 
ways that images, films, television programs, and music can be edited to 
produce, for instance, so- called family- friendly versions. Hearing a song on 
the radio with the curse words bleeped out is a sanitized version. But sani-
tizing leaves a censorial gap, Guins argues, and “cleaning” is a further act of 
repair that not only sanitizes the text but fills the gap left by the initial cut. 
A clean version of the same profane song would substitute new words to 
cover up the censorship, and the result would appear to be the original.34 
In both cases, hygienic practices are instrumental in making texts that can 
circulate according to differential norms of propriety. Sanitized films, as 
Guins points out, are often promoted as versions that audiences can sup-
posedly trust. If dirt is equal to disorder and dirty content is untrustworthy, 
then hygiene becomes a way of bringing trustworthy content through an 
imagined boundary protecting the home.
In American laws and regulations that seek to control content through 
a threshold between decency and obscenity, children are often the pre-
sumed victims of unfettered access to any allegedly dirty content. If we take 
data hygiene as an umbrella term to refer to a range of hygienic practices 
meant to identify and manage data, information, and content, then the 
idea of “out of place” can mean anything from an inadvertent keystroke 
that infects a data set to a fleeting expletive on live television, to an image 
that must be vetted before it is posted to a public website. From the office 
to private media lives, hygiene is not a supplemental practice added to the 
management of information, media, and data. Instead, it is a constitutive 
condition for the emergence of information management, as well as the 
very architecture of private and professional space— internal, external, and 
the ventilation in between.
> > >
Hygiene is a fundamental technique for delineating social boundaries and 
norms of orderliness; it is a way that a society constructs techniques for 
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identifying some things as dirt, and the response to that dirt in the form of 
rituals and practices of cleanliness. But hygiene is also inescapably bound 
up in power. Hygiene protocols always target specific things, people, and 
behaviors. And they are carried out by specific bodies. In the United States, 
voter suppression takes place in a system of structural racism that, in con-
cert with the state’s carceral industries, excludes racialized, immiserated, 
and marginalized populations from the democratic process; databases are 
often constructed to limit gender identity to a binary value, even when 
user- facing interfaces present a variety of options;35 content moderation, 
on social media platforms, is often specifically targeted at limiting the com-
munication of marginalized and minority users and of sex workers, and is 
carried out by a precarious and outsourced workforce often denied the bare 
minimum of workplace safety and mental health protections;36 custodial 
labor is disproportionally carried out by racialized and migrant workers; 
household labor is disproportionally carried out by women. And some 
users of information systems are considered to be dirtier than others.
As T. L. Cowan has suggested, “digital hygiene” can refer to the ways 
that we are called upon to maintain clean digital habitats. This might mean 
keeping an orderly file structure, or maintaining a professional presenta-
tion on social media. In either case, the metaphor always concerns the 
body.37 Just as bodily hygiene, diet, and behavior have been used to shame 
individuals and to police bodies that are deemed a threat to public health, 
the compulsory demand that our digital environments be sanitary falls 
mostly upon the already- marginalized. Even when we look for exceptions 
to this rule, we find that hygiene is inescapably bound up in political nego-
tiations over the power to handle information. As Daniela Agostinho and 
Nanna Bonde Thylstrup show, whistleblowers, leakers, and “truth- tellers” 
are always “entangled in gendered matrices of control that make possible 
some truth- telling subjects while foreclosing others.”38 All of this orients 
the study of data hygienics (1) as a social category for the policing of bodies 
and behaviors, (2) as relying on the embodied and infrastructural labor of 
a community of practitioners, and (3) as bound up in a political negotia-
tion over who can handle and manage information in normatively valued 
ways.
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As the remainder of this chapter returns to the role of standards in 
structuring lifeworlds, it will be tempting to see the protocols for main-
taining the IPK as being unbound to the same political negotiations over 
hygiene protocols. But this couldn’t be further from reality: not only is the 
metric system the foundation of a global infrastructure for the measure-
ment and control of space and time— a European- based standard on which 
countless other standards rely— but the protocols for cleaning the kilogram 
demonstrate that, at the most fundamental level, standards and infrastruc-
tures are always tied into the manual and bodily practices of hygiene and 
cleanliness that make data socially valuable.
STANDARDS AND THE THEATER OF OBJECTIVITY
Standards are a dominant way of organizing the world. They distribute 
people, places, and things according to hierarchies, classifications, and cat-
egories, and they do so in ways that are putatively pragmatic. Standards are 
often treated as obdurate pieces of technology that spread over time and 
space with a force all their own. But in practice, the standardization process 
is contingent, as people craft standards in specific places and for practical 
or idealistic reasons, and they maintain them in makeshift ways according 
to local imperatives.39
Over the past several decades, scholars have increasingly turned to the 
role of standards on two contrasting scales: as technologies that condition 
everyday existence, and as technologies that span the globe, enabling sys-
tems of trade, circulation, and management.40 But on each scale, standards 
are made to get things done— for some people, at some times. As we are con-
stantly reminded, standards are also meant to disappear from view, to sink 
to the level of infrastructure, to go without notice, and to become second 
nature— they are meant to help us to forget.41 As Elizabeth Cullen Dunn 
says, “A standard without an appropriate infrastructure cannot be put into 
force without major upheavals in the physical environment and the social 
organization of production.” 42
To employ standards requires an initial investment in a single decision 
about choosing fixed points.43 These points are both arbitrary and precise: 
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even when based on supposedly invariant, natural phenomena, they are 
the product of human community, human measurement, and a collective 
agreement to accept them as fixed and communal.44 For a familiar case of 
arbitrary precision, take the case of progress marking in football, in which 
officials manually place the game ball on a line at the end of each play 
by basing the measurement on their split- second judgment of a tackle. 
They determine, to the best of their judgment, exactly where the football 
stopped moving forward. This location becomes the fixed point for starting 
the next play. In instances where the ball is very close to the threshold for 
a first down, officials will bring out a ten- yard chain to measure if the ball 
progressed far enough.45 The entire scenario provokes necessary reflection: 
why employ a precise measurement instrument like the chain when the 
first judgment was imprecise and reflexive? This is the logic of arbitrary pre-
cision: decisions must be made to situate fixed points in certain positions, 
and those fixed, certain positions become crucial to further judgments. 
Protocols like the referee’s locating of the football are part of the rituals 
that go into making systems appear objective; they are part and parcel of a 
theater of objectivity. In another sense, fixed points work as the “fictions” 
that make standardization possible.46
A standard, as Lawrence Busch argues, is a recipe for producing and 
reproducing a narrowly defined phenomenon. A meter stick stands in for 
a fraction of the Earth’s meridian and is easily reproduced in metal, wood, 
or string whenever a meter is needed.47 As a proxy for both a specified 
length and for the process that created it, the meter stick eliminates the 
need to remeasure the meridian and protects against the variations in other 
ready- at- hand standards, like the difference in length of various people’s 
outstretched arms.48 This is the promise of proxies: they allow us to for-
get. Because scientific and technical proxies are the embodiment of choices 
about imagining the world within testing environments, like those of the 
lab, the workshop, the courtroom, and the office, they are important mate-
rializations of a hypothesis about the world, forged into small, manageable, 
usable, workable, exchangeable, and reproducible chunks. They include proto-
types, working objects, measurement apparatuses, lab samples, and test and 
training data— and are supported and buttressed by a whole ecology of 
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objects, manuals, and memos for referencing, checking, and maintaining 
those materials. To study the material life of proxies is to study the process 
of capturing the world in usable chunks, to interrogate the choice of some 
proxies over others, and to investigate the contextual characteristics of main-
taining a material apparatus as the basis of a knowledge infrastructure.
Standards are primarily intended to make things run smoothly for 
interested parties by reducing local differences and increasing interoper-
ability. As Laura DeNardis argues, interoperability is the growing concern 
of systems that are built to share resources, standardize parts, and exchange 
information efficiently.49 There are clear exceptions in which standards 
actually introduce friction; for instance, proprietary industrial standards 
that are supposed to make it harder for new entrants to join a market or 
prevent users from opening the black- boxed content of their media.50 But 
even in these cases, we can say that standards are crafted in and through 
power: they work for certain people in certain ways— industrial standards 
might protect the market share of existing operators or the financial ben-
efits of existing copyright holders, while state identification standards 
might limit who can drive, vote, or have their gender identity recognized.51 
Studying the proper functioning of a standard then becomes about iden-
tifying for whom it works and under what conditions. If we stipulate this 
premise, then we can study standards as specifically situated and insistently 
normative statements about how the world should operate— statements 
that unavoidably embody and codify ethical statements about who or what 
is a priority.52
The smooth functioning of an integrated economy or a system of cen-
tralized governance requires the commensurability of people, places, and 
things to rank, order, and measure. Complexity requires comparison, and 
standards create and enforce categories that become means of control.53 
Yet, as Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star argue, belonging to a cat-
egory can either be a privilege or an affliction, a condition of possibility or 
a means of oppression— or something in between.54 The ambivalence of 
standards, norms, and categories can compel the abandonment of radical 
difference in exchange for recognition in an institution. It is a Whiggish view 
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of history as the progress of rights, which treats the recognition of one’s dif-
ference in a standard or norm as the surest way to economic and political 
enfranchisement.55 The danger of recognition in a standard is that it will 
crystallize an identity or a category that may otherwise be fluid, uncertain, 
or undecided.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, standardization was often 
imagined to be a pathway to interjurisdictional (if not global) harmony. 
What we now call interoperability was once a test of a country or an empire’s 
capacity to control the basic terms of measurement and exchange, while 
basic units of measurement for length, weight, and coinage are often regarded 
as the earliest form of contemporary standardization. By demonstrating the 
possibility of standardization in these domains, the legitimacy of standard-
ization was later imported into other disciplines and domains.56 As Kath-
ryn Olesko states, “The techniques and instruments that produced more 
accurate weights and measures (which made social interactions as well as 
commercial transactions more exact) migrated early in the century to the 
sciences where they formed the nucleus of exact experimental practice.”57 
Going further, James C. Scott, in his analysis of the modern nation- state, 
traces its emergence to the provision of basic units and the standardization 
of measurement. Standards, Scott argues, are “transformative state simpli-
fications.”58 As such, standards appear as primary and ideal instruments 
of management, and encapsulations of the very possibility of manageabil-
ity. By using an arbitrary but precise measurement system, states could 
manage the much- less- precise and much- more- fluid components of their 
population.
The crafters of the metric system, operating at the height of the 
Enlightenment and in the throes of the French Revolution, imagined that a 
new political unity needed an apparently democratic system of units based 
on a measurement of the Earth’s circumference. In a contemporary setting 
where standards are often equated with state violence, blunt instruments 
like standardized testing, and the eradication of difference, it is easy to for-
get that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, standards were imag-
ined as tools for maintaining fairness and justice.59 Sandford Fleming, the 
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Scottish- Canadian engineer who proposed a system of time zones (what he 
called “Cosmic Time”), believed that the implementation of such a system 
could bring about global, political, and economic harmony.60 Max Planck 
went one step further, suggesting that a system of units based on the fixed 
constants of nature could be a standard shared for all times, by all peoples, 
and potentially even by extraterrestrials.61
The critical and cultural study of standardization is concerned with 
the ways that quotidian life and practices of making do are structured by 
standards and infrastructures that are themselves massive, sometimes vio-
lent, technologies rendering things interoperable at the cost of heterogene-
ity and uncertainty. By approaching proxies as leveraged simulations of 
the world and treating the standardization process as a cultural, performa-
tive, and representational practice, we reverse the relationship between the 
macro scale of standards and the micro scale of lived experience; instead, 
we can analyze the ways that local contingency enters the standardization 
process through the representation of the world in usable ways and the 
embodied labor of animating proxies. Through the cultural lives of prox-
ies, we can trace histories of the cultural interiors of standardization. The 
history of proxies not only shows how standards are made to contain messy 
reality, but also what happens when that messiness inevitably leaks out and 
new realities seep in.
CLEANING A KILOGRAM
To clean a kilogram, you will need the following supplies:
For cleaning by hand
1) 1 piece of chamois leather
2) A 500 ml mixture of equal parts ethanol and ether
For solvent washing
1) 1- L Pyrex flask containing bidistilled water
2) 1 tube with a 2- mm spout
3) 1 bowl for collecting condensed water
4) 1 tripod that can spin on its vertical axis and extend vertically
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5) 1 platinum- iridium disk
6) Filter paper
Time: about 50 minutes
About 6 days before you want to clean your kilogram, begin soaking the 
chamois leather in the ether- ethanol mixture for 48 hours. Wring out the 
leather— this helps remove impurities, and you definitely don’t want impuri-
ties on your kilogram. Repeat this stage two more times by soaking the cham-
ois leather in a fresh bath of ether and ethanol and wringing it out each time.
When your chamois is finally free of impurities, you can begin to clean your 
kilogram. A kilogram needs to be rubbed with approximately 10 kPa of pressure 
(figure 2.2). If you do not have a Pascal gauge handy to measure kilopascals, 
Figure 2.2
Cleaning a kilogram by hand. In your less- dominant hand, cushion the kilogram in a length 
of chamois leather. With your dominant hand, take a corner of the chamois, wrap your index 
finger in it, and clean until you reach the handsome, but not specular, surface you desire. 
Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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simply rub the kilogram fairly hard by hand. Remember that you are trying to 
return the kilogram to its original luster: “rather handsome, but not specular.”
After manual rubbing, your kilogram is ready for solvent washing with 
steam. Figure 2.3 shows you what your solvent cleaning setup should look 
like. Place the kilogram (A) on the platinum- iridium disk (B). The disk should 
fit comfortably on top of the tripod (C). Fill your Pyrex flask (D) about three- 
quarters with doubly distilled water. Run the tube from the flask to the top of 
the tripod, pointing the opening at the kilogram but keeping it about 5 mm 
from the surface. Heat the water with an electric mantle, operating at 350 W.
As the water boils, steam will start to come out of the tube. It should first 
be pointed directly at the kilogram’s uppermost edge. Rotate the tripod on 
its vertical axis, making sure to steam all 360 degrees of the cylinder. It’s like 
Figure 2.3
The steam- cleaning apparatus for washing your kilogram with solvent. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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a vertical rotisserie! Start moving the kilogram upward while continuing to 
rotate it. Blast the kilogram with steam for 15– 20 minutes.
Most of the steam should run off the kilogram and into the bowl. It is 
normal to have a few drops of condensed steam on the kilogram’s surface. For 
these stragglers, take a corner of the filter paper and absorb each drop indi-
vidually using the paper’s capillary action. If you don’t have filter paper, you 
can also blow the drops away with a jet of clean gas.
Next, flip the kilogram on to its bottom so that you can clean the part that 
was resting on the disk. Repeat the process of steam cleaning the kilogram— 
rotating it and raising it— so that the cylindrical surface gets a second clean-
ing. (Of course, you’ll want to make sure that the disk under the kilogram was 
cleaned in advance using the same technique. But you knew that!)
Return the kilogram to its resting place under a glass bell jar (as shown in 
figure 2.1). If you are accustomed to using a chemical desiccant to dry the air 
inside the bell jar, it’s really not necessary (but there is comfort in tradition). 
Congratulations— your kilogram is clean!62
THE METRIC SYSTEM: MEASUREMENTS MAINTAINED 
THROUGH HYGIENE
For proxies to work, they have to act as fixed points and have to be taken 
for granted. For this to be possible, they must be orderly. Because, as arti-
facts, they soak up their surroundings, leak, and decay, all proxies need to 
be cleansed or risk falling into permanent disrepair. This section considers 
one practice of hygiene through an analysis of the IPK and the protocols 
for keeping this small piece of metal clean— a process that extended its 
life as a proxy and as a component of the metric system. Until recently, 
the IPK was the last remaining physical artifact that formed the basis of a 
fundamental unit in the metric system. Because fundamental units are pri-
mary building blocks in standardization, the kilogram was a special case: a 
physical artifact meant to serve as a shared and immutable reference point. 
Far from an obscure piece of bureaucratic triviality, the standard of mass is 
inseparable from everyday life and the calibration of the world around us.
The IPK is a 39- millimeter- tall, platinum- iridium cylinder housed in 
three nested, vacuum- sealed, glass bell jars and locked in a vault on the 
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outskirts of Paris.63 Access to the IPK requires five separate keys, kept by 
three separate individuals.64 If Hollywood films are to be believed, there 
are more keys involved in accessing the IPK than launching a nuclear 
missile from a submarine (which movies have shown me only need two 
keys).65 That much security is necessary to guarantee that this small piece 
of metal is safe and uncontaminated.66 Until 2019, the IPK— represented 
more elegantly by its symbol, 𝔎— was the basis of the unit of mass in the 
International System of Units. The International System of Units, abbre-
viated SI, is more commonly known as the “metric system,” though the 
equation of the two is misleading. When I write 𝔎, please imagine that 
I have written “IPK.”
𝔎 was afforded its own special symbol because it is a unique object; 
though it has siblings and descendants, it is special among its kind. 𝔎 gets 
its own symbol because of its use in mathematical calculations. Like π (pi) 
or Ω (ohm), 𝔎 is a fixed value used in the calculation of other values. 𝔎, for 
instance, is used in the calculation of Ω. Unlike π or Ω, however, 𝔎 previ-
ously did not refer to an abstract figure, but rather to a physical artifact. 
The most important aspect of 𝔎 was that all kilograms referred back to it.
Like many proxies, 𝔎 represented a kind of idealism. As part of the 
original metric system, it was derived from a scientific endeavor situated 
in the depths of the Enlightenment and was based on French Republican 
ideals, which stated that more democratic measurement standards could be 
based on the so- called invariants of nature instead of the arbitrary whims of 
kings, lords, or merchants. In this case, the invariant was a fraction of the 
Earth’s circumference (a meridian). While not all proxies are this idealistic, 
the high- minded surrogate logic behind 𝔎 hinged on picking a piece of 
metal that could transcend the authority of monarchs.67
The choice of a proxy is the choice of a fixed point against which sub-
sequent objects will be judged. Lying beneath the choice to base a measure-
ment system on the invariants of nature is a searching desire for stability 
in a chaotic world, in which standardization represents a human- built 
attempt at creating order. By divorcing measurement standards from the 
whims of monarchs and their emissaries, the designers of the metric system 
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were declaring that the scientific community was the proper locus of power 
to name proxies.
The management of the metric system is overseen by a three- part bureau-
cracy, created by the 1875 Metre Convention (also known as the “Treaty of 
the Meter”): the Conférence Générale des Poids et Mesures (CGPM; General 
Conference on Weights and Measures), which acts like the UN General 
Assembly of all signatories to the Convention and meets every four years; 
the Comité International des Poids et Mesures (CIPM), which is kind of 
like the UN Security Council to the CGPM, meeting every year and guid-
ing decisions about measurement standards; and the Bureau International 
des Poids et Mesures (BIPM), which encompasses all of the physical infra-
structure of the metric system and its headquarters. The BIPM includes a 
set of laboratories and offices in Sèvres, in the suburbs of Paris. Together, 
these different groups and institutions are responsible for guiding changes 
to the future of metrology and providing protocols to national laboratories 
and methods for establishing equivalences between national measurement 
standards.
Despite its origins in a French Republican project aimed at creating 
democratic standards, the IPK was a rarefied object. Although local mea-
surement standards for length were once embedded in city gates, making 
them available for traveling craftspeople trying to calibrate their tools, the 
IPK was, in its lifetime, exceptionally difficult to access. This is a deep but 
functional irony of proxies, as they need to be both easily realizable and 
secured against interference. 𝔎 manifests this irony in a very obvious way: 
most of the world engages with the metric measurement of mass on a daily 
basis. (Even the pound unit of weight in the US customary system is actu-
ally defined as a fraction of the kilogram.) Yet a tiny number of people have 
ever interacted with 𝔎. It’s like the pope, but even more secretive. Each 
measurement of mass that relied on the soundness of the metric system 
relied on the fact that 𝔎 was safely kept where almost no one could see it. 
Yet when it is withdrawn from its safe enclosure to be cleaned, it transi-
tions from the secure basis of being a worldwide measurement system to 
become a working object and a profane artifact of the laboratory; hygiene 
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is what connected the kilogram’s idealism with its realization as a scientific 
instrument.
Sporting the French designation nettoyage et lavage (cleaning and 
washing), the hygiene protocols for 𝔎 were a response to the object’s spe-
cific history— crafted in the nineteenth century, locked in a vault— and its 
position atop a referential hierarchy. 𝔎 is a privileged case in the history of 
measurement standards that nonetheless demonstrates many of the basic 
features that proxies share. It was selected and agreed upon by committee 
and convention, and it is invested with self- referential importance, such 
that replacing it required a wholesale rewriting of the metric system. The 
history of 𝔎, then, is both a general history of the manual maintenance of 
proxies and a history specific to the material conditions and constraints of 
this one specific piece of metal.
THE HIERARCHY OF KILOGRAMS: TRACEABILITY
Measurement science uses the relationships between objects and institu-
tions to maintain the authority of standards. The referential relationship 
between 𝔎 and other kilograms is called traceability. Traceability is a term 
used in a wide range of disciplines, operations, and practices. Genealogy 
uses a kind of traceability, as does forensics. In measurement science, trace-
ability refers to “a property of a measurement result whereby the result can 
be related to a reference through a documented unbroken chain of calibra-
tions, each contributing to the measurement uncertainty.” 68 There are two 
things to note. First, this kind of traceability deals in a logic of material 
presence. The unbroken chain of calibration means that each kilogram in 
the chain of kilograms must have been compared, side by side, to a kilo-
gram one level above it in the hierarchy. Second, each step away from 𝔎 
adds to the uncertainty of each kilogram’s precise mass. Traceability is the 
combination of calibration and citation: a measurement operation with 
a history. As one introductory textbook puts it: “To say that a package of 
butter weighs a pound means that it has been connected by some long and 
complicated series of comparisons to The Kilogram in Paris, and weighs 
0.4539237 times as much.” 69
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In practice, this means that local inspectors possess a kind of working 
standard that is checked against, for example, county, state, or national 
prototypes so that they can verify a scale in a grocery store— a practical 
mass measurement instrument— with the knowledge that the standard is 
traceable to 𝔎 (figure 2.4). Most national laboratories have prototypes that 
are traceable to 𝔎; these are referred to as “secondary standards,” which are 
calibrated through direct comparison with each other or 𝔎, the primary 
standard.70 Traceability is the capacity of a system to account for its con-
nections: in this case, to quantify, document, and disseminate the differ-
ence between two individual pieces of metal. But not just any traceable 
difference will suffice. The kilograms involved in the traceable hierarchy of 
mass standards need to have the lowest possible level of uncertainty.
Figure 2.4
Traceability in the wild— in this case, proof that a scale at a New Jersey branch of a popular 
chain of grocery stores was recently inspected. Similar stickers are seen on any scale that an 
employee operates (deli, butchery, fish, and so on), including the scales used by cashiers. This 
interdependent network of inspected scales guarantees that the measurable weight of goods 
is consistent throughout a given store, within a particular state or nation, and that all of them 
are ultimately traceable to 𝔎.
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THE PROTOTYPE KILOGRAM: A SYSTEM OF FIXED POINTS
The metric system is the most wide- reaching set of measurement standards 
in history. And among modern standards, it is also one of the longest last-
ing, having been in force in some form since 1799. Many of the protocols 
surrounding the metric system established the means through which inter-
national standardization efforts could take place. Tellingly, the 1798– 1799 
Congress on Definitive Metric Standards, organized by the French govern-
ment, was likely the first international scientific conference of any kind.71
Prior to the creation of the metric system in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, the Ancien Régime in France believed that the flourishing of the Brit-
ish economy was due to their standard measurement system, and the lack 
of such a system in France prevented them from participating in the kinds 
of frictionless trade possible in Britain.72 A uniform system of measure-
ments, the monarchy’s chief minister of the nation believed, could solve the 
national food crisis, so he recommended declaring the local Parisian set of 
measurements as the new national standards. As Ken Alder writes, “A mod-
ern nation needed a standard, any standard, and the surest course of action 
would be to declare the units used in Paris the national units.”73 Instead, 
as scientists and bureaucrats worked on a new system of measurement— 
what would become the metric system— revolution broke out in France 
and standardized units, universal decimalization, and fixed points based on 
the Earth were each held up by Republican figures as symbols of the egali-
tarian possibilities of nonauthoritarian rule. The French Academy of Sci-
ence wanted a universal measurement based on the “invariants of nature.” 
This was an attempt to erect a standard that could be enacted— that is, 
performed— neutrally, objectively, and beyond the control of the monarchy.
Here, a subtle shift was made to align scientific objectivity with politi-
cal neutrality and egalitarianism. Hence, the meter was based on a fraction 
of the Earth’s quarter- meridian: “They vowed to choose a set of measures 
which would ‘encompass nothing that was arbitrary, nor to the particular 
advantages of any people on the planet;’” and a set of measures that could 
establish “a uniform language for the objects of daily economic life.”74 
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Despite the language of the proposal— the insistence that the measure-
ment system would “encompass nothing that was arbitrary”— there is no 
natural or guaranteed alliance between something called a “meter” and the 
Earth.75 Indeed, as later calculations would show, even the measurements 
of the meridian were erroneous and based on inaccurate, though no less 
precise, conjecture about the Earth’s shape. 
In the metric system, the length and shape of a meridian constituted a 
way of encoding a necessary fiction as a starting point for a new measure-
ment system. The fiction itself was also a heavily encoded signifier, reflect-
ing the social, political, and economic idealism of a nation on the brink of 
revolution and promising that citizens would be able to share information 
and conduct business through a standard that was independent of the sov-
ereign. As an outgrowth of the political upheavals of post- Revolutionary 
France and Enlightenment ideals, the early years of the metric system were 
tumultuous— and imposition of the new system was often met with vio-
lent pushback. But its designers persisted.
In 1799, a prototype meter and kilogram, called “Le Mètre des Archives” 
and the “Kilogramme des Archives,” were produced using provisional mea-
surements of the meridian. The Kilogramme des Archives was based on three 
interrelated, fixed points: the length of the meter, itself based on a fraction 
of a terrestrial meridian, and the mass of distilled water at its melting point. 
Here, 1 cubic centimeter of pure water equaled 1 gram and, to make the pro-
totype more practical (instead of tiny), its mass was 1,000 grams. Yet once 
the meridional measurements were shown to be inaccurate, the inaccuracy 
was ignored. That is to say, the precision of the inaccurate measurements and 
the precision of the prototype’s construction were far more valuable for the 
social and political work that the new measurement units would perform, as 
fixed points, than the accuracy of their referential measurements.
As Scott notes, three factors in particular led to the metric system’s 
ascendance:
First, the growth of market exchange encouraged uniformity in measures. Sec-
ond, both popular sentiment and Enlightenment philosophy favored a single 
60  Chapter 2
standard throughout France. Finally, the Revolution and especially Napoleonic 
state building actually enforced the metric system in France and the empire.76
While Napoleonic conquest within Europe is often credited with the success 
of the metric system, recent research has highlighted the role of industrial 
standardization. Beyond mere market exchanges, international expositions 
became major trading sites and stages for the benefits of standardization.77 
For nearly a hundred years, the metric system ebbed and flowed in its adop-
tion and enforcement. Despite being illegal in England (it was legalized in 
1896) and the United States (1866) for much of the nineteenth century, 
the metric system grew into a singularly powerful and deeply entrenched 
standard through both industrial adoption and military imperialism.
> > >
The true moment of ascendence for the metric system came in 1875, with 
the signing of the Metre Convention. The conference to sign the Metre 
Convention took place in Quai d’Orsay, in Paris, and lasted from March 1 
until May 20. Over those seven weeks, attendees planned the creation and 
maintenance of new physical standards for the meter and the kilogram.78 
This meant deciding on the design and selection of new physical artifacts, as 
well as the establishment of a new bureaucracy to oversee the system. At the 
1875 conference, attendees considered whether the Mètre des Archives and 
Kilogramme des Archives would serve as the bases of the new standards, 
as the intervening decades had shown these standards to be far from true 
derivations of the “invariants of nature” on which they were supposedly 
based. They decided to retain these prototypes as primary models and to 
produce new meters and kilograms as facsimiles. The choice of an original 
fixed point, the precise- if- inaccurate measurement of a terrestrial meridian 
had, it turned out, locked in a system of measurement whose usefulness 
superseded the drawbacks of its inaccuracies. At each stage of renewal and 
revision in the metric system, the original, arbitrary decision to base the 
system on meridional measurements was reaffirmed and resanctified.
A renowned British assayer and refiner, Johnson & Matthey, was cho-
sen to produce thirty prototype meters and forty prototype kilograms to 
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serve as national reference standards for signatories to the Metre Conven-
tion.79 The first three kilogram prototypes were produced together and, as 
such, 𝔎 is one of three “identical” artifacts, chosen for having the smallest 
measurable difference to the Kilogramme des Archives. The word “identi-
cal” is tentatively used here because 𝔎 was vested with its position atop the 
hierarchy of mass measurements precisely because it is not identical to any 
other object. When it came time to compare the new prototype kilogram 
with the Kilogramme des Archives, the measurements were carried out in 
the grand hall of the Paris Observatory (among the greatest symbols of 
Enlightenment science), which was located directly on the same meridian 
that was used to formulate the metric system.80
I highlight these rituals because they do nothing to make measure-
ment science more accurate. But they clearly perform a cultural function: 
through the theatrical performance of objectivity and the rituals of com-
mensuration that surround the manufacture and consecration of new 
proxies, we glimpse the ways that institutions shore up the arbitrariness of 
human decision- making. Here, the choice of one tiny piece of metal over 
others in order to stand as a sacred and self- defining unit was explicitly 
drawn together with the measurement of the Earth, the legitimacy of aca-
demic science, the larger political movements of Republican France, and 
the institutional markers of seriousness, prestige, and history.
THE RITUAL BURIAL
𝔎 was joined by six other check- standard kilograms, called témoins (wit-
nesses). The wording here is important. The meaning of the French words 
témoin or témoinage (witnessing) is comparable to their counterparts in Eng-
lish. The witness kilograms are meant to attest to changes in 𝔎. They do not 
do this through eyewitness accounts or oral testimony; rather, they attest to 
changes in 𝔎 by being brought into measurable comparison. The only knowl-
edge that we have of 𝔎’s absolute mass comes from comparisons conducted 
with a mass comparator, which is like a kind of scale that only measures differ-
ences between two objects. The witnesses’ bona fides are established through 
a shared history and through their identity as kilograms: they were produced 
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from the same metallic alloy from the same refining company, some at the 
same time as 𝔎 and some in the years afterward; and they are housed in the 
same environment, in the same vault, with the same air and the same exposure 
to light.
According to the BIPM, any factor that is shared by 𝔎 and its wit-
nesses can be ruled out as a factor contributing to changes in the mass 
of 𝔎.81 That is to say, the officials at the BIPM believe that anything that 
would bear on 𝔎 would also bear on its witnesses. It is afforded more care 
and attention than most measurement tools, but the use of témoins and the 
attempt to control for 𝔎’s historical specificity— to identify what is special 
to it that might explain some change in mass— highlight a facet of com-
mensuration in all measurement operations: measurement is a process of 
developing conditions for identifying difference.
In 1889, fourteen years after the signing of the Metre Convention, 
it came time to vest the prototypes and the témoins with the imprimatur 
of the institution at the first meeting of the CGPM. During the troisième 
séance (third session) of the General Conference, the attendees entombed 
𝔎 along with 𝔐, the prototype meter. The two would serve as the basis of 
length and mass measurements in the metric system for decades to come, 
but first it needed to be sanctioned by the attendees of the conference. In 
the early afternoon of September 28, 1889, the attendees of the CGPM 
gathered to enclose the new prototype meter and kilogram. The minutes 
from the session describe the process as “enfermer,” which translates in a 
number of ways: “to enclose,” “to lock up,” or “to sequester.” Peter Galison 
translates this act as “burial” and “interment,” which might exaggerate the 
inaccessibility of the prototypes to future access, but usefully highlights the 
ritual nature of the event.82
Eight objects were enclosed that day: 𝔎 and 𝔐 were each joined by two 
témoins, a thermometer, and a copy of the report describing the ritual. This 
network of objects created a circuit of referentiality based in a documen-
tary regime of verification, with each piece pointing back to another: the 
report signifying the consecration of the objects, the thermometer attesting 
to the fact that the objects are kept at a stable temperature (that of melting 
ice), the témoins as corroborators of the prototypes, and the prototypes as 
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embodiments of the measurement system’s authority.83 The entire vault was 
locked by three keys, behind an outer door locked by an additional two keys, 
and the keys were given to three separate officials.84 This process, consisting 
of burying objects in front of an audience, with reports of their sanctifi-
cation, and locking those things away with keys to make them transcend 
their profane origins, attests to the ritual, manual, and documentary condi-
tions that enable, create, and maintain proxies at the basis of standards. Like 
Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the signatures on the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, where “the signature invents the signer,” the Prototype Meter and Pro-
totype Kilogram had no authority until they were hidden from view, locked 
in the dark along with the documents declaring their power.85 Likewise, the 
authority of the documents that are buried alongside the meter and kilogram 
is performed by the copresence of the consecrated objects. One does not 
predate or include the other; they work together to constitute a verifiable 
institution.
The ritual burial of 𝔎 and 𝔐 began a new era in the metric system. There 
was now widespread international agreement among a plurality of nations to 
assign foreign (Parisian) artifacts as the basis of their measurement systems. 
Even in the United States— a country famous for its refusal to use the metric 
system in civic measurements— the Metre Convention changed the meaning 
of standard units. The United States was an original signatory to the con-
vention, and in 1893 it changed the definition of its customary units (feet, 
inches, pounds, ounces) to be based on fractions of the metric system. The 
allure of international interoperability was too powerful to resist. But the 
1889 ritual gets short shrift in the history and philosophy of measurement. 
The focus instead tends to fall on the definitions of the meter and kilo-
gram that followed after those artifacts were sealed into the vault. At the 
third CGPM in 1901, the mass standard was defined explicitly:
The kilogram is the unit of mass; it is equal to the mass of the international 
prototype kilogram.86
This declaration meant that the kilogram, as a unit, is only ever the mass 
of 𝔎, and the mass of 𝔎 is always equal to 1 kilogram. By this definition, 
𝔎 could not include a measurement error, as it contains no uncertainty.87 
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This is the only way that it can serve as a stable ground for determining dif-
ference in other prototypes and, for that matter, any measurable difference 
of mass.88 This assertion of 𝔎’s lack of inherent error is strictly conven-
tional. A “kilogram” had no natural meaning except that which is assigned 
by decree to one particular piece of platinum- iridium. The original Kilo-
gramme des Archives, which 𝔎 was meant to reproduce, was based on both 
the measurement of the meter and the density of water. The meter, in turn, 
was based on a fraction of painstaking (if inaccurate) measurements of 
the Earth’s meridian. Objects can seal in provisional, mistaken, or hurried 
knowledge and assumptions about nature, behavior, and political process. 
The mass standard, then, is at once a rich index of a political process and a 
flawed index of a natural attribute of the Earth.
BAD HYGIENE
The circular definitions of the metric system’s mass and length standards have 
produced no shortage of philosophical consideration.89 Ludwig Wittgenstein 
turned to the International Prototype Meter to prove a point about the con-
ventionality of paradigmatic thinking. He writes by way of example in Philo-
sophical Investigations: “There is one thing of which one can say neither that 
it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the stan-
dard metre in Paris.”90 What Wittgenstein is arguing is that there are certain 
concepts (or, in this case, objects) that are paradigmatic and self- sufficient, 
such that they create the standard by which other objects of that kind will be 
understood, measured, classified, and otherwise ordered. Some have dismissed 
Wittgenstein as fundamentally misunderstanding or misstating the function 
of measurement but he, and likeminded philosophers, expose both the con-
ventionality of measurement and an aporia at the center of standards.91 It is 
this kind of paradigmatic thinking that Michael de Podesta invoked when 
he began his lecture at the RI with his definition of measurement.
An object cannot be compared with itself— we need methods for separat-
ing objects from each other and from themselves. As Natalie Melas describes, 
comparison implies both a comparator and a perspective, as all comparison is 
situated by who or what is doing the comparison and from what position. 
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In comparative literature, as Melas argues, the Western canon provided the 
background against which other literatures could be compared (and, accord-
ingly, shapes the inclusions and exclusions of what is considered serious lit-
erature). In mass metrology, the kilogram served that purpose.92 As Karen 
Barad states, “there is something fundamental about the nature of measure-
ment interactions such that, given a particular measuring apparatus, certain 
properties become determinate, while others are specifically excluded.”93 In 
the case of mass measurements in the metric system, 𝔎 appears to create 
the possibility for a determinate mass property in its traceable descendants; 
through traceability to 𝔎, other kilograms are granted the property of being 
kilograms, and gain the seriousness of measurability.
But with no ground of its own, 𝔎 cannot resort to traceability for its own 
determination. Instead, as Barad writes, “which properties become determi-
nate is not governed by the desires or will of the experimenter but rather 
by the specificity of the experimental apparatus.”94 𝔎 gained its status as 
a kilogram through a piece of circular logic embedded within the written 
documentation for the metric system. 𝔎’s statutory status as a self- sufficient 
measurement standard provoked a couple of uncomfortable questions: Could 
a decree be the grounds for determining a measurable property? Is the decree 
part or parcel of the measuring apparatus? Changes that the BIPM made to 
the definition of mass in subsequent years, short of answering these ques-
tions, show how the metrology community has, at least, struggled with their 
answers.
In its 1921 definition for mass, and, with it, the kilogram, the BIPM 
tried to obviate the need to determine the true mass of 𝔎. The self- sufficient 
definition vested the act of determining the kilogram’s mass in the institu-
tions of the metric system— in its conventions, practices, and protocols, 
but also in its vaults, bell jars, and keys. But the need to compare 𝔎 to its 
témoins created friction. By the middle of the twentieth century, BIPM offi-
cials were aware of the mounting problem of 𝔎’s poor hygiene. Earlier in 
this chapter, I stated that 𝔎, by definition, cannot contain uncertainty—it 
is, at all times, equal to 1 kilogram. This is, in practice, true. However, the 
kilogram does have an absolute uncertainty— a rate or amount by which 
its mass is increasing or decreasing— which could, in theory, be estimated 
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through comparison to its témoins, though never fully determined (or put 
more simply: we cannot be certain about its uncertainty). However, there 
is a more fundamental uncertainty that has prevented any attempt to esti-
mate how much 𝔎 has changed over time, and that is a form of uncertainty 
that results from an untimely act of cleaning.
When the assayer and refiner Johnson & Matthey manufactured 𝔎 
and the other forty original kilograms, the committee responsible for over-
seeing the production specified at which stages, and in what ways, the pieces 
of platinum- iridium were to be washed and cleaned.95 At times, this meant 
cleaning with some combination of steam, alcohol, or distilled water. The 
final step, when the manufacturing was complete, was a steam bath.96 (The 
apparatus used to clean kilograms from 1882 to 1889 can be seen in 
figure 2.5.) The kilograms were then left to dry under a bell jar in the pres-
ence of a desiccant, anhydrous potassium hydroxide.
Great care and meticulous specifications were put into the directions 
for precise hygienic treatment of the kilogram prototypes, and yet no direc-
tions were provided for the upkeep, maintenance, and ongoing hygiene 
of the prototypes after being manufactured. It is important to remember 
that in the mid- to- late nineteenth century, the possibility of a truly func-
tional metric system was an unprecedentedly large standardization project. 
Although most countries, municipalities, and merchants had experience 
with their own measurement standards, less thought had ever been paid 
to how a material proxy would be maintained for a longer period and in a 
verifiable way.
Hence, there was no mention of cleaning kilograms again until 1939. 
At this point, Albert Bonhoure investigated the effect of cleaning on the 
mass of platinum- iridium kilograms. He used a chamois leather cloth, 
soaked first in ethanol and then in redistilled gasoline, to rub all the sur-
faces of the cylinder. Although World War II interrupted his investigations, 
Bonhoure cleaned 𝔎 and its témoins in 1946. That’s when he made a fateful 
mistake: he cleaned the kilograms before noting their masses and how each 
compared to the other. This untimely act of hygiene wiped the traceable 
history of measurable contamination off 𝔎 and its siblings. This decision of 
Bonhoure’s to clean before measuring fundamentally changed the capacity 
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to quantify the relationship between 𝔎 and its descendent kilograms— and 
forever marked the definition of mass with an uncertainty borne of bad 
data hygiene.97
Data hygiene is a set of manual protocols for maintaining the author-
ity of data but there is also a temporality to these protocols. Once 𝔎 was 
cleaned, cleanliness became a part of its history— a pivotal moment that 
altered its commensurability with other objects. The history of its hygiene 
then became a crucial part of accounting for its materiality. But by mistim-
ing the act of cleaning— by wiping and then measuring— Bonhoure left a 
Figure 2.5
An artist’s rendition of an apparatus for cleaning prototype kilograms from 1882– 1889. Steam 
and alcohol vapor were directed alternately at the kilogram. A similar apparatus can be seen 
in Girard (1990), 6. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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gap in the documentary regime that maintained 𝔎’s authority as a ground 
of value.
Despite this untimeliness, the BIPM used Bonhoure’s new cleaning 
protocols on all kilograms that were subsequently sent to the BIPM for 
verification; the only provisional remedy to the erasure of 𝔎’s history was 
to also scrub the objects it was compared with. There were a total of three 
periodic verifications of 𝔎 and the national standards that are descended 
from it. These periods lasted several years (the first from 1899– 1911, the 
second from 1947– 1954, and the third from 1988– 1992). During these 
verifications, the BIPM invited members of the Metre Convention to send 
their national prototypes to be verified against 𝔎 and the BIPM’s other 
working standards. By means of rotating comparison— pairing up different 
kilograms with each other— the BIPM scientists deduced changes of mass 
in national prototypes, and these changes were registered as innate errors 
in those prototypes. The verifications also allowed the possibility— with no 
absolute certainty— of deducing some estimated mass changes in 𝔎.
The third periodic verification, beginning in the late 1980s, allowed the 
greatest comparison among 𝔎, its témoins, and other nations’ kilograms. It 
also became a staging ground for developing a more complete technique 
for cleaning and washing kilograms, which could be “addressed in a more 
searching way than had been done previously.”98 The technique developed 
by G. Girard, through the third verification, was interpreted earlier in this 
chapter in the instructions for washing your own kilogram, and describes 
a method for nettoyage et lavage that cleanses the surface of the kilogram 
while apparently doing no damage to the object.
In 1989, cleaning shifted from a supportive protocol in the mainte-
nance of mass standards to being a constitutive part of the definition of 
mass. Henceforth, the kilogram would be defined by reference to 𝔎 imme-
diately after cleaning. The full definition reads as follows: 
The kilogram is the unit of mass; it is equal to the mass of the international 
prototype of the kilogram.
It follows that the mass of the international prototype of the kilogram is 
always 1 kilogram exactly, m(𝔎) = 1 kg. However, due to the inevitable accu-
mulation of contaminants on surfaces, the international prototype is subject 
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to reversible surface contamination that approaches 1 μg per year in mass. For 
this reason, the CIPM declared that, pending further research, the reference 
mass of the international prototype is that immediately after cleaning and washing 
by a specified method.
The reference mass thus defined is used to calibrate national standards of 
platinum- iridium alloy.99
This redefinition of the IPK makes it clear that the mass standard is not 
simply defined by reference to its Enlightenment ideals— the transcen-
dence of nature’s invariants, represented by the length of a meridian— but 
rather by reference to the history of the maintenance of 𝔎 and the make-
shift methods for mediating between its environment and its metal alloy.
Starting in 1989, the metric system was, by definition, inseparable from 
the protocols for maintaining 𝔎, and we can detect a historical awareness 
in the new definition— which is otherwise meant to be a succinct descrip-
tion of a basic unit— with the references to the “inevitable accumulation” 
of contaminants and a quantifiable amount of “reversible” contamination. 
This statement declares the awareness that all objects are porous and leaky: 
they absorb their environments and leave their own traces. In this formula-
tion, the keepers of the metric system appear to understand and incorpo-
rate the same critique that Barad made against the whims of the scientist. 
The documentary history of the mass standard shows a growing awareness 
that 𝔎‘s milieu, as well as the manual protocols for its maintenance, are as 
much a part of the kilogram as were the finely tuned instructions for craft-
ing the object.
> > >
Data hygiene, as an analytic term, is meant to illuminate the labor of main-
taining proxies, data, and knowledge infrastructures. Initial considerations 
of 𝔎’s material hygienics concerned its metallic alloy, the reputation of the 
company that crafted it, and the security of its enclosure; later in its life, 
having built up a history of care, new concerns developed regarding the con-
taminants of its environments, the traces that it picked up through circula-
tion, and the potential to account for its history when it was compared to 
its fellow kilograms.
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Proxies intersect and collide with their environments in unpredictable 
ways, despite attempts to control their circulation, to fix them as known 
quantities, and to protect them from interference. Before it was replaced, 
several people tried to deduce the source of deviations between 𝔎 and its 
siblings. Although it is known that 𝔎 and other, lesser reference kilograms 
change in mass, there is no agreed- upon explanation for their changes. One 
possible explanation includes the presence of atmospheric mercury used 
in other parts of laboratories.100 Mercury, which may fall on floors and 
seep into the ground, eventually vaporizes and resettles in metals like the 
platinum- iridium surface of 𝔎. Cleaning cannot undo the eventual mass 
gains from mercury contamination. As Andrew Barry reminds us, this pro-
cess is typical of metal, though counterintuitive:
Metals are not the hard, inert objects that they are often thought to be. . . .  They 
have become “informationally enriched,” and part of the driving force for this 
informational enrichment comes from growing efforts to regulate the properties 
of the materials and the actions of those who develop and use them.101
𝔎 exemplifies this view— a view that we can extend to other proxies as 
well. The hard shell of platinum- iridium is shown to be porous, and the 
practices of the kilogram’s handlers are deeply encoded with more than 
a century’s worth of informationally enriched maintenance— a fact that 
drove the creation of a protocol for cleansing 𝔎 of this rich, lived history.
All physical proxies feature some kind of instability that produces a 
demand. Sometimes these physical artifacts are, by conventional decree, too 
instable and need to be replaced— “standards are not static, never defini-
tions, but representations of something infinite, merely provisional drafts 
certain to be corrected, stand- ins for better ones to come.”102 But if they 
are not replaced, then physical proxies require supportive practices to keep 
them viable. Proxies– – even those erected on a scaffolding of the French 
Revolution’s most idealistic promises– – are in constant need of maintenance. 
The protocols that kept 𝔎 viable lasted over many stages of its existence: its 
crafting, its endowment as the prototype kilogram, and its maintenance as 
a ground of value. Protocols for creating, storing, cleaning, and employing 
proxies are part of what make up the apparatus through which measurement 
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operations become possible, and they comprise the theater of objectivity 
that allows a community to trust a proxy as a credible stand- in.
Whether it’s the conspicuous performance of referees and officials drag-
ging a set of chains on to the field to judge a first down in football or the 
trained hands of scientists rubbing a kilogram with a piece of chamois leather, 
ritual bolsters the significance of measurement. Cleaning the kilogram, like 
burying it, is not just an act meant to protect against scrutiny; it is also an 
internal act that signals to professionals that the work they are doing is mean-
ingful. In commercial and regulatory standards, path dependence will often 
compel accordance with a standard because of the power of history, eco-
nomics, and learned behavior. In the actual crafting of a standard and in its 
maintenance, rituals can serve a similar function by helping to conceal the 
fissures of arbitrariness. By developing protocols for keeping kilograms clean, 
officials at the BIPM invested a performance— the embodied practice of 
cleaning— with the endorsement of scientific necessity. These hygienic pro-
tocols were manual and practiced, and they mediated between the kilogram 
as a piece of scientific hardware and a piece of metal in the care of people.
Consider one of the final changes to the milieu of 𝔎: it moved homes. 
In 1889, the Prototype Kilogram and Prototype Meter were buried in a 
safe together, an act that compelled “cascades of rituals” that included the 
redefinition of the kilogram to incorporate manual cleaning.103 From 1889 
to 2002, 𝔎 and the witness kilograms were kept in that same safe. In 2002, 
the “safe was replaced by a new modern one because the old one was becom-
ing increasingly difficult to open.”104 The problem of doors, the “hole- wall 
dilemma,” as Bruno Latour calls it, exposes the negotiated treaties between 
people and technologies.105 Such a treaty is on display in Sèvres, where main-
taining a proxy as the basis of a standard was conditioned by the capacity to 
work a sticky door. And because the kilogram’s specific milieu (including its 
atmospheric contaminants) will inevitably shape its physical composition, 
this particular door problem will have had a material effect on the makeup 
of the mass standard. How it changed and to what degree would always 
depend on where it was kept. Decisions about its milieu would not deter-
mine whether it changed, but how it changed. This is what institutions do: 
they stabilize social life and structure the behaviors they house.106
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𝔎 was an inordinately long- lived proxy with a rarified biography. The 
choice of 𝔎 over other pieces of metal (or glass, or wood, or water) was 
arbitrary— its shape, composition, and mass were all decided with refer-
ence to a contrived set of invented units. And yet the choices that led 
to 𝔎, however contingent, were specially planned, designed, and treated 
in ways that were meant to transcend this arbitrariness. All proxies are 
conventional and all standards contain material aspects, but the conven-
tional materialism that 𝔎 embodied defined the standard itself; there was 
no separating the metric system from 1889 to 2019 from the worldwide 
agreement over the material specificities of 𝔎 and the practices for keeping 
it as clean as possible.
As the history and end of the IPK indicate, there is a basic discomfort 
with the provisional nature of data hygiene protocols. They give lie to the 
claim that science operates hermetically and objectively by providing access 
“to the pure technological realm.”107 Data hygiene is a necessary, though 
not sufficient, condition of bringing things into measurable relationships. 
Although the choices of materials, shapes, sizes, and compositions may be 
arbitrary, those choices matter, and they solidify in forms that need mainte-
nance. As we will see in subsequent chapters, when the choice is not which 
metal but rather which image to stand in for other images, or which human 
to stand in for other potential humans, the choices will have a significant 
impact on the composition of proxies and the potential for justice within 
systems of standardized knowledge.
3 THE VISUAL CULTURE OF IMAGE 
 ENGINEERS (OR THE LENA IMAGE,  
PART 1)
The centerfold image of the November 1972 issue of Playboy magazine 
featured a young Swedish woman in a large, beige hat with an enormous, 
purple feather tassel. It appears that she is in an attic: a wicker bassinet con-
taining a doll is visible in the background and a kerosene lamp sits over her 
shoulder. Her breast is exposed and reflected in a mirror on the right side 
of the image. The mirroring of the naked body is a generic feature of porn: 
it doubles the model’s flesh and often reveals what is otherwise hidden 
from the gaze of the camera/spectator. She is naked but for the hat, a scarf, 
and a pair of boots— which is a weird assemblage of clothes for someone 
to be wearing. She stares directly into the camera. Playboy said her name 
was Lenna Sjööblom, though we now know her name to be Lena Forsén 
(previously Söderberg). The centerfold appeared in Playboy at the peak of 
its popularity, and the November 1972 issue was (perhaps coincidentally) 
the highest- selling issue of Playboy ever.1
Having considered and talked about this image for the past decade, I 
still think that it is a rather odd picture. The hat and the feather tassel are 
incongruous with the scene; the image is cropped awkwardly. The whole 
thing has the appearance of someone having escaped to an attic naked 
and put on whatever they found. That may be the point. It’s indelibly 
marked by the aesthetics of its time, including a Vaseline- smudged lens 
that is unmistakably an artifact of the 1970s. It remains surprising to me 
that this image has circulated as an example of a good image for nearly fifty 
years– but it has.
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This centerfold would be an unremarkable footnote in the history of 
visual culture, photography, porn, and magazine publishing were it not 
for the fact that in 1973, someone at the University of Southern Califor-
nia (USC), in the Signal and Image Processing Institute (SIPI), scanned 
it to test new image compression and transmission techniques for use on 
ARPANET, an early computer network built by the US military and his-
torically treated as the predecessor to the internet. Between the moment 
that it was digitized in 1973 and today, this particular image transformed 
into the “Lena image” or “Lenna image” (figure 3.1), a ubiquitous industry 
standard and, by anecdotal measure, the most popular digital test image 
of all time. The way that we look at images online was standardized by 
engineers and computer scientists, who often returned to the Lena image 
when they wanted to demonstrate new skills, new techniques, and new 
standards— it is woven into the fabric of our digital and visual cultures.
There are differing accounts of how a Playboy centerfold wound up on 
ARPANET in the earliest days of this network technology. The accounts 
agree that it took place in mid- 1973 and that a SIPI engineer named Alex-
ander Sawchuk and/or his graduate assistant, W. Scott Johnson, performed 
Figure 3.1
The Lena image in its test image form. This image is called Lena_std.tif and was obtained 
from the Signal and Image Processing Institute’s test image database. It is an excerpt of the 
November 1972 centerfold of Playboy magazine.
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the digitization. From there, however, the precise details diverge. Version A 
of the origin story describes a deliberate choice to send someone out to buy 
a Playboy, which they chose because of its special qualities:
One team member ran out to the nearest magazine store and picked up the 
latest Playboy, the fateful Lena issue. The magazine was chosen because it was 
one of the few publications that had full- color, high- quality glossy photos— 
Hugh Hefner insisted on using only the best photography and paper stock 
to avoid having his product considered a low- end skin rag— and its center-
fold was ideal because it was the right size. Photos were wrapped around the 
scanner’s cylindrical drum, which measured thirteen centimeters by thirteen 
centimeters. Folded to hide the “naughty bits,” the top third of the centerfold 
fit perfectly.2
In this version, the image was specifically chosen with foresight out of a 
desire for a high- quality image on good paper stock— an attempt, as it is 
remembered, to capture the qualities of Playboy as a printed artifact, which 
were specific to its status as porn. Although someone supposedly “ran” out 
to a store, the scene is relatively calm and deliberate. The narrator remarks 
that the object and the instrument had a natural affinity— the image “fit 
perfectly” on the scanner— just the right size to crop out the model’s breasts 
and scrub the image of its porniness. The image, in this version, was simply 
“folded” in a way that rendered it no longer illicit.
In another telling of this story, published in the IEEE Professional Com-
munication Society Newsletter, the scene is much more frenzied. According 
to version B:
Sawchuk estimates that it was in June or July of 1973 when he . . .  along with 
a graduate student and the SIPI lab manager, was hurriedly searching the lab 
for a good image to scan for a colleague’s conference paper. They had tired of 
their stock of usual test images, dull stuff dating back to television standards 
work in the early 1960s. They wanted something glossy to ensure good output 
dynamic range, and they wanted a human face. Just then, somebody happened 
to walk in with a recent issue of Playboy. The engineers tore away the top third 
of the centerfold so they could wrap it around the drum of their Muirhead 
wirephoto scanner, which they had outfitted with analog- to- digital converters 
(one each for the red, green, and blue channels) and a Hewlett Packard 2100 
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minicomputer. The Muirhead had a fixed resolution of 100 lines per inch and 
the engineers wanted a 512 x 512 image, so they limited the scan to the top 5.12 
inches of the picture, effectively cropping it at the subject’s shoulders.3
In this version, Sawchuk, his assistant, and the lab director used the maga-
zine both out of necessity and an acute desire for a novel image. Instead of 
folding the image, they tore it. This narrative replaces the deliberate, mod-
est folding used in the first version with a feeling of urgency. In this tale, 
too, there is an affinity between the scanner and the image: the engineers 
“wanted a 512 x 512 image,” which had the effect of cropping the image 
above the model’s breasts.
This is a fairly typical way that moments of innovation are remem-
bered in both popular culture and in professional oral histories; moments 
of boredom and tedium are interrupted by frenzied improvisation. This 
hurried scene is characterized by the hectic pace of intense ingenuity, leav-
ing the scanner, limited by its resolution, to do the hard work of cleaning 
the image of its “not safe for work” content. The irony, of course, is that by 
using the Playboy image, the engineers had already revealed that for them, 
the centerfold image was safe for their workplace: perhaps a colleague 
brought the Playboy to work, like a mystery novel, a crossword puzzle, or a 
newspaper to read on a lunch break.4
It is also apt that the Lena centerfold should follow this path to noto-
riety. On the formal level, Playboy was known as the first popular magazine 
with a centerfold in the United States. This is an important detail in the 
life story of an image often used to test the limits of data compression: 
the centerfold was already a compression technology that used the tech-
nique of folding to maximize the storage potential of stapled paper. The 
centerfold— as compression technology— employs the codec of a single 
gatefold to fit 50 percent more nude woman into the format of the maga-
zine (figure 3.2). Compression allows data to travel, and the centerfold 
allowed the Lena image to be transported into the lab undisturbed, in the 
hands of an engineer.
These stories recall Eve Sedgwick’s exploration of “male homosocial 
desire” and the (sexual and nonsexual) ways that the coherence of American, 
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heteronormative desire is mediated and maintained through shared objects 
of desire.5 By “homosocial desire,” Sedgwick means the ways that objects 
like centerfolds are sites of sexual attachment– – artifacts through which 
groups (of men) can articulate their desire and bond with other people 
over their shared experience of desiring. The Lena image in its original 
context was not just any kind of private image, but a Playboy centerfold, an 
archetypal artifact of what Lauren Berlant calls the “zone of privacy” and a 
conspicuous symbol of a “national heterosexuality [that] ‘adult’ Americans 
generally seek to inhabit.” 6
If the magazine was unremarkable in the USC lab, it is remarkable 
for this taken- for- grantedness. Even if we don’t know this scene firsthand, 
we can recognize it as a genre of “spectacular masculinity”: the garage, the 
closet, the shed, the “man cave”— marked by communal signifiers like the 
pinup calendar, the beer fridge, or a picture of a Corvette.7 It’s the way 
that American hetero desire left its mark on domestic and workplace archi-
tecture of the late twentieth century. And the emerging computer profes-
sions were no exception.8 A Playboy centerfold in a research lab in the early 
1970s was not any mere piece of pop culture detritus. It was a rank icon of 
normative desire and the shifting popular mores surrounding the expres-
sion of sexuality in public life.
Figure 3.2
Diagram of centerfold technology. Paper folds are marked by dashed lines, with the far- right 
third folding inside of the middle third. The centerfold uses a gatefold to compress porn into 
the standard dimensions and format of a magazine. Image: Dylan Mulvin.
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In each version of the origin story, agency for acquiring and possessing 
Playboy was redistributed and disavowed. Desire for the image was dis-
placed and recoded as desire for the formal qualities of the picture and the 
material features of the magazine— singling out the paper stock, the glossi-
ness of the image, its dynamic range, and its portrayal of a human face. 
The image, which is passive in this narrative (something to simply appear; 
something to be retrieved), is subjected to the close analysis and gaze of the 
technicians. But it’s the form, not the content, that they cop to wanting. 
This requires a significant suspension of disbelief that the content of the 
image (a naked woman) could be separated from its form (a glossy image 
on paper). It denies that the glossiness of a porn magazine is connected to 
the aesthetics of representing nudity. But it is altogether typical of the ways 
that proxies are cleaved from their origins. This is a clear attempt to clean 
the image, to render it as mere data and grist for a technical system.
Scholars of data are now well accustomed to noting the ways that data 
are never raw but always cooked, and never mere data but always mate-
rial artifacts of social relations.9 Data sets are inescapably shaped by the 
contexts of their collection, storage, transmission, and interpretation.10 As 
part of a larger project to complicate stories about data and to rematerial-
ize the digital, this chapter documents how an object of desire was framed 
as useful data and a useful proxy for images of the world out there. The 
Lena image served the dual purposes for engineers needing data to train 
algorithms and seeking a template of a human face to act as a stand- in for 
other faces. This story traces the social life of images in the earliest days of 
network technologies and illustrates how image proxies are marked by the 
cultural milieus of their uses.11 By reconstructing the media practices of 
computer scientists in the early and adolescent periods of the internet, I 
excavate the norms and controversies surrounding image reproduction and 
the ways that test images— as porous proxies for the world— soak up the 
contexts of their use and reuse.
This chapter is organized around three contexts for studying proxies 
as porous materializations of data: the socioaesthetic context of test images 
used in the standardization of image technologies; the context of computer 
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research in the 1960s and 1970s— including the regular exploitation of 
women’s bodies; and the institutional context of military- funded image 
research at USC. It closes with a discussion of conversions and how we 
can think about the transformation of images within the larger history 
of proxies. Through the investigation of these contexts, I undertake an 
analysis that follows how the Lena image came to be and came to be taken 
for granted— to see how a cropped image of a white woman from a porn 
magazine could settle into a canonical test image for a new, digital, and 
networked visual culture.
It is now axiomatic in the history of media technology to recognize 
the ways that sexuality and technology codevelop in cycles of innovation, 
adoption, fear, hope, stigma, experimentation, and desire.12 The internet is 
often singled out for exaggerating the effects of a “pornotroping” approach 
to information— one that renders and controls bodies as codified flesh.13 
This chapter and the next will contribute to that historiography. But I also 
want to use the institutional and technological history of image processing 
to understand how image engineers, in addition to being skilled laborers 
embedded in a university and a foundational, technical institution, were 
processing their labor through their identity as consumers of porn.14 The 
intention, then, is to reckon with the ways that desire and control (and 
desire as control) shape technological development from the ground up.
> > >
The history of the Lena image links two forms of cultural work surround-
ing proxies: that of the women who have traditionally served as the models 
for test images, and that of the engineers, technicians, and scientists who 
leverage these images to build connections between their work environ-
ment, their disciplinary standpoints, and the coding of technologies. To 
appreciate the connection between these two forms of labor, joined as they 
are by a Playboy centerfold making its way into the SIPI labs, we first have 
to recognize that there is one obvious discrepancy between the two origin 
stories of the Lena image. In version A, a team member “ran out to the 
nearest magazine store” to buy the issue of Playboy. In version B, at the 
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moment of technical need, “somebody happened to walk in with a recent 
issue of Playboy.” But we can probably dismiss version A’s timeline, as the 
centerfold is from the November 1972 issue, which wouldn’t have been 
on the shelves of a nearby store or newsstand in “June or July of 1973.” 
So maybe something like version B is somewhat closer to the truth. But 
this version should give us pause. Objects are never simply lying around. 
Porn magazines do not happen to appear in a lab at just the right moment. 
Timeliness is a condition of social expectations— a blend of the material 
culture of our surroundings and the tempos of our labor.
Objects, as Sara Ahmed writes, do not “make an appearance.” Instead, 
arrivals take time. Objects “could even be described as the transformation of 
time into form.”15 To study the arrival of objects (or stories of their arrival) 
is to interrogate the contexts of their appearance, and how those contexts 
condition and shape what exactly arrives. We cannot understand how the 
Lena image came to appear on ARPANET in the early 1970s without 
understanding the welcome presence of the November 1972 issue of Play-
boy in the offices of SIPI. The conditions for the arrival of the Lena image 
had to be right. In this case, those conditions included the practiced sur-
veillance of a woman’s body by the trained eyes of engineers, who them-
selves were devoted to the labor of training computers in the surveillance 
of images. To investigate the history of a proxy test image is not only to 
plumb the standards of visual culture, but also to reckon with the visual 
culture of engineers, their position in a larger circuit of culture, and the 
material culture of their workplaces.16
The power to name— let alone create— proxies can shape the default 
conditions of a knowledge infrastructure and the common connections 
shared by its participants. Sawchuk, who digitized the Lena image, would 
go on to serve as one of SIPI’s first directors, and SIPI itself would gain 
notoriety for its early work in image compression and analysis, as well as its 
database of digitized test images. If, following Marilyn Strathern, we con-
sider culture to be “the way certain thoughts are used to think others,” then 
the Lena image, as much as any proxy, has served this purpose for nearly 
fifty years— acting as a lingua franca through which image engineers could 
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understand one another’s labor and accomplishments.17 Although the Lena 
image began as a stand- in for the world of images, it soon became a stand-
 in for the lifeworld of engineers, a stand- in for the communal media of a 
mostly male profession, and a stand- in for a world of images of women that 
could be decompiled, measured, and analyzed.
More than just an analogy, the persistence of the Lena image exposes 
what Charles Goodwin has termed “professional vision.” For Goodwin, 
members of a profession shape events through the creation of objects of 
knowledge “that become the insignia of a profession’s craft: the theories, arti-
facts, and bodies of expertise that distinguish it from other professions.”18 
Practitioners do this, Goodwin argues, through the coding of phenomena, 
which renders everyday events into recognizable objects of knowledge in the 
discourse of a profession; through the highlighting of phenomena and their 
features through practices of discursive marking; and by producing and artic-
ulating material representations— meaning that the stuff of representation 
becomes “the material and cognitive infrastructure” that makes theory pos-
sible.19 In the two narratives about the Lena image’s origins, we can already 
see this process at work, as SIPI engineers sought to code a centerfold as a 
digital image (their domain), highlight its formal features (and downplay 
its cultural ones), and produce and articulate their own process of material 
representation— in this case, articulating the use of the image to the materi-
ality of digital transformation.20
What we recognize as styles and techniques of visual representation 
are inseparable from the uses of image proxies, which are used to train 
and evaluate representational skill. From painting and drawing to three- 
dimensional (3D) renders and machine learning databases, shared refer-
ence images have served as tools for training and comparing the results of 
graphic techniques and the skills of various creators.21 These shared refer-
ence points, in turn, serve as benchmarks for communities of practice. Cho-
sen to stand in for the world out there, an image proxy becomes an artifact 
of a profession’s history, its coherence, and a signal of insider knowledge. 
Through these proxies, we learn how to see, how to judge, how to classify, 
and how to trace our belonging in a culture.
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LENA/“LENA”/“LENNA”
There are at least three different, overlapping figures to consider in the Lena 
image— three different codings of the image. There is Lena Forsén, a Swedish 
person; there is Lenna Sjööblom, the name that appears in Playboy; and 
there is the Lenna/Lena image, a cropped, scanned, and digitized copy 
of the centerfold, whose varied spelling in the digital imaging literature 
indicates some of the awkward liminality of the image itself. We should 
be uncomfortable completely separating these three figures, as doing so 
threatens to undercut the humanity of the person whose body and labor 
are on display in every version of the image. However, as the history of these 
images and their different circulations show, in order to understand how 
the Lena image operates as both a proxy and a token of professional vision, 
it is necessary to understand how the Lena image and the model, Lenna 
Sjööblom, were effectively separated— how a person can be separated from 
her representation and how a test image is coded as a test image instead of 
as a centerfold.22
What really separates the Lena image from the centerfold is a massive 
act of erasure and a concerted act of data hygiene: cropped just above the 
model’s bare breasts, the test image elides the illicit content of the original, 
leaving only her face and the reflection of the woman in the mirror. But the 
act of concealment that recodes the image and transforms it from a lurid 
centerfold into a decontextualized headshot can only ever be partial. The 
image is still marked by the soft- focus styling of 1970s magazine represen-
tations of women, and its original status as a centerfold codes the imagi-
nary spaces beyond the cropping, as the unseen naked body haunts the 
excerpt. This decontextualization is also the primary act of highlighting (to 
use Goodwin’s terminology) that transforms the Lena image into a work-
able proxy. The act of cropping the image above the bare breasts, whether 
by folding or tearing, cleansed it of its original context and transported it 
from a private image of desire into a testable surface.
In the context of the image’s creation, we can situate clipping, crop-
ping, tearing, and folding as ways of transforming the image and framing a 
vision process that would make it a viable test object. This reframing allowed 
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the image to travel outside the immediate context of the SIPI lab. Just as the 
Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) or MP3 standards reformat image 
or sound data to travel in a compressed form, centerfolds need to be reformat-
ted as scientific objects.23 The history of digital image compression needs to 
be understood through the manual labor of shaping image standards, includ-
ing their test data, and the many acts of formatting and cleaning “dirty” test 
data for professional use.
With the growth of computer vision research driven by massive data-
bases, there are potentially millions of test and training images, often 
obtained from social media and the World Wide Web. Each image has an 
origin story and could serve as a case study in how the material of a ver-
nacular life can be transformed into a test object in scientific and technical 
research. But the Lena image is a privileged case. Not only is it excerpted 
from porn, and likely the most frequently used test image of its kind— with 
an inordinately long lifespan— it stands out from other test images because 
of the sentimentality espoused by engineers toward the image, as well as the 
woman it portrays. But even if it is a privileged case, it is far from alone. 
The Lena image is one in a long line of images of white women used by 
engineers and technicians to set the contours of so- called normality within 
image standardization.
TEST IMAGES: A HISTORY OF FEMINIZED WHITENESS
Now let us approach the moment of digitization in the SIPI labs as a con-
juncture: a meeting of contexts that brought together a moment in Ameri-
can popular culture, a set of homosocial rituals, common- sense thinking, 
practices surrounding the use of images, and scientific knowledge- making. 
The first node in this conjuncture, then, is the history of test images used 
in the standardization of visual culture. This history demonstrates that the 
use of the Lena image was entirely in keeping with existing practices of 
calibrating visual standards to white women’s skin as a prototype. And the 
history of test images weds the datafication of images and the visual culture 
of engineers, braiding together a material and aesthetic assemblage for pro-
ducing standardized image technologies.
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A well- used and - circulated test image is a proxy: a known quantity, 
a fixed point, and an invariant for testing the variables of image technolo-
gies. Test images are objects for trying things out, measuring the skills of 
students, and gauging the success of new techniques and technologies of 
image reproduction and manipulation.24 Test images are worked upon 
when they are transformed, compressed, warped, masked, analyzed, iden-
tified, decompiled, and recompiled. But whatever is done to a test image 
must be measurable. In the parlance of digital image processing, test images 
are considered “data”:
Testing different methods on the same data makes it possible to compare their 
performance both in compression efficiency and in speed. . . .  The need for 
standard test data has also been felt in the field of image compression, and 
there currently exist collections of still images commonly used by researchers 
and implementers in this field.25
In researching how scientific and technical processes choose stand- ins, 
the terms “test data” and “training data” frequently appear. For instance, 
training data can be used to hone a facial recognition algorithm’s predictive 
assumptions by using a corpus of facial images. Test data will present the 
algorithm with fresh data to see if the training was successful. For this rea-
son, test data must be data that did not appear in the training set because 
in order to prove that your facial recognition algorithm works on the same 
data set twice would be redundant and offer no predictive value of its suc-
cess in the real world. The definition of “success” will be negotiated by a 
range of stakeholders who can contest what kinds of successes and failures 
are acceptable and which may be noxious.
A piece of test- proctoring software, used for administering university 
exams remotely, flags people of color as “unverifiable” and denies them access 
to their schoolwork— a situation for which students must seek redress. The 
technology, driven by artificial intelligence (AI), asked these students to 
“shine more light” on their faces.26 A millimeter wave- scanning machine, 
used in airport security checkpoints and trained on a strict, binarized cat-
egorization of genders, registers statistically “anomalous” cases as suspicious, 
singling out some people for further inspection and scrutiny.27 The result is 
85  The Visual Culture of Image  Engineers
greater friction, more work, more uncertainty, and less security for people 
who do not cleanly register in opaque, data- driven systems that are increas-
ingly embedded within the civil infrastructures of everyday life. In each case, 
the likely culprit are the training and test data used to develop technologies; 
data that circumscribed the normative dimensions of how these technologies 
could be used.
In visual culture and visual technologies, using the same test images 
repeatedly and consistently across techniques enables a process of techno-
aesthetic benchmarking, in which practitioners can weigh the costs of band-
width or storage against the question “Does it look good enough?” or “Does 
it work well enough?” Benchmarking works only if we can say (in quantity 
or quality) how a new version compares to the original, and without a test 
image, difference isn’t measurable. As for the Lena image’s benchmarks, it 
features a recognizable face, a reflective surface, and a complex feather tassel 
that are often cited as the fixed points that computer scientists and engineers 
can use to track and index the success of their transformations. Test images, 
then, become canvases for crafting, marking, and capturing differences. As 
such, test images often (but not always) feature inconspicuous subject mat-
ter, clear divisions of space, and a variety of pictorial features.
My favorite test image is used in 3D object recognition, and it features 
a shoe, a landline telephone, and a box of miniature biscotti. It gets the 
job done.28 The thinking goes that if an image technique works well on a 
test image or a series of test images, then it is likely to work well on future, 
yet- unknown images. This is possible only if a given image— like the Lena 
image or a shoe and a box of biscotti— is treated as a credible sample of 
the world of possible “natural images” (i.e., the world of rich and varied 
images from the vernacular world). This requires seeing the Lena image as 
a stand- in and imagining, however provisionally, that the way it responds 
to transformation and analysis will correspond with the world of as- yet- 
unknown images. Here, the proxy status of the Lena image is leveraged to 
make a wager: if a processing technique works on this woman’s face, it will 
probably work on pictures of other faces too.
As much as we might try, it is not possible to unbraid the cultural 
dimensions of proxies from their material and formal dimensions. Instead, 
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proxies must be approached as porous and leaky amalgams of their socio-
material histories— they must be approached, in other words, as culture.29 
The uses of the Lena image, beginning with the production of a glossy cen-
terfold for Playboy and continuing through its digitization and circulation 
among engineers, are as much a part of the image as its formal representa-
tion, distribution of features, and color values.
> > >
Femininity and whiteness haunt the history of test images. Throughout the 
twentieth century, images of young white women were used by engineers, 
technicians, and consumers to develop image standards, test that those stan-
dards were implemented correctly, and maintain their equipment. By creat-
ing technologies that more faithfully reproduce whiteness, those coded as 
nonwhite (especially the skin of those culturally coded as Black and Brown) 
are rendered less legible in image media and are subject to the compound-
ing inequalities of intersectional prejudices, produced and exaggerated by 
technology.30 In recent years, and because of the work of civil rights, anti- 
racist, and abolitionist activists, greater attention is now paid to the failures 
of representation that result from using biased training data. Train your algo-
rithms on too many images of pale- skinned people, and they will struggle 
to properly recognize less pale faces and flag those faces as problems for the 
system— a problem that is multiplied when such technologies are dispropor-
tionately used to police and incarcerate racialized populations.31
The failure of image technologies to render or register nonwhite skin 
has become a focus of activists’ demands for more just image technologies. 
However, activists and critics have also been clear that merely using more 
“inclusive” training and testing data is not a sufficient response to the vio-
lences and oppressions of carceral technology. And while these concerns 
are magnified by the unprecedented scales of new technologies and the 
low level of interpretability of many algorithms, the warped representation 
of skin is an endemic issue in the development of both digital and analog 
image technologies.
As Simone Browne describes, “prototypical whiteness” operates by 
treating whiteness as a normative starting point and coding “darkness” as 
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an exception.32 The structuring power of prototypical whiteness means that 
some bodies are coded as legible and others as problematic. This is the ideo-
logical manner in which race becomes a “problem to be solved,” to which, 
ironically, technology is offered as a solution.33 Browne is building on the 
work of Lewis Gordon, who writes that “whites’ existence is treated as self- 
justified whereas Blacks’ existence is treated as requiring justification.”34 
Figure 3.3
Kodak Shirley Card (1974) portraying a woman positioned between three cushions (in the 
original color image, the cushions appear clockwise from right: red, yellow, and blue) and 
wearing a fur stole (white) with gloves (black). Original image: Kodak; photograph: From the 
collection of Hermann Zschiegner.
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Whiteness is a standard, Gordon argues, a default that can be taken for 
granted; adjustments to this default are exceptions and require their own 
explanations and justifications. But it’s a process that always refers back to 
an inescapable, normative whiteness that structures both the standard and 
the exception.
Prototypical whiteness is a facet of the history of image technologies 
and a general “culture of light,” in Richard Dyer’s terms, that binds the his-
tory of pictorial representation with the history of race and colonialism.35 
As Dyer states, “white power secures its dominance by seeming not to be 
anything in particular”36— e.g., the automated proctoring software that 
asks you to “shine more light” on your face. The whiteness at work in test 
images is not an essential identity, but rather a social category that treats 
“white” as the unmarked and default condition of image technologies. Pro-
totypical whiteness works in concert with other normate templates that 
code bodies along the axes of race, gender, sexuality, able- bodiedness, and 
age. Hence, whiteness is both a technological construction that encodes 
some bodies as more legible than others and a coordinate on a graph of 
social difference. In both valences it acts as a cultural adhesive, connecting 
aesthetic norms and technological constraints.
Because we cannot unbraid the social and the material, we have to 
understand the ways that they reinforce each other, in this case in the 
continued production and encoding of bodily difference.37 Prototypical 
whiteness is baked into the history of visual media, but it extends to other 
imaging technologies as well, where different flesh tones and luminosities 
are treated unequally. Researchers have shown that self- driving cars show 
a “predictive inequity” in detecting pedestrians of varying skin tones;38 
that pulse oximeters— which provide vital information about a person’s 
pulse and blood- oxygen levels— provide less accurate readings on darker 
skin;39 and that fitness trackers report less accurate heart rates for people 
with higher levels of melanin.40 Each of these technologies presents the 
possibility of worse health outcomes or death, in part because of a test-
ing and calibration system based on prototypical whiteness.41 By being 
treated as prototypical, default, invisible, and taken- for- granted white-
ness escapes marking, and, in relief, defines what it means to be marked as 
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ethnic, different, impaired, queer, or generally Other. In the technological 
construction of prototypical whiteness, otherness becomes the special case 
that must be explained and adjusted for, while simultaneously serving as 
the exception that proves the rule of whiteness’s normativity. This means 
that “whiteness,” as a cultural position and a datafied coding of flesh, is not 
simply captured and reproduced by image technologies; but image tech-
nologies also work within a sociomaterial system to code and crystalize 
nonwhiteness as difference.
> > >
Whiteness is most portable, as a benchmark for image technologies, when 
it is yoked with gendered representation and a normative femininity. Here 
the history of images of white women threads together a history of being 
looked at and consumed through measurement. In recent years, several 
researchers have taken up the history of test images to chart how engineers, 
scientists, technicians, and a range of standard- setters have encoded this 
history of raced and gendered representation within the basic infrastruc-
tures of visual culture.42
Genevieve Yue and Mary Ann Doane have each written about “China 
Girls,” which, despite the orientalized name, were white women used in 
the calibration of film reels, from the 1920s to the 1990s. China Girls were 
short filmstrips, clipped from a young woman’s screen test and stitched to 
the beginning of freshly developed film reels as tests for technicians to use 
in calibration. The strips would be played before the newly processed film, 
and through these side- by- side comparisons, technicians ensured that the 
film was developed correctly. In this way, they work as a fail- safe check 
against error. There is no clear account of the origins of the term “China 
Girl,” and the professional use of the term apparently predates any appear-
ance in print.43 Despite the difficulties in precisely locating the origins of 
the term, the orientalist emphasis of the name privileges, as Yue writes, “a 
woman’s subordinate, submissive behavior, qualities that would be con-
sistent with the technological function the image serves.” 44 The search for 
these qualities is echoed throughout the history of test images in visual cul-
ture, as well as the long- standing uses of images of women as test objects, in 
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which whiteness and a normative femininity are used to set the conditions 
of new image media and maintain their default settings.
“Shirley images” or “Shirley cards” have served a similar function to 
China Girls, but they are used in color calibration and skin- color balance 
in photography.45 Named for an early model, Shirley cards act as color 
bars for flesh tones. As Lorna Roth writes, skin color balance is a process 
in which a “woman wearing a colorful, high- contrast dress is used as a 
basis for measuring and calibrating the skin tones on the photograph being 
printed.” 46 Shirley cards and China Girls are striking in the ways that they 
try to suture together a technical apparatus and a woman’s face and body. 
They forecast the practices that these technologies might be used for— they 
imagine, however partially, the kinds of faces that might appear on film 
and photography stock.
Figure 3.3 (seen earlier in this section) shows a typical Kodak Shirley 
card from the early 1970s. It portrays a woman in upper- class garb sur-
rounded by pillows in primary colors. Against the stark contrast of her 
black- and- white clothing, the image provides clearly delineated blocks of 
color that can be tested and compared with other images. Figure 3.4, on 
the other hand, is a Pixl test image produced by a Danish company, repro-
duced around the web (I first found it on the website of a Russian ink 
supplier), and used for color calibration of photo printers, acting as an 
unofficial Shirley card. The image features the faces of women, a pair of iso-
lated lips, a pile of meat, a well- manicured park, a luxury car, a watch, and 
a naked pair of buttocks. These Pixl images circulate on message boards as 
calibration tools, and even though the assemblage sometimes changes (the 
car is updated, for instance) the women’s faces and the buttocks stay con-
stant. It’s an incredible amalgam of stuff, all marked by a kind of distilled 
desire. Where early Shirley images dressed models in high- class finery to 
test image media, the Pixl image drops the pretense; women and the arti-
facts of conspicuous leisure all encircle a final image: a giant crevasse.
Television standards were also built on test images with similar aes-
thetic values as Shirley cards. For most of its history, American color tele-
vision was based on something called the NTSC standard (named after 
the National Television System Committee). This standard was adopted by 
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dozens of other countries and lasted for over five decades as a truly hege-
monic standard of visual culture.47 It’s fair to describe the NTSC standard 
as one of the most pervasive and longest- lasting moving image standards of 
the twentieth century. Curiously, though, this moving image standard was 
almost completely based on still images. The engineers who built the stan-
dard used twenty- seven test images and a single filmstrip. A close look at 
their test images (figure 3.5) shows that they depict scenes from an idyllic, 
pastoral life while portraying exclusively white skin.48 They show, among 
others, scenes of people boating, playing table tennis, lounging on hay, and 
leaning on a single- propeller airplane. Although China Girls and Shirley 
cards predated the NTSC, the prototypical use of whiteness as a default in 
image media was extended through the standardization of television.
Like the many test images that came before it, the so- called first Pho-
toshopped image, taken and used by one of Photoshop’s inventors, John 
Knoll, also features the half- nude body of a woman with pale skin, sitting 
Figure 3.4
The Pixl test image for 2009. Used for standard Red Green Blue (sRGB) calibration. Courtesy 
of Thomas Holm and Pixl Aps.
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on the beach, her back to the camera. The image is called “Jennifer in 
Paradise”; the Jennifer in question is Knoll’s girlfriend, and paradise is Bora 
Bora. Also, like the USC engineers and the Lena image, Knoll narrates his 
selection of the image through the combination of its formal features, its 
transformability, and its affective charge. “It was a good image to do demos 
with,” he recalls. “It was pleasing to look at and there were a whole bunch 
of things you could do with that image technically.” 49 The image was just 
one of several that were used to demonstrate the capacities of Photoshop, 
but like other test images, it has taken on an iconic status as the ur- text of 
the technology.
> > >
From early film and television to the present, image technologies have 
been tuned to the prototype of white women’s skin, used as an instrument 
of infrastructural calibration. This means that whiteness moves through 
Figure 3.5
NTSC test image, “Boat- Ashore Pair” from Donald G. Fink and NTSC (1955), Color Televi-
sion Standards: Selected Papers and Records.
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these standards with ease, whereas darker skin creates friction for image 
standards. People with darker skin have historically been portrayed in less 
detail, with less accuracy, and in aesthetically marginalized ways. This is 
due to the amalgam of the ways that image technologies are tested, cali-
brated, and standardized, as well as the network of technologies, practices, 
and cultural labor that surround image reproduction. Kodak film and 
photography stock notoriously failed to reproduce nonwhite skin— a fea-
ture attributed to the assumed whiteness of its users and the film emulsion 
used in producing it and the ways that cinematographers photographed 
scenes and the ways that make- up artists were trained and the way that 
lighting professionals lit faces.50 It’s this entire circuit of people, practices, 
and trained know- how, calibrated through image proxies, that further 
entrenches whiteness as a norm of visual representation. As Dyer writes of 
the history of photography and cinematography,
The assumption that the normal face is a white face runs through most pub-
lished advice given on photo- and cinematography. This is carried above all by 
illustrations which invariably use a white face, except on those rare occasions 
when they are discussing the “problem” of dark- skinned people.51
Treating whiteness as a default meant that cases when conventional light-
ing techniques didn’t work or some skin wouldn’t register on film required 
exceptional solutions— these moments turned those bodies into so- called 
problems that exceeded the default operating conditions of the technology. 
Whereas Dyer documents this process in the history of film, photography, 
and art, we can see its traces clearly extended in the history of test images. 
By basing their sample of the outside world on a prototypical whiteness, 
these failures of imagination and consideration are embedded in technolo-
gies that are developed and calibrated according to a strictly limited cul-
tural viewpoint.
As companies like Kodak accrued more evidence that their technolo-
gies failed to work outside of a narrow band of prototypical whiteness, 
they increasingly sought to remedy the problem by redesigning film stan-
dards and lighting techniques that could reproduce a wider range of skin 
tones.52 These adjustments were frequently coded in racialized terms. As 
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Lorna Roth reports in a personal correspondence from one Kodak execu-
tive, lauding the capacities of a new film stock called Kodak Gold Max, he 
praised its ability to “photograph the details of a dark horse in low light.” 
As Roth writes, “I take this to be a coded message, informing the public 
that this is ‘the right film for photographing ‘peoples of colour.’”53
If we follow Roth’s reading of this correspondence as a coded message, 
then we can see it as an attempt to conceal the existing, racialized problems 
with Kodak film stock through a comparatively ridiculous scenario— there 
were presumably fewer complaints regarding the incapacity of Kodak film 
to photograph horses in low light than its incapacity to reproduce some 
people’s faces and skin. This is not only a dehumanizing equivalence that 
equates (dark) horses with Black or Brown human bodies, it further denies 
the political demand for just representation and the dignity of having one’s 
body faithfully captured on film.
In addition to new film stocks, film and photography companies 
started producing new “multiracial” Shirley cards. Figure 3.6 displays one 
example, called “Musicians,” that was produced by Kodak and provided 
to consumers by an Australian photo printer. As part of a $400,000 AUD 
Kodak Photo CD and Pro Photo printer from the early 1990s, the “Musi-
cians” image could be used by anyone who wanted to calibrate their own 
at- home monitor.54 But on the internet “Musicians” has traveled widely 
and now easily can be found reformatted on message boards, hobbyist sites, 
and commercial printers’ sites, which indicates many and makeshift ways 
in which proxies float through social networks, becoming recognizable 
through use and reuse as quasi- standard stand- ins. In this image, the white-
ness and high- class garb of earlier Shirley cards are swapped out. Instead, 
the scene that it portrays is an emphatically ethnicized one, in which a 
contrast of skin tones is paired with essentializing cultural stereotypes.
Although all the models in “Musicians” hold instruments and wear a 
headdress of some sort, the image attempts to create another kind of strik-
ing delineation. Like the stark opposition of white, black, and primary 
colors in figure 3.3, here the accessorizing of the models separates them 
into (still- feminized) ethnic types based on an equation of skin tone with 
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culturally predetermined modes of dress. For the publics of test images 
(photo- printers and photographers), these multiracial Shirley cards reen-
trench the prototypicality of Euro- American whiteness by clearly mark-
ing these remedial test images as exceptions to the rule. They situate the 
so- called problem of race as a problem of identity and ethnic tradition, 
thereby reifying the default, white Shirley as its own ethnic type.
The “solution” to the regular failures of image technologies once again 
materializes in the cultural, proxy labor of feminized models, here called 
upon to stand in for a performed diversity— a consumable otherness— that 
is conspicuously marked by their contrast to the unmarked whiteness of ear-
lier Shirleys. Solutions like that presented by “Musicians” to the histories of 
failure within image technologies expose the limited potential of inclusion 
Figure 3.6
A Kodak Shirley card called “Musicians” (1993). Image: Kodak. Courtesy of David Myers.
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as a remedy to unjust representation— and demonstrate how inclusion itself 
can reinforce the representational power of the already- dominant.55 Images 
like “Musicians” expose the global reach of image technologies and stan-
dards, but they do so by presenting a visualized menu of women, and evok-
ing the commodification of otherness, in which “ethnicity becomes spice, 
seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture.”56
Whiteness is a problem for technical reasons— it breaks the intended 
outcomes of a technology meant to portray people faithfully— but more 
important, it is also unjust and sets a default against which everything 
else must be treated as exceptional. Defaults encode the normal way that 
a technology is meant to work; when these defaults are tuned to normate 
bodily templates that are ableist, sexist, and racist, it forces the vast major-
ity of people who don’t fit those templates to adjust their behavior to fit the 
defaults. This is a recurrent theme in the politics of proxies. The Middletown 
and Decatur studies discussed in chapter 1 inserted whiteness as a default 
social position in measuring American experience. We see the technological 
construction of prototypical whiteness at work in stark relief in the history 
of test images, where whiteness has consistently and repeatedly mutated 
the conditions of possibility for new technologies and their capacities of 
representation.
The fact that white women’s bodies— often half- clothed, naked, or in 
a swimsuit— are employed throughout the process of creating and main-
taining a standard demonstrates how proxies are not only used as a way of 
modeling the world in the laboratory setting. These images suture a stan-
dard together throughout the process of its development, use, and ongoing 
maintenance. In this sense, the SIPI engineers could be confident that their 
use of the Lena image would cohere with the larger world of image stan-
dards, which had also been tuned to similar images of white women. Of 
the images discussed here, from China Girls to the “Jennifer in Paradise” 
image to Shirley cards, some might be used by professionals trained in 
computer science, image engineering, or photo processing; others might 
be used by amateurs and hobbyists. But the corpus braids together the 
sociomaterial process that forms a consistent visual culture.57
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THE CASE OF COMPUTER VISION: THE PROFESSIONAL  
CONTEXT OF THE LENA IMAGE
We’ve seen that the Lena image— in its portrayal of a white woman’s face 
and body— is consistent with the use of test images in other twentieth- 
century image technologies, from photography to film to television. On 
the one hand, the history of these images corroborates the notion that the 
Lena image did not just appear as an unprecedented kind of image in the 
engineering labs of USC. On the other hand, the digitization of a new test 
image was a more novel event. Although the first digital image was scanned 
in 1957, most test images at SIPI were reused from film and television.58 
Digital image processing was mostly new and experimental, and its practi-
tioners hoped that it would solve many of the challenges of compression, 
analysis, and transmission presented by existing video and image technolo-
gies. Moreover, image technologies have often served as useful demonstra-
tion sites for the potential of new computing technologies. And this was 
equally the case during the period that the Lena image appeared, as many 
of the early and foundational experiments in AI were built with the aim of 
teaching a machine to recognize images.59 As one practitioner noted in a 
history of this formative period in digital image work, “Almost as soon as 
digital computers became available, it was realized that they could be used 
to process and extract information from digitized images.” 60
The history of SIPI runs parallel to both the rise of computer sci-
ence and the establishment of the internet— in the form of its predeces-
sor, ARPANET. ARPANET existed from 1966– 1990 as a joint scientific 
and military project investigating the possibilities of distributed computer 
networks and packet- switching. It was funded by the US Department of 
Defense (DoD)’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA— hence, 
ARPANET ), and led by one office in particular, the Information Process-
ing Techniques Office (IPTO). The IPTO helped establish computer sci-
ence as a discipline and provided the direction and funding of what would 
become the internet.61 That background uses a lot of acronyms to say one 
thing: the Lena image appeared during the earliest days of networked com-
puting, when the technology was still in flux and its uses undetermined.
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During ARPANET’s formative years, the research was led by Law-
rence Roberts, who headed up the IPTO. Roberts, an electrical engineer, 
is renowned in the industry for his role in supervising the development of 
ARPANET and his early work on e- mail. But he had also cut his teeth as 
an engineer working on image processing in his graduate work at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The terms “Roberts gradient” 
and “Roberts Cross” are derived from his work and remain key concepts in 
computer vision and digital image processing. Strikingly, his master’s the-
sis, “Picture Coding Using Pseudo- Random Noise,” used several Playboy 
images in demonstrating a technique for sending television images over 
a digital network. The research also appeared as an article, including the 
Playboy images, in the IRE Transactions of Information Theory journal in 
1962 (and is still available online).62 It continues to be widely cited in 
research and patent applications up to the present day.
It was later revealed that the model in the Playboy images used by 
Roberts was sixteen when she posed for her nude photos— so she was only 
a child.63 Like the Lena image, Roberts cropped the nude Playboy images 
when he transformed them into test images; but unlike those who digi-
tized the Lena image, Roberts attributed the images to Playboy. Despite 
the revelation that his foundational study employed excerpts of underage 
pornography, no attempt to redact Roberts’s thesis was ever made, and 
that fact has never been addressed or even mentioned by Roberts or by any 
article that cites Roberts’s research (as far as I have been able to find). His 
research was anthologized by SIPI’s founding director, William Pratt, who 
listed it in 1967 in an early bibliography of work on image compression.64 
Additionally, Lawrence Roberts’s doctoral work was widely cited by the 
engineers at SIPI during the same years that the Lena image first appeared 
in their research.65
The appearance of Playboy at SIPI was not just predictable but a typical 
and indelible mark of the profession’s values and cultural outlook. It is sig-
nificant that the leader of the ARPANET project, who was responsible for 
funding much of the research at SIPI, was himself a trailblazing researcher 
in digital image technology and had used Playboy as his own test material. 
Roberts’s study had already confirmed an important feature of a very new 
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and experimental field: digital image processing would continue the pat-
tern established in other image technologies by using images of women as 
test objects for the demonstration of professional skills and technical feats.
> > >
Within many of the most prominent institutions involved in the history 
of computing and networking, young engineers were practicing digitiz-
ing, analyzing, and transmitting images of nude women. Beyond USC 
and Lawrence Roberts’s work at MIT, engineers at Stanford had used the 
communally sanctioned objectification of women and the sexualization of 
image analysis as a professional practice. The Stanford Artificial Intelligence 
Lab (SAIL) is among the earliest and most storied centers of AI research in 
the postwar period. Established in the early 1960s by John McCarthy, who 
is credited with (among many other major achievements in the field) coin-
ing the term “artificial intelligence (AI),” it pioneered research in language 
processing and robotics. SAIL was folded into Stanford’s computer science 
department during the “AI Winter” of the 1980s and 1990s, a period of 
depressed investment and interest in AI research.
At one point in 1991, past members of SAIL circulated a remembrance 
of the early years of the lab, titled “TAKE ME, I’M YOURS: The Autobi-
ography of SAIL.” The remembrance is told from the perspective of a SAIL 
computer, a PDP- 6, and focuses on notable moments in the lab’s history. 
At one point in the message, PDP- 6 discusses its sexuality (equating time-
sharing with promiscuity) and reminisces about a lab project in which stu-
dents solicited a woman to be part of a film in which she would have sex 
with a computer. Having interviewed two volunteers and rejected one for 
being “too inhibited,” they conspired to film the other volunteer sexual-
izing the computer while other members of the lab secretly watched on a 
recently installed closed- circuit television (CCTV). As PDP- 6 described it:
As you know, we timesharing computers are multi sexual– – we get it on with 
dozens of people simultaneously. One of the more unusual interactions that 
I had was hatched by some students who were taking a course in abnormal 
psychology and needed a term project. They decided to make a film about a 
woman making it with a computer, so they advertised in the Stanford Daily 
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for an “uninhibited female.” That was in the liberated early 70s and they got 
two applicants. Based on an interview, however, they decided that one of 
them was too inhibited.
They set up a filming session by telling the principal bureaucrat, Les Ear-
nest, that I was going down for maintenance at midnight. As soon as he 
left, however, their budding starlet shed her clothes and began fondling my 
tape drives– – as you know most filmmakers use the cliché of the rotating tape 
drives because they are some of my few visually moving parts.
Other students who were in on this conspiracy remained in other parts of 
my building, but I catered to their voyeuristic interests by turning one of my 
television cameras on the action so that they could see it all on their display 
terminals . . . 
After a number of boring shots of this young lady hanging on to me while 
I rotated, the filmmakers set up another shot using one of my experimental 
fingers. It consisted of an inflatable rubber widget that had the peculiar prop-
erty that it curled when it was pressurized. I leave to your imagination how 
this implement was used in the film. Incidentally, the students reportedly 
received an “A” for their work.66
The “experimental fingers” mentioned were likely part of two SAIL projects 
on robotic arms— either the Stanford Hydraulic Arm or another imple-
ment called the “Orm” (Swedish for “snake”), which “featured 28 rubber 
sacks sandwiched between steel plates. By inflating various combinations 
of sacks, the arm would move.” 67 Les Earnest, the SAIL lab manager men-
tioned in the reminiscence, is also the likely author of this document. The 
image stills from this episode are still available on a website devoted to the 
history of SAIL.68
What should we make of this episode? Some might treat it as a story 
about students in the Bay Area in the early 1970s engaging in a sexually 
provocative stunt for a psychology assignment, using their research into 
robotics and AI as the basis of a movie not atypical of the B- movies of the 
era. But there is another reading of this episode that we can see beneath the 
glibness of the PDP e- mail. We know that the images of the woman’s nude 
body were recorded by a PDP- 10 in 4- bit grayscale and saved for (at least) 
the next fifty years. We know nothing about whether the woman con-
sented to the lab’s clandestine observers, the recording of her image to disk, 
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and its storage in their database and continued storage online. As such, this 
episode is one of many in the burgeoning field of computer science and 
engineering in which the bodies of women were instrumentalized in the 
demonstration of technology; here, it is not the Orm or the hydraulic arm 
that should draw our attention, but the CCTV, networked to computer 
monitors throughout the lab. We know that this episode took place on 
March 8, 1971, shortly after the terminals were equipped with the ability 
to receive television signals.
Thus, this e- mail, far from a mere remembrance of the glory days of 
AI research, is a reminiscence about the novel CCTV system and the secret 
filming of a naked woman that the system enabled. These moments of self- 
narration tie together multiple kinds of instrumentalization— that of new 
technology and that of a woman’s body. The episode highlights the ways 
that men articulate their technical achievements to homosocial desires. 
Like the narratives of the Lena image’s origins, resourcefulness in the lab 
was sexualized, and the feat of putting an image of an unwitting, naked 
woman onto the computer network was treated as both a cultural and a 
technical accomplishment.
Robin Lynch has recorded other similar entries from this period. For 
instance, at Bell Labs in 1964, Kenneth Knowlton and Leon Harmon 
had a renowned dancer, Deborah Hay, pose for a nude photo, which they 
printed as a 12- foot- long bitmap mural that they posted on the office door 
of their manager. They were admonished for the prank, but much like the 
Lena image, they found themselves celebrated later when the image made 
its way into art exhibitions and reminiscences about the interconnected 
histories of art and computing. The image, which is known as Nude or 
Studies in Perception I— is often treated as “the first computer- made nude 
portrait.” As Lynch makes clear, however, every step of the process of pro-
ducing Nude involved a deliberate suturing together of the performance 
of Hay, the instruments of their computers and scanners, and the visual 
reference points of classical nude portraiture.69
The professional context for the creation of the Lena image was, there-
fore, the well- practiced use of nude women as test subjects and the per-
vasive sexualization of digital image production as an emergent technical 
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field. Through repetition and citation, these practices of objectification fos-
tered homosocial bonds that connected the sexualized examination of wom-
en’s bodies to the professional measurement of their features. Digital image 
processing was a nascent discipline, but throughout many of its earliest and 
most prominent institutions, the instrumentalization of women’s bodies 
was a means of demonstrating the potential of new methods of seeing.
TANK, WOMAN, TERRITORY: THE INSTITUTIONAL 
 CONTEXT OF SIPI
The Playboy image that USC engineers placed on the analog- to- digital 
scanner was not a random excerpt from the world of pop culture. Rather, 
the centerfold was a conspicuous sample of the SIPI engineers’ cultural 
milieu and a sign of the porous boundaries of the lab’s environment. This 
milieu was characterized by the kinds of image work already happening at 
the USC, the precedents set by existing test images that used white women 
as prototypes, and an espoused desire to create a new kind of test image 
that reflected, through proxy logic, the cultural and technical aspirations 
of the SIPI engineers.
According to the institute’s own description of its history, “SIPI was 
one of the first research organizations in the world dedicated to image pro-
cessing.”70 It was established in 1971 as the Image Processing Institute (IPI) 
using funding provided by a contract from the DoD and the IPTO, the 
organization headed up by Lawrence Roberts, and the office leading the 
ARPANET project.71 Prior to its foundation, many electrical engineers 
at USC already worked with several branches of the military, conducting 
image processing work contracted by the US Air Force, the Army Research 
Office, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA)— and indeed, much of their research con-
cerns more efficient ways of sending images from the Moon back to Earth. 
As William Pratt writes, the initial work at SIPI began “on a very modest 
scale, but the program increased in size and scope with the attendant inter-
national interest in the field.”72
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According to SIPI’s current director, Richard Leahy, “Much of the 
early work at SIPI was on transform coding, now the basis of the [Joint 
Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) and Moving Picture Experts Group 
(MPEG)] standards for still and video image compression and transmis-
sion over the internet.”73 The institute, in other words, aligns its early and 
field- defining research into image coding with some of the most perva-
sive and recognizable standards for digital images today. Reports from the 
1960s attest to Leahy’s claim. A representative report by the lab founders 
William Pratt and Harry Andrews describes the “classic problem” of digital 
image coding as “the search for a coding method which will minimize the 
number of code symbols required to describe an image.”74 To this end, SIPI 
engineers developed what they describe as a novel means of image com-
munication: “whereby the two dimensional Fourier transform of an image 
is transmitted over a channel rather than the image itself.”75 When Pratt 
and Andrews refer to “the image itself,” they are referring to a situation 
like NASA’s Moon Surveyor missions, meant to make the transmission 
of images from the Moon back to Earth more efficient. Transform coding 
changed how this happened. Instead of sending analog television signals 
from the Moon, images could be sampled, turned into bits, and reconsti-
tuted from the data back on Earth.
In reports from the early 1970s, SIPI’s leadership explicates the work 
that they are meant to be doing for the DoD’s ARPA program. The reports 
that are contemporaneous with the Lena image refer to the institute’s work 
as, generally, “Image Processing Research,” which included every step from 
processing, transmitting, displaying, and analyzing to detecting and identi-
fying images in digital form.76 Their research goals also indicated the ways 
that image processing could support the aims of the DoD, if only in the 
abstract. In particular, image transmission from the battlefield, combined 
with image analysis and detection, could be used to distinguish between 
enemies and nonenemies. It is worth highlighting that this research was 
taking place in the middle of the Vietnam War and at the height of the 
Cold War, and that these military priorities were reflected in the test images 
used in SIPI reports.
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Ivan Sutherland, an influential computer scientist, pioneer of com-
puter graphics, and another early director of the IPTO, recalled the use of 
test images during this period in work that he called “artificial intelligence” 
research:
[When] I was in ARPA, the Army had this set of tank and non- tank images, 
and one of the problems was, could you recognize tanks in aerial photo-
graphs? There was this wonderful set of tank and nontank images— I think 
there were a hundred images. Some of the tanks were half under a tree, and 
some of them were recognizable mostly because of the tracks, the trail that 
they leave behind. For 20 or 25 years, there has been the hope that some 
artificial intelligence program or vision program would be able to recognize 
tanks reliably.77
I love this passage for a bunch of reasons— I especially love the idea of 
the exclusive categories of “tank” and “nontank” images. But Sutherland’s 
memories of this data set are also revealing. They indicate some of the test 
images that SIPI engineers might be expected to use— and indeed, tank 
images and aerial photography reappear regularly in their research. His 
comments also signal the larger goals of image processing work in this 
period and its connection to early AI research.
Much of the early digital image processing research began as an attempt 
at character recognition— the idea of using a computer to process images 
that could be automatically “read” without help from a human.78 The goal 
at SIPI was to combine this work with the ambitious project of also trans-
mitting compressed images, potentially across large territories or even from 
space. Whether the “tank” and “nontank” images that Sutherland refers to 
are the same ones that appear in SIPI reports is unclear. But the test images 
used at SIPI certainly speak to the interests of the institute’s government and 
military funders. The research was often caught between clearly military- 
oriented applications such as aerial surveillance and the more pedestrian 
uses of digital images for sending pictures of people. This awkward blend-
ing is visible in the test images from SIPI at that time. Figure 3.7 shows one 
example, a triptych where a white woman’s face is sandwiched between an 
image of a tank and an aerial surveillance image.
Figure 3.7
An artist’s rendering of a triptych band of test images from SIPI: a tank, “Girl,” and an aerial 
surveillance image of a territory surrounding water. It appears to be a port or naval base. This 
is an interpretation of the test image triptych found in William K. Pratt, USCIPI Report #660, 
51. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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The image of the woman in this triptych was in wide circulation long 
before the Lena image and is often simply called “Girl.” It is actually a 
frame from an earlier (1966) test film produced by the Society of Motion 
Picture and Television Engineers (SMPTE). Frames from the SMPTE’s 
test film appear throughout SIPI’s tests, including other images of the same 
woman and a “Man” image.79 The test images at SIPI combined multiple 
image technologies— stitching together a new makeshift standard from 
the proxies of earlier technologies and the emerging applications of digital 
processing.
Enter, finally, the Lena image. The first time that the Lena image appears 
in the published research at SIPI, it is used in three different studies— 
suggesting its adoption as a common proxy across the lab.80 Although it 
was scanned in 1973, the image did not appear in a published SIPI report 
until 1975– 1976.81 The first three published studies that use the image in 
this report are typical of SIPI research in this period, with the aim of com-
bining the digital coding and transmission of images with the analysis and 
identification of their picture elements. In short, the work continues the 
project of combining image coding with AI and the hope that digital pro-
cessing could lead to a system to automatically detect and identify picture 
content (like tanks!).
In addition to the sudden and widespread appearance of the Lena 
image in SIPI research, the lab’s work alternates between a fairly stable set 
of test images, including the triptych of the tank, woman, and aerial sur-
veillance images, and often running the same techniques on the triptych 
and the Lena images. Among the areas of research using these images were 
edge detection and salient feature extraction. Edge detection is a way of 
measuring discontinuities in image brightness, which allows you to outline 
the edges of shapes. If you were going to distinguish tanks from nontanks, 
edge detection would be a first step. Salient feature extraction is a technique 
for reducing the amount of information that you need to identify and 
describe a data set: how much of a face do you (or a computer) need to see 
to know that you are looking at a face and not a tank? These are both ways 
of looking at images and training computers to look at images and each 
transforms their formal components (e.g., luminosity, prominent features) 
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into measurable data— rendering images of people and space as control-
lable material. The Lena image, like the images of tanks, other women, and 
territory, was among the material through which visual culture was becom-
ing digitized and measurable. The desire for a “good image” meant a desire 
for something that could be predictably controlled.
To put a fine point on it, the test images being used at SIPI capture how 
the nascent field of image processing collapsed images of territories, femi-
nized human faces, and enemy tanks into the same grammar of control. By 
applying the same techniques of image analysis to these three kinds of test 
image, side by side, techniques like edge detection and feature extraction 
were meant to transform images into measurable, identifiable data. Engi-
neers were working with a stockpile of images oriented to military research 
goals and recycled from film and television standards. But in the genesis of 
the Lena image, they chose to use a new proxy for the world of images, and 
they chose a Playboy photograph as their stand- in.
Lawrence Roberts had already shown Playboy to be a viable source of 
test material, and existing test images like China Girls and Shirley cards 
echoed the notion that images of white women could be useful stand- ins. 
Choosing an image from which to extract features requires a familiarity 
with the features that one wishes to extract. It means being able to choose 
and desire an image that one can consume as an object. Tasked with train-
ing a computer to understand salient images, a homosocial and (almost) 
universally male group of engineers selected an artifact of American main-
stream porn to train computers in a new science of recognition.
> > >
As historians of computing and networking have shown, much of the early 
history of the internet is concealed through secrecy, a lack of publicity 
surrounding the IPTO, and a lack of interest in its operations.82 This lack 
of traces reflects my own experience with this era as well. Janet Abbate’s 
history of the internet is a valuable resource, but it doesn’t mention SIPI.83 
The piecemeal documentation of early ARPANET work makes it diffi-
cult to understand this period outside of the dominant narratives provided 
by its main architects in interviews and existing histories. Those narratives 
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are characterized by the frequent claim that a series of high- risk decisions 
about packet switching, time-sharing, and distributed and open networks 
created the internet as we know it. It is difficult to test these claims with 
a limited set of documentary evidence from ARPA, the IPTO, and other 
involved institutions.
What do we make of SIPI’s work on ARPANET, in the midst of the 
Vietnam War? Looking to the historiography of the internet shows a denial 
of a connection between the two. Abbate writes:
One potential source of tension that does not seem to have arisen within 
the ARPANET community was the involvement of university researchers— 
many of them students— in a military project during the height of the Viet-
nam War. It helped that the network technology was not inherently destructive 
and had no immediate defense application.84
It is worth investigating the claim that both practitioners and historians of 
computing treat work on ARPANET as “not inherently destructive.” First, 
if this were the entire case, then we might expect that work on ARPANET 
would be immune to the backlash against military research in universities 
during the Vietnam War. However, as Bob Kahn (one of IPTO’s directors 
in this period) says, the IPTO’s budget was suppressed in the mid- 1970s 
due to the “Vietnam Syndrome,”85 meaning someone (if only the DoD) 
thought that the work wasn’t shielded from the war or blowback from the 
war.
Second, to argue that “the network technology was not inherently 
destructive” is to take a narrow view of network technology. For start-
ers, multiple members of the IPTO research team point to the IPTO’s 
involvement in crafting command- and- control technologies, with direct 
application to destructive activities.86 This includes the image processing 
work going on at SIPI and the use of AI to distinguish between tanks 
and nontanks— with the direct implications for choosing bombing targets 
more efficiently.
Third, if we understand the work at SIPI as part of a larger trajec-
tory of research into surveillance and camouflage— a historical struggle 
between hiding and detecting— then it is harder still to exceptionalize it 
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as nondestructive.87 In the Vietnam War era, image processing became 
the newest technique of beating the enemy’s camouflage strategies; this 
destructive reality is materialized in the database of test images, including 
tank and nontank images, the Lena image, images of other women’s faces, 
and images of territories. The fantasy of digital image processing was one 
that combined an entire vision process, from the moment of observation 
through transmission, and up to the moment of identification and analysis. 
The dream is that to see is to know and to know is to control. Test images 
outline this process by standing in for the people, places, and things that 
could be seen, known, and controlled.
CONVERSIONS
The history of test images is one in which the cultural labor of models, act-
ing as stand- ins, is leveraged by engineers, scientists, and technicians, who 
exercise their power to delegate stand- ins for the world of images out there. 
Test images function as a stable set of pregiven data for image professionals 
to use to demonstrate their aptitude and skills. In addition to being a pre-
given set of data, test images are the basis of commonality and community; 
they embody a sameness that enables the measurement of difference.
To become an industry standard and a pregiven set of data, the Lena 
image underwent three kinds of conversion: from paper to pixels, from 
analog to digital, and from the standards of a soft- core porn magazine into 
an image standard. When asked, SIPI engineers say that they converted 
the Lena image from a centerfold into a digital image as a response to their 
work environment and a desire for a dynamic image with distinct formal 
properties on “good paper stock.”88 They characterize their work environ-
ment as boring and their labor as repetitive, and they claim to be “desperate 
for a new test image” 89 and “tired of their stock of usual test images, dull 
stuff dating back to television standards work in the early 1960s.”90 
We now know that their existing images were either recycled from 
previous standards or dictated by their research goals. As a matter of labor, 
the engineers responded with sheer boredom to the repetitive use of their 
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existing set of images and the Lena image appeared as a potential answer 
to boredom. A welcome break from things like tank and surveyor images, 
it was a chance to make a new kind of test image. The Lena image was not 
a haphazard fluke of engineering: it was the result of a concerted effort to 
crystallize the existing and familiar standards of porn’s pictorial style in a 
new technology.
The Lena image is frequently lauded for its formal features— often in 
the process of disavowing desire for the woman it portrays. In the Jargon 
file (a glossary of computing terms first compiled and hosted on ARPANET 
in 1975), the image is described as having “interesting properties— its 
complex feathers, shadows, [and] smooth (but not flat) surfaces,” and these 
properties are regularly cited in technical justifications for the image’s digi-
tization and its continued use today.91 The implicit argument goes as fol-
lows: it is not that the Lena image was simply a centerfold; it was also a 
particularly testable image that gave engineers a set of problems to solve, 
including complex surfaces, reflections, and overlapping textures. This logic 
is repeated as new image techniques are often modeled on the Lena image, 
even when those techniques were developed using a much larger set of test 
images.92
But the story of the Lena image’s appearance in the SIPI lab is about so 
much more. When someone is said to have “walked in with a recent issue 
of Playboy,” what we’re getting is in fact a story of the material portability 
of compressed data and the ways that data can travel. The history of the 
Lena image’s conversion, then, is a series of stories about how an image is 
transformed and converted in order to enable its circulation and to make it 
portable. If no one compresses the Lena centerfold by folding it inside the 
magazine, it can’t be carried around an office by hand; if it isn’t compressed 
digitally, it can’t be transmitted over a network; and if isn’t cropped of its 
explicitly sexualized content, it can’t be used as a scientific instrument. It 
is all these acts, not just one in isolation, that lifted the Lena image from 
the private sphere of desire into the sphere of professional image analysis. 
Objects have to be made portable, but some objects can be moved more 
easily. It’s necessary to question why the Lena image moved so easily into 
the lab environment, through a new digital network, and into the pages of 
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disciplinary journals. The ease with which it flowed from private domain to 
research network demonstrates that it already possessed some of the neces-
sary affordances to move between environments as a ready- at- hand proxy 
for the world of images.
At the advent of networked computing, in a moment when engineers 
at USC were testing the potential of sending images as data, they chose to 
encode Playboy’s aesthetic template within their new medium. The center-
fold was the most conspicuous section of an iconic magazine, chosen at a 
moment in which American porn was going mainstream. Not only does 
the Lena image appear in the highest- selling issue of Playboy ever, that issue 
appeared only a few months after the release of Deep Throat, one of the first 
hard- core porn films to be seen by a significant portion of the American 
public.93 And, in 1973, the same year that USC engineers digitized the 
Lena image, the US Supreme Court delivered a decision in Miller v. Cali-
fornia that rewrote the limits of acceptable pornography by redefining the 
meaning of obscenity. The court said that while obscenity had been defined 
as something “utterly without socially redeeming value,” it would hence-
forth be defined as anything lacking “serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.”94 The ruling in Miller actually broadened what could be 
considered obscene and was widely viewed as a reaction to the recent popu-
larization of mainstream porn. The new definition would narrow what was 
acceptable and widen the ambit of the state to censor sexualized texts.
But the implications of this timing are significant. In the year of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller, the engineers at SIPI inadvertently helped 
Playboy overcome the new standard for obscenity by incorporating the mag-
azine’s centerfold into the knowledge infrastructure of their profession; by 
doing so, they relicensed the use of porn— already established by Lawrence 
Roberts— and demonstrated its potential scientific value by converting it to 
a test image. By inscribing Playboy’s aesthetic standard into the prototype of 
the internet, SIPI engineers highlighted the image as a professional object of 
study and encoded the practice of reading pornographic images as a profes-
sional commitment.
The history of test images from photography, film, and television through 
to digital image processing shows that the instrumentalization of women’s 
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bodies was part and parcel of creating a new image standard. The Lena 
image continues this patterned, historical recurrence and reencodes a femi-
nized whiteness as the prototype of image technologies. In the 1970s, with 
an emerging prototype of what would become the internet, computer sci-
entists and image engineers were hard at work perfecting the most efficient 
and dependable ways of sending a now- cleansed bit of porn over a computer 
network.
The origins of digital image processing were not inevitable. While the 
Lena image ascended as a constant against which the variabilities of dif-
ferent image techniques were tested, it was always superseded by a more 
forceful constant: a model of professional vision conditioned by the pro-
totypical whiteness of test images and a field shaped by the pursuit of con-
trolling space and bodies through optical capture. The researchers at SIPI 
often focused on new techniques for managing warfare, analyzing space, 
and classifying enemies. They frequently ran this line of study alongside 
the segmentation, identification, and analysis of women’s faces and bodies. 
Digital image processing is a continuation of a longer history that weds 
militarization and the control of women’s bodies, and the practices of pro-
fessional vision traced by the Lena image force us to see these two forms of 
optical control as inseparable.95
To talk about the politics of the Lena image is to, by extension, talk 
about image standards like JPEG and MPEG that its use helped establish. 
The politics of test images compel us to ask, “Who is seeing?” “What is 
this a representation of?” “Who is it for?” and “Who gets to use it?” Image 
standards are shaped by testing regimes and the practices of professional 
vision, which are in turn shaped by the cultural milieus where profession-
als work. In chapter 4, as we follow how the Lena image circulated outside 
USC, the image’s history traces the contours of a new discipline. The Lena 
image was exchanged, cited, lauded, canonized, challenged, resuscitated, 
and finally abandoned, as its circulation continued to expose who had the 
power to choose proxy images, how those images were used, and which 
contexts those images sought to represent.
4 PROXY JUSTICE (OR THE LENA  
IMAGE, PART 2)
An article in the 1997 issue of the Electronic Engineering Times, written by 
engineer and journalist Sunny Bains, begins:
The most famous female face in the field of electronic imaging was honored 
last week. Engineers were urged to meet her and get her autograph. Con-
ference speakers were encouraged to include her work in their publications. 
What did this woman do to gain such respect and admiration? Did she win 
a Nobel Prize? Was she voted the best Ph.D. supervisor in the country? Did 
she invent a device or algorithm that earned her company oodles of money?
None of the above. In fact, she took off her clothes for Playboy a couple 
of decades ago, and a (presumably male) reader decided that her centerfold 
would make a great subject for some image- processing experiment.1
By the 1990s, the Lena/Lenna image was no longer a curiosity of test 
media from a southern California lab. It could now be called the “most 
famous female face in the field of electronic imaging”; however, as this 
passage hints, its notoriety as both an industry standard and a centerfold 
was beginning to create friction. Bains herself was critical of the image’s 
use, and the tone of the passage indicates her disdain for the context that 
created it.
In chapter 3, we examined the origins of the Lena image (see figure 
3.1)— a photo of a woman’s face, partially covered by a hat and a feather 
tassel. The image was cropped from the centerfold of the November 1972 
issue of Playboy magazine, where the full image shows “Lenna Sjööblom” 
naked in an attic (the spelling of Lena/Lenna has varied over time). When 
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Figure 4.1
An artist’s interpretation of the cover of Optical Engineering (July 1991), featuring the Lena 
image and another widely used test image of bell peppers. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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engineers at the Signal and Image Processing Institute (SIPI) at the Uni-
versity of Southern California (USC) digitized the image in 1973, they 
created a new proxy for digital image processing.
SIPI went on to shape the digital image standards of our contemporary 
world and the ways that images travel and appear in networked commu-
nication. All the while, this work was tested and displayed through the 
image of a Playboy model. This background to the institutional and cul-
tural context of the Lena image, as well as its position within the history 
of test images, are marked by the prototypical encoding of whiteness as a 
default skin tone, the instrumentalization of women’s bodies as measurable 
surfaces, and the collapse of bodies, faces, territories, and enemy Others 
under a regime of optical control.
In this chapter, we fast- forward to the 1990s, to a moment when the 
Lena image had hardened into a material proxy for a growing field and an 
artifact of the trained professional vision of image engineers (figure 4.1).2 
Here, we find new institutional and professional contexts, and through key 
moments when the Lena image was challenged, we glimpse the activist 
responses to the unjust settings of computer science and image engineer-
ing. Finally, we gather some of the many afterlives of the Lena image, which 
in recent years has transcended its status as a proxy to become an emblem 
for the field of image processing and a persistent target of critique.
Although the Lena image is easier to track in the 1990s than before, 
there are evident traces of its movement, storage, and transmission as early 
as the mid- 1970s. By 1977, SIPI had established and distributed its first 
version of the USC- SIPI Image Database, a database of test images that 
functioned as a storehouse of potential commensurability for the growing 
field of digital image processing (and is still available today).3 The USC- 
SIPI Image Database worked to establish common references for the field 
because it could be shared, reused, and cited— it provided the network 
of traceable fixed points, through which a growing field could make new 
connections. The institute often distributed batches of test images to other 
research centers, in person, using data stored on magnetic tape. Alexander 
Sawchuk (the engineer who originally digitized the centerfold and a future 
SIPI director) recalls: “Visitors asked us for copies, and we gave it to them 
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so they could compare their image processing and compression algorithms 
with ours on the same test image.” 4 In other words, the media of digital 
image processing began with the circulation of privately collected images 
that were exchanged by hand.
A similar story is told about the origins of the computerized Bulletin 
Board System (BBS) in 1978. The architects of BBS, Ward Christensen 
and Randy Suess, exchanged programs with each other by recording them 
on cassettes and then mailing them. When a snowstorm stranded the 
two men at home, as Christensen recalls, BBS was born “of the neces-
sity of transferring files mostly between Randy and myself, at some means 
faster than mailing cassettes (if we’d lived less than the 30 miles apart we 
did, XMODEM might not have been born).”5 These stories of manual 
exchange, which follow personal networks and precede digital ones, cap-
ture two common aspects of the history of standards and proxies: at key 
moments, the work of building and maintaining a standard is done by 
hand; and the tools of standards work are assembled ad hoc, but always 
with the aim of establishing conditions of commensurability across space 
and time between like- minded researchers and workers.6
In 1975, the same year that the Lena image first appeared in the insti-
tute’s reports, SIPI engineers transmitted test images over ARPANET.7 
While we don’t have evidence of which images were transmitted at this 
time, the Lena image was among SIPI’s most frequent test objects. There-
fore, the image was spreading through two networks concurrently: by 
hand through the social networks of engineers whose colleagues visited the 
lab, and through a novel computer network that would one day come to 
reshape the visual culture of everyday life. The first appearances of the Lena 
image do not announce its use by naming or labeling it in any consistent 
fashion. However, by the mid- 1980s, the image was sometimes labeled as 
“Lena” or “Lenna” in articles outside of USC.8 It was rare for the image to 
be consistently labeled during this period, and it often appeared with other 
images of women’s faces, tagged as “girl,” “woman in hat,” or sometimes 
just “womanhat.” It is only when the image became the source of conflict 
that it transformed from a taken- for- granted piece of a knowledge infra-
structure into a named object with a contestable history and politics.
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CONFLICTS
A few months after Optical Engineering included the Lena image on its 
cover and in two published studies within its pages, Playboy Enterprises 
sent a letter demanding that the journal cease its use of the Lena image on 
the grounds that it was the intellectual property of Playboy ( Playboy Enter-
prises is the umbrella company, launched by Hugh Hefner, that publishes 
Playboy magazine). The letter reads (sic):
It has come to our attention that you have used a portion of the center-
fold photograph of our November 1972 PLAYBOY PLAYMATE OF THE 
MONTH Lenna Sjööblom, in your July 1991 issue of Optical Engineering 
magazine. . . .  Playboy Enterprises, Inc., the publisher of PLAYBOY maga-
zine, owns the copyright in and to this photograph.
As fellow publishers, we’re sure you understand the need for us to protect 
our proprietary rights. We assume you did not intentionally make unauthor-
ized use of our material and we ask that you contact us for authorization 
before using any of our copyrighted material in the future.9
Optical Engineering is the flagship journal of SPIE, the International Soci-
ety for Optics and Photonics. The issue in question, from July 1991 (figure 
4.1), advertised a special section devoted to “visual communications and 
image processing.” A few months after receiving Playboy’s cease- and- desist 
letter, the journal’s editor, Brian Thompson, had to deliver a somber mes-
sage about the meaning of copyright. He wrote in an editorial:
The image in question is used a great deal by workers in image processing 
and is often referred to as the “Lena” image. As SPIE noted in its response 
to Playboy Enterprises, “The image is widely used in the worldwide optics and 
electronics community. It is digitized and its common use permits comparison 
of different image processing techniques and algorithms coming out of different 
research laboratories.” 10
As one of the few indications about the negotiations between Playboy 
Enterprises and Optical Engineering, this passage is highly suggestive. In 
its appeal for leniency, Optical Engineering made the case to Playboy that 
the use of the Lena image is not trifling. Instead, Thompson justifies the 
118  Chapter 4
image’s use by highlighting it as an object of honed, professional vision. 
He qualifies the use of the Lena image by noting both that engineers have 
transformed the image through digitization and that its popularity, its 
“common use,” provides the conditions of commensurability for digital 
image processing as a field of practice. In this pithy response, Thompson 
neatly explicated the role of proxies in creating coherence within domains 
of practice, across space, and through time. The professional vision of 
image engineers relies on a continuity of technical experimentation that 
hinges on the conventional use of a circumscribed set of images.
Thompson was also speaking for a new field that was increasingly dis-
tinct from his own. Optical Engineering was not primarily a journal that 
concerned itself with digital image processing, but rather with other optical 
applications like holography, x- ray lithography, and three- dimensional (3D) 
sensing. But in the years leading up to 1991, the journal often devoted a 
special issue to the burgeoning field of image processing. But what Thomp-
son either didn’t know or didn’t confess was that the Lena image ran fre-
quently on the journal’s cover and throughout the pages of the journal.11 In 
fact, the presence of the Lena image on the cover was often what marked 
those special issues on image processing— and marked image processing as a 
distinct discipline, with its own test images and reference points.
Despite Thompson’s equivocating, he finished the editorial by placing 
the onus on researchers to manage their own copyright permissions:
With regard to the “Lena” image, we reached an understanding with Playboy 
and appreciate their cooperation. However, because publishers do not know 
whether or not material is borrowed, adapted, etc., from other sources, be 
advised that it is each author’s responsibility to make sure that materials in their 
articles are either free of copyright or that permission from the copyright holder has 
been obtained.12
Ultimately, in Thompson’s piece, individual responsibility took the place 
of collective responsibility to control and manage the selection of test images. 
Furthermore, he does not suggest that Playboy Enterprises could be wrong. 
It is questionable whether the use of the Lena image as a test image, without 
permission, is legitimate under fair use provisions in the United States: the 
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Lena image is cropped and does not reproduce the entire centerfold, which 
conforms to the protection of the use of excerpts; it was also only ever used 
for research and scholarly purposes, again conforming to a use that is (in 
theory) protected; fair use exemptions often hinge on the use of the original 
being transformative and in many cases, the Lena image is, strictly speak-
ing, transformed through various signal processing techniques. On the other 
hand, though, in fair use cases transformation usually refers to a creative 
appropriation of an original text. The fact that engineers treat the Lena image 
as test data, not as the grounds for creative expression or critique, might 
make it less likely that it would pass a fair use test. Finally, a fair use exemp-
tion would require that the Lena image plays a role that only the Lena image 
could do— for instance, in this book, only showing the Lena image could 
serve a discussion of the Lena image. Thompson’s appeal to Playboy made the 
case for its permitted use on two grounds: it was for research purposes, and 
the Lena image did serve a unique purpose due to its common, widespread, 
and regular use. Its uniqueness was directly tied to its cultural role as a disci-
plinary proxy for the world of images, as well as the ways that it was used to 
foster and maintain communal connections in the field.
He did not give any details about the agreement that he reached with 
Playboy in his editorial, and he stopped short of telling Optical Engineering 
authors to cease using the image. Playboy, for their part, later claimed that 
their agreement to permit use of the image grew out of their opportunism 
and that they worked with the Society for Imaging Science in Technology 
to track down Lena Forsén so the society could invite her to its fiftieth 
annual conference, in 1997— the event captured in the opening passage of 
this chapter. Playboy’s vice president of new media said, “We decided we 
should exploit this, because it is a phenomenon.”13
> > >
Playboy Enterprise’s letter to Optical Engineering was the first challenge to the 
viability of the Lena image as a professional proxy. This controversy erupted 
because the image had circulated unobstructed in digital image processing for 
nearly twenty years, throughout which time it was used by a global com-
munity of researchers. In contrast to the image’s origins, when engineers 
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lauded it for its formal properties (its glossy paper, its dynamic range) and 
disavowed its content (a cropped nude woman), the first impediment to its 
use came from Playboy’s assertion that the image was their private property.
A second challenge came a few years later, in 1996, and again it 
emerged on the editorial page of a professional journal: IEEE Transactions 
on Image Processing, where the editor responded to accusations that the Lena 
image’s origins in a porn magazine should preclude it from further use on 
sexist grounds.14 IEEE Transactions on Image Processing was established in 
1992, when it splintered off from IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 
because that journal’s backlog of paper submissions grew too large and the 
digital image processing community feared “the exodus of image process-
ing expertise from our society to other professional groups.”15 This is a key 
moment in that it signals an attempt to consolidate digital image processing 
as a discipline: the journal materialized its separation from other disciplines 
to keep members within its specialization. It is noteworthy, then, that at this 
important point in the history of the discipline, the Lena image appears 205 
times in the first volume (the first four issues) of the journal (table 4.1).16
For context, while other common test images appear in the journal, 
the Lena image is by far the most used. There are, in the same volume, six 
reproductions of an image of Walter Cronkite and one image of Ronald 
Reagan. There are virtually no traces of anyone who reads as nonwhite; 
even by the early 1990s, digital image processing operated through a visual 
culture of prototypical whiteness.17 This meant that mastery of the tools of 
representation and reproduction was equated with a visual culture domi-
nated by the oversampling of whiteness in test images (discussed at length 
in chapter 3). Representational equity was clearly not on the minds of 
engineers, even while the Lena image was used to fulfill other representa-
tional desires. As Jamie Hutchinson proclaimed in 2001, “If the criterion is 
frequency of Lena, then the IEEE Transactions on Image Processing is by far 
the sexiest journal out there.”18 A process of proxification began at SIPI in 
the 1970s, when a group of men instrumentalized the detritus of their pop 
culture surroundings to turn the nude body of a woman into processable 
data and so-called extractable features. In the pages of journals like Optical 
Engineering and Image Processing, we see the culmination of this process. 
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The Lena image was now part of the canon of test images and the chosen 
stand- in for a new discipline.
Citation patterns expose the unspoken politics that shape a discipline’s 
own narrative.19 Citation sutures and divides: it builds canons, defines 
boundaries for insiders and outsiders, and confers legitimacy. It first confers 
legitimacy on the source (e.g., an image, a text, an author), but through the 
networks of repeated use, it confers legitimacy on those doing the citing by 
signaling their awareness of a community’s common ties. At moments of gen-
esis, like the first volume of Image Processing, citation was a way of highlight-
ing a shared set of referential materials that demonstrated the coherence of a 
newly formed field. Readers of Transactions on Image Processing in the 1990s 
witnessed how different people transformed the Lena image, and technical 
scrutiny of the Lena test image became an occupational obligation. Being 
literate in image processing meant sharing a set of professional vision practices 
that made one conversant in the transformations of the Lena image.
In 1996, four years into the publication of Transactions on Image Pro-
cessing, the journal’s inaugural editor, David Munson, was nearing the end 
of his tenure. Volume 5, Issue 1, contains a letter from the editor, in which 
Munson reflected on the journal’s first four years and its future. On the 
subsequent page, however, there is a second, exceptional, editorial, “A Note 
on Lena.” Munson began:
During my term as Editor- in- Chief, I was approached a number of times with 
the suggestion that the IEEE Transactions on Image Processing should consider 
banning the use of the image of Lena.
Table 4.1
Appearances of the Lena image in Transactions on Image Processing (Volume 1)
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Munson established a vague controversy but made it clear that this had 
been an issue throughout his tenure as editor.20 Then he continued:
I think it is safe to assume that the Lena image became a standard in our 
“industry” for two reasons. First, the image contains a nice mixture of detail, 
flat regions, shading, and texture that do a good job of testing various image 
processing algorithms. It is a good test image! Second, the Lena image is a 
picture of an attractive woman. It is not surprising that the (mostly male) 
image processing research community gravitated toward an image that they 
found attractive.21
Munson, like many before and after him, was determined to fold the 
Lena image into the professional practices of image engineering: he high-
lighted the image’s formal usefulness in the specialized terms of his discipline. 
And he also appealed to the Lena image’s value as a tool for perpetuating 
a chain of iteration that maintained the profession’s standards. But unlike 
Thompson with his editorial in Optical Engineering, he also acknowledged 
that the image was popular for reasons beyond its formal features and pro-
fessional history— that it was an image of a desirable subject— and in doing 
so, he confessed to the heterosexist logic of the image’s use.
The language here is telling, as he described a nearly inexorable attraction 
(“gravitated”) of the community toward their object of desire. Unlike the 
accounts of the Lena image’s original digitization, this passage affirmed the 
sexualization of the test image; but like those earlier accounts, it disclaimed 
the agency and responsibility that individual researchers held for choosing 
their proxies. It’s a rare but telling moment that undermines a common 
refrain in image engineering, where there is often a presumed objectivity in 
selecting a natural image as a proxy, because one’s techniques— if properly 
tuned— will work similarly across the world of potential images. Munson 
stepped out from behind a shield of presumed objectivity to excuse his col-
leagues’ image selection on the basis of the image’s “attractiveness.” Here, 
it was the image that had power (pull) instead of the engineers making a 
conscious choice.
Having stipulated the scientific and affective qualities of the image, Mun-
son recapped the controversies surrounding its continued use. He summarized 
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the earlier conflict between Playboy and Optical Engineering but noted that it 
was essentially resolved. Munson concluded:
So what is the problem? Well, quite understandably, some members of our 
community are unhappy with the source of the Lena image. I am sympathetic 
to their argument, which states that we should not use material from any 
publication that is seen (by some) as being degrading to women. I must tell 
you, though, that within any single segment of our community (e.g., men, 
women, feminists), there is a complete diversity of opinion on the Lena issue. 
You may be surprised to know that most persons who have approached me 
on this issue are male. On the other hand, some informal polling on my part 
suggests that most males are not even aware of the origin of the Lena image! 
I have heard feminists argue that the image should be retired. However, I just 
recently corresponded with a feminist who had a different point of view. She 
was familiar with the Lena image, but she had not imagined that there could 
be any controversy. When I offered an explanation of why some persons are 
offended by the use of the image, she responded tartly. A watered- down ver-
sion of her reply is, “There isn’t much of Lena showing in the Lena image. 
This political correctness stuff infuriates me!”22
Munson was perhaps receptive to the complaints of some colleagues but 
took great pains to make it clear that the issue was more complicated than 
some may have thought. The unnamed interlocutor here played the dis-
cursive role of severing the demand for different test images from one kind 
of feminist politics, claiming that such demands are emblematic of a lesser 
brand of censorious feminist.23 Ultimately, Munson decided that the per-
ceived ambiguity of the issue (even the feminists can’t agree!) merited a 
recommendation that was similarly compromised:
As Editor- in- Chief, I did not feel that this issue warranted the imposition of 
censorship, which, in my view, should be applied in only the most extreme 
circumstances. In addition, in establishing the precedent, I was not sure where 
this might lead. Should we ban the Cheerleader video sequence? Should we 
establish an oversight panel to rule on acceptable imagery? Instead, I opted to 
wait and see how the situation might develop. I suspected that the use of Lena 
would decline naturally, as diverse imagery became more widely available and 
as the field of image processing broadened in scope.24
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His equivocating speaks to a fear of shared governance as a potential curb 
on one’s academic freedom. The fear of a “precedent” that Munson cited is 
a fear of shifting power dynamics and it’s a testament to the fear that an 
explicitly political standard could supersede the power of elite scientists to 
choose their own test media. Munson’s concluding suggestions come down 
on the side of the complainants, if only passively:
In cases where another image will serve your purpose equally well, why not 
use that other image? After all, why needlessly upset colleagues? And who 
knows? We may even devise image compression schemes that work well across a 
broader class of images, instead of being tuned to Lena! 25
His final response, then, was not to censor the image but to plead that fellow 
researchers might be more considerate when selecting test images. It’s the 
final sentence, however, that makes the use of the Lena image seem inescap-
able. There is a hint of irony, but the notion that existing image compression 
schemes are “tuned to Lena!” is a clear indication of the image’s power as a 
proxy and an adhesive that binds the profession of image engineers.
And here is the problem: Munson is drawing attention to the fact that 
test images do not function ahistorically. Rather, they operate through 
chains of iteration that maintain standards and norms. Most important, 
they operate through the labor of the people doing the image processing— a 
kind of work that is already calibrated (tuned) to this one particular image. 
It was not just “compression schemes” that are tuned to the Lena image; the 
people doing the compression calibrated their vision practices to the image. 
The cultural work of using and reusing the Lena image as a proxy requires 
this attunement. This feeling was echoed in 2001 by a Carnegie Mellon 
University engineer, Chuck Rosenberg, who said that “many researchers 
know the Lena image so well that they can easily evaluate any algorithm run 
on her.”26 Participation in the image engineering community of the 1990s 
meant putting the Lena image under scrutiny as a matter of professional 
necessity.
These two letters from journal editors (Thompson in Optical Engineer-
ing and Munson in Image Processing) present two ways that the politics of 
images, computer science, and the internet were being renegotiated in the 
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1990s. Thompson’s letter foreshadows how the management of images as 
private property, and porn in particular, would shape the internet as a com-
munication medium; and Munson’s letter shows how gendered mistreat-
ment and gendered violence were the sources of long- standing conflicts 
within the larger communities of computer science and engineering. These 
letters provide us with two pathways to studying the labor and politics 
of visual media and proxies, first through tracing the history of porn and 
property, and second through the contestation of university classrooms and 
computer science workplaces by feminist activists. Each of these histories, 
which played out in the late 1980s and through the 1990s, discloses the 
contested uses of emerging network technologies and the gendering of 
computing.
PORN AND PROPERTY
Pornography is often credited as a driving force and a shadow influence over 
the ways that new media and technologies are used, adopted, appropriated, 
and controlled. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun states, the perception of porn’s 
primacy was crucial to the discourse surrounding the internet in the 1990s:
In terms of technology development, sex allegedly popularizes new devices: 
pornography is the “killer application” that convinces consumers to invest 
in new hardware. New technology is a “carrier”— a new Trojan horse— for 
pornography; sex is “a virus that almost always infects new technology first.” 
Sexuality is the linchpin for strategies as diverse as entrepreneurial capitalism, 
censorship, and surveillance.27
The production, circulation, and consumption of porn helped shape the 
ways in which both regulation and commerce took form through the inter-
net and the legal framework for the internet’s infrastructure in the United 
States and elsewhere.28 This meant that internet porn received outsized 
attention as a phenomenon, often crystallizing sensationalized fears about 
the dangers of cyberspace, cybersex, communicating with unknown oth-
ers over a computer network, and the threat of children being exposed to 
explicit images.
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The largest and most conspicuous attempts at regulating the internet 
were often based on efforts to sanitize a new communication medium that 
was both newly privatized and potentially global— to make the data of the 
internet more hygienic. Hence, the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 
of 1996 was prompted by a politicized desire to redefine obscenity and to 
curtail access to sexual information and sexualized media.29 Fears of the 
internet in this time were not only infantilizing, they were also deeply gen-
dered. Amy Hasinoff argues:
In the heady rhetoric of the early 1990s, the internet is naturally democratic, 
anticensorship, and virtually impossible to regulate . . .  Metaphors position-
ing the early internet as a “wild west” frontier space justified the idea that it 
was an unsafe place that women should avoid. The key idea is that the inter-
net could not (and should not) be governed.30
The CDA was opposed by civil libertarians and many of the internet’s 
earliest and most vociferous proponents, many of whom argued that the 
legislation ran counter to the free- speech principles of a flat, open, and 
horizontally structured network. The fact that misogyny and bigotry were 
endemic in many of those open communities was dismissed as an unfortu-
nate side effect. In retrospect, misogyny and hatred have thrived online and 
through the architecture and affordances of the web, and white suprem-
acist and misogynist communities continue to frequently innovate new 
exploits of network technologies to find new audiences, expand their reach, 
and evade censorship.31 Although most of the CDA was struck down by 
the US Supreme Court in 199732— thanks in large part to the advocacy of 
sexual health experts— section 230 of the Act, which shields most content- 
hosting companies from many kinds of liability, still structures how the 
internet is commercialized and used today.33
The Lena image is woven into the internet as a key instrument in the 
standardization of digital images, and it is a signal example of how the inter-
net could be used for sending and analyzing porn. But it does more than 
mark yet another case where porn played a vanguard role in the develop-
ment of technology. As a proxy used in the preconditioning of visual stan-
dards, it connects the visual culture of engineers and their sociotechnical 
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practices with the visual technologies that they were building. It is not a 
mere token of pornographic media fought over by stakeholders in techno-
logical development; it is meant to leverage its relationship to a larger cul-
tural context, to be used in the building of a visual internet, and to be used 
to determine which images would look good enough for a potential world 
of users. If the Lena image at SIPI was a stand- in for a particular kind of 
male desire and a world of measurable images of women’s bodies, by the 
1990s it had become a stand- in for the heteropatriarchal relationships that 
structure the spaces and institutions of engineering and computer science.
> > >
Playboy Enterprises is infamous for enforcing its copyright and going to 
great lengths to sue perceived violators. In the 1990s, several high- profile 
legal decisions followed from companies hosting Playboy content on digital 
networks (both prior to the World Wide Web and afterward). These cases 
include Playboy v. Frena (1993); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Harden-
burgh (1997); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld Inc (1997); and Play-
boy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp (2004), which went 
all the way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. Both Hardenburgh and 
Webbworld are still cited by the Recording Industry Association of America 
on their website’s section on copyright infringement with regard to digital 
images.34 In both Hardenburgh and Webbworld, Playboy sued because online 
aggregators had reproduced Playboy’s copyrighted images in a nonpassive 
way (at the time, a host that acted as a conduit had a much easier defense 
than one that undertook any kind of curation or control over the selection 
of images). In Webbworld, the defendants argued that they were ignorant 
about what their users were doing and thus couldn’t be held responsible 
for users uploading or sharing copyrighted images. The court found in 
favor of Playboy, ruling that ignorance was not an acceptable defense in this 
case, as Webbworld had targeted adult websites and concertedly built what 
amounted to a database of secondhand images.35
Hardenburgh offers a more intricate case to consider the kinds of 
infrastructural and cultural labor that shape technologies and standards— 
including legal ones— through the management of porn. In Hardenburgh, a 
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popular, preweb bulletin board system called Rusty- N- Edie’s (RNE) issued 
tokens to users who uploaded images— the tokens became a kind of voucher 
for downloading other users’ images. Of the approximately 50,000 images 
on RNE, an estimated 40,000 were porn, a portion of which were proved 
to be Playboy Enterprise’s property. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) raided RNE’s servers in 1993— which were located in the Ohio home 
of Rusty and Edie Hardenburgh— seizing hundreds of computers. The case 
became a cause célèbre for the American Civil Liberties Union, but the 
judge in the case used Playboy’s display rights to find in the magazine’s favor.
In building their case Playboy paid an employee, a woman named Anne 
Steinfeldt, to join Rusty- N- Edie’s and spend her workdays downloading 
images from their servers, finding and tagging images that were potentially 
owned by Playboy Enterprises. The judge describes at length the manual 
process of finding, tagging, downloading, and examining the pictures:
In the early 1990s, PEI [Playboy Enterprises] employee Anne Steinfeldt was 
given the job of scanning on- line systems to determine whether [copyright 
infringing] photographs were available to subscribers via their home comput-
ers. In November of 1992, Ms. Steinfeldt subscribed to Rusty- N- Edie’s BBS 
under the pseudonym “Bob Campbell.” She conducted key word searches in 
the files available on the BBS, and claims to have downloaded approximately 
100 GIFs from the BBS which contained reproductions of PEI’s photographs. 
She transferred these files to floppy disks, and then delivered the disks to PEI 
photo- librarian Timothy Hawkins. Mr. Hawkins states that he examined the 
files by displaying the images on his computer monitor and comparing those 
images with photographs from Playboy Magazine.36
The work that Steinfeldt performed on behalf of Playboy Enterprises, under 
the name “Bob Campbell,” is infrastructural labor. Just as thousands of 
people are now employed to moderate content on commercial social media 
platforms like Facebook and Instagram and to check that images uploaded 
to these platforms meet standards of decency (including that they are not 
sexually explicit), Playboy contracted an employee to scan the databases of 
a bulletin board system to locate private property.37 Steinfeldt was already 
performing the manual labor of image classification on a nascent platform. 
She went an extra step, though, by downloading images, copying them to 
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disks, and providing them to a librarian, Timothy Hawkins. The librarian 
in turn performed a final act of commensuration by comparing the images 
side by side with Playboy’s archive of images.
This analysis and memory work, all performed without the help of 
automation, became the basis of a precedent- setting legal decision regard-
ing the knowing curation of copyrighted porn. While legal precedents 
shape the contexts in which images can legally appear and circulate over 
the internet, it is too easy to ignore the actual labor that it takes to create a 
testable batch of possibly infringing images. Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to know if the November 1972 Playboy centerfold was among the images 
Steinfeldt found on the RNE servers (the company identified ninety- nine 
images and submitted ten to the court, although they are kept sealed at an 
Akron courthouse). Nonetheless, it is in this context of sounding out the 
limits of free expression and free circulation in networked communication 
that Playboy Enterprises became aware of the use of the Lena image by the 
image processing community. The very techniques that were used by users 
of RNE to digitize, compress, and transmit images, as well as those used by 
Steinfeldt on behalf of Playboy Enterprises to build its case against the bul-
letin board system, were built in the same laboratories that used the Lena 
image as the basis of technoaesthetic benchmarking.
The Lena image is remarkable because of the way that it persisted over 
time, well beyond its original use. But it hasn’t lasted as long as it has by 
accident; at each phase of its existence, it needed the intervention of its 
users to shore up its viability. In its original digitization, the act of erasure 
(tearing or folding) that cropped the image of its illicit content also cleansed 
it of Playboy’s trademark, printed in the bottom- right corner (“Playboy’s 
Playmate of the Month”). And in the negotiated agreement between Play-
boy Enterprises and Optical Engineering, the image was once again saved, 
its use repaired, as the intervention by Brian Thompson rescued it from 
illegitimacy due to its being a popular proxy. The self- policing that image 
engineers tacitly agreed to was meant to secure the permission of Playboy 
Enterprises (and not of, say, Lena Forsén herself ), and that permission con-
cerned only the status of the image as property.38 We can imagine another 
history in which image engineers voluntarily quit using the image before or 
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immediately after Playboy’s copyright claim. This was the first moment that 
the professional community could no longer claim ignorance of the image’s 
origins or ownership. It would then stand as a powerful counterexample 
to the uncontrolled distribution of pornographic images on the internet 
instead of the original model of the form. Instead, the image only grew 
more famous, while the community of image engineers was given special 
dispensation from Playboy to keep using it.
Until recently, outright banning of the Lena image was always a last 
resort. The only legitimate claim against the image’s unfettered use that 
found quarter with the engineering community was Playboy’s legal claim 
that the image was private property. Like others working at the beginning 
of the computer projects of the Cold War period funded by the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the engineers at SIPI couldn’t have pre-
dicted the outcome of digitizing any one particular image in the 1970s— or 
how the primary act of cleansing the image would code its use.39 However, 
by the time the image made its way onto the cover of Optical Engineering, 
there was a strong incentive to retain the Lena image as a shared reference 
point and a material articulation of the professional vision of digital imag-
ing researchers.
> > >
As Judith Butler argues, our understandings and embodiment of gender 
norms must be iterable to persist: “The historicity of norms (the ‘chains’ of 
iteration invoked and dissimulated in the imperative utterance) constitute 
the power of discourse to enact what it names.” 40 But chains of iteration 
do not simply exist as static connections; they are animated in practices of 
performance, citation, and memory. The use of test images as proxies is— 
but need not be— a powerful means of reiterating a gendered, heterosexist, 
and racially twisted norm within the foundations of image technologies. 
Standards— as technologized norms— also work as a means of shaping the 
representational capacities of media infrastructures and rely on proxy sam-
ples of the world out there as the basis for their norming logics.41 Because 
the Lena image is both a de facto standard and a tool for constructing other 
standards, it plays a double role in perpetuating the chains of iteration and 
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the representational norms of visual culture. But just as a norm has to reit-
erate to persist, breaking the chain of iteration can strain the norm. This 
is the political potential of refusal and willfulness. As Sara Ahmed argues, 
willfulness also requires a chain of action in order to break the relations of 
injustice: “Willfulness becomes what travels, as a relation to others, those 
who come before, those who come after.” 42 No one mandated the use of 
the Lena image, and anyone could stop using it at any time. But refusal 
requires a system of support and reinforcement to counter the pull of nor-
mative habit.
For instance, other than its copyright status, a person could refuse to 
use the Lena image for any or all of the following reasons: they think that 
the image is sexist; the use of the image seems overly arbitrary; the image 
is formally insufficient; there isn’t enough information about the image’s 
production to make it a truly useful proxy; the image is too old and its aes-
thetics are out of date; the image, like many before it, overemphasizes white 
skin; and the image is not a born- digital image. Any of these may suffice as 
a reason to stop using the image or even to ban its use. Instead, in a final 
twist to this story, one engineer, concerned that Playboy might one day stop 
allowing academic uses of its image, had his wife pose for a new version 
of the Lena image (figure 4.2), calling it the “iLena image.” The image is 
licensed to Creative Commons Attribution- Share Alike.
He was neither the first nor the last image engineer to invoke his wife’s 
image. William Pratt, the first and longtime director of SIPI, released four 
editions of his Digital Image Processing textbook over a forty- year period. 
Each one begins with the same dedication:
To my wife, Shelly,
whose image needs no enhancement43
This constant enfolding of male engineers’ wives into the image production 
system underscores the constant reiteration of women’s images as tools of 
masculine mastery. While Pratt’s dedication draws a distinction between 
the images of women whom he works on professionally (those needing 
enhancement) and his wife, the iLena image exposes another flawed argu-
ment: that simply removing the private copyright status of the Lena image 
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would eliminate any danger that it poses to the coherence of the discipline’s 
practices of professional vision. The Lena image’s liminal status as private 
property and communal instrument provoked the first cease- and- desist 
complaint from Playboy Enterprises, but prizing the image from the struc-
tures of private property by negotiating its use or reformatting it using a 
new stand- in model does nothing to change the contexts of its creation and 
continued use. As activists, workers, and students have made clear, these 
contexts were persistently abusive and objectifying.
RESISTANCE
There is a cost to the repetitive use of women as test objects and the regular 
presence of porn in computer science environments. A process of objectifi-
cation that played out in test materials drew an implicit connection between 
the day- to- day routines of knowledge production and the many forms of 
abuse, violence, and mistreatment surrounding computer science and engi-
neering in the late twentieth century. It connected the violence of campuses 
and workplaces to the compulsory objects of professionalization.
Figure 4.2
The iLena image is a Creative Commons reenactment of the original Lena image. (CC BY- SA 
2.5 BR) Photo by Roberto Bittencourt; the model is Ila Fox.
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In the late 1980s, women scientists, computer scientists, and engineers 
started publishing accounts of their experiences of gendered violence, isola-
tion, and mistreatment in their laboratories, offices, and classrooms. These 
accounts took the form of official and unofficial reports published by uni-
versities or circulated online, among women, and through backchannels. 
The objections that they voiced were tied to the same social contexts that 
enabled the Lena image’s use: the Lena image would not have made its way 
onto ARPANET if the November 1972 issue of Playboy hadn’t made its 
way into the USC lab, and if the USC lab had not been the kind of place 
in which shared consumption of porn was an unremarkable social practice. 
As these objections collided with the growing cultural and political power 
of computer science, a shift to digital and networked methods of visual 
representation, and a drop- off in women’s enrollment in computer science 
programs, the Lena image received public criticism as an emblem of sexist 
exclusion, misrepresentation, and mistreatment.
In recent years, several popular and academic researchers have rein-
scribed the fundamental role that women have played in the history of 
computing and engineering. This work documents the concerted efforts 
to remove women from engineering professions at moments of increasing 
prestige, as well as the widespread (and often intentional) failure to account 
properly for the constitutive labor of women, trans and nonbinary research-
ers, and queer actors.44 As Mar Hicks argues, this research can revive for-
gotten and erased stories that are regularly concealed by an overemphasis 
on heroic tales of masculine dominance of technology. Beyond the recu-
peration of marginalized history, work still must be done to understand 
“how gender is a formative category for postindustrial labor markets and 
how gendered analyses alter the main contentions of the historiography of 
computing.” 45 The history of proxies and the history of digital test images 
are avenues for talking about the role of gendering within knowledge sys-
tems and computing professions.
Learning to look at pictures of women, teaching computers to look at 
pictures of women, and using pictures of women (often taken from Play-
boy), all of which show white skin, have historically been compulsory parts 
of learning to be an image engineer. As Munson’s editorial in Transactions 
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notes, this is an inescapable facet of tuning one’s perceptual apparatus 
to the technoaesthetic benchmarks of image engineering. All computing 
professionals experience life through gendering systems and institutions. 
It’s necessary, then, to understand the ways that gender— as an intersec-
tional system of representation, identity, performance, labor, and social 
categorization— shapes computing sciences and the work that people are 
asked or permitted to do.
In the early- to- mid 1990s, enrollment in science, technology, engineer-
ing, and math (STEM) programs in Canadian and American universities was 
dominated by men and trending away from a period of moderately increas-
ing gender parity. Many people in these programs often found the settings 
alienating, inhospitable, and abusive. Particular attention was focused on the 
ways that gender was expressed, policed, and weaponized. In one of the most 
vicious examples, a man shot and killed fourteen women— mostly engineer-
ing students— and injured another fourteen people in 1989 at the University 
of Montreal’s École Polytechnique. The gunman’s motivations were explic-
itly misogynist; he is quoted as saying to his victims, “You’re women, you’re 
going to be engineers. You’re all a bunch of fucking feminists. I hate femi-
nists.” 46 The Montreal Massacre irrevocably marked the context for women 
in STEM fields in Canada and forced a confrontation with the misogynistic 
surroundings of engineering programs more broadly.47
The killings and the response to them also took place during a period 
of increased sensitivity to the structural inequalities that produce, rein-
force, and perpetuate discrimination. The 1980s and 1990s were marked 
by a series of very public social justice struggles that are often erroneously 
lumped together under the heading of “political correctness.” During this 
period, American and Canadian campuses were often prominent sites of 
confrontation between those who demanded fair treatment, affirmative 
action, equal pay, and reparations for historical wrongs and those who 
rejected these claims, resisted transformative change, and treated these 
demands as an attack on tradition. As Joan Wallach Scott wrote in 1992, 
“If there were any doubt that the production of knowledge is a political 
enterprise that involves a contest among conflicting interests, the raging 
debates of the last few years should have dispelled them.” 48
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Within the larger context of campus politics and social justice cam-
paigning, a series of reports were published in this period that documented 
the difficulties that women were experiencing in computer science and 
engineering departments. These include the Spertus report from the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT 1991), the Cottrell report from 
the University of Vermont (1992), the Winslett report from the University 
of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign (1993), and a cover story in Communica-
tions of the ACM by Karen Frenkel (1990). There were other related reports 
as well, including a Harvard report on Women in the Sciences (1991) and 
a second MIT report on Family and Work (1990).49 Although this was a 
bumper crop of reports in this area, similar texts have continued to be pro-
duced since this time. There is also a collection of gray literature from this 
period that includes reports that are cited but not published. Where some 
documents were officially released by universities, many others circulated 
through online message boards and early social networks. This body of 
literature offered evidence and support for young academics and engineers 
looking to address the institutionalized sexism and gendered inequalities of 
the scientific fields in which they worked.50
One of the most widely cited of these reports came from Ellen Spertus, 
titled “Why Are There So Few Female Computer Scientists?” At the time, 
she was a graduate student in electrical engineering and computer science. 
Spertus notes that in 1990, only 13 percent of computer science PhDs went 
to women, only 7.8 percent of computer science faculty were women, and 
only 2.7 percent of the tenured computer science faculty were women.51 
Spertus’s wide- ranging report documents a variety of possible factors that 
could contribute to the lack of female computer scientists, including social 
factors like stereotyping, subtle biases, gendered language, and the tyranny 
of low expectations.52 Among Spertus’s contributions in this report is an 
exhaustive bibliography, which later circulated on message boards, was 
added to, and became a hyperlinked web resource.53
The larger group of research on women in STEM fields from this period 
describes university computer science departments as hostile workplaces 
and classrooms. The reports often emphasize the pervasive display and cir-
culation of pornography. For instance, as Spertus states, “Some computer 
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science graduate students and staff at Carnegie Mellon were sufficiently 
disturbed by the display of nude pictures as backgrounds on computer ter-
minals that they got together and tried to change the situation by publicly 
appealing to the community.”54 She draws on an unpublished report written 
by Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) students and staff called “Dealing 
with Pornography in Academia: Report on a Grassroots Action.” After chal-
lenging the presence of porn in computer labs and appealing for change, the 
students and staff of CMU were met with outrage:
The appeal closed by making clear that they were not advocating banning 
such displays but were requesting that people voluntarily remove them out of 
sensitivity to others. Responses about the appropriateness of the displays and 
of the appeal were mixed and are categorized in the report. Negative reactions 
included the position that the writers were advocating censorship “like the 
Nazis or the Ayatollah Khomeini,” that people should not be asked to change 
their behavior merely because of what others might think, and that a public 
appeal was inappropriate but instead should have been made by individuals to 
individuals. . . .  In response to the criticism that individuals should complain 
personally, several women wrote that “[w]omen asking for changes in behav-
ior individually are exposed to ridicule and abuse.”55
This account highlights that the requests from women at CMU recognized 
both collective responsibilities (creating a workplace that is comfortable 
for everyone) and the importance of having the power to shape one’s work-
space (asking for voluntary compliance instead of a policy banning porn). 
In response, the requests were transformed into fuel for further abuse, ridi-
cule, and alienation, with the moderate demands for equitable and nonvio-
lent workplaces being equated to authoritarianism. It’s a textbook example 
of what Sarah Banet- Weiser calls the “funhouse mirror” of gendered poli-
tics, through which social justice demands are twisted and mutated to por-
tray men as the “real” victims of inequality.56
At the time, MIT had a reputation for innovation, often ascribed 
to its valuation of unorthodox thinkers and loose surveillance of social 
norms. The school remains among the most influential sites of academic 
research into computing and artificial intelligence (AI). Among the most 
137  Proxy Justice
often credited reasons for this reputation is Marvin Minksy, who founded 
the school’s AI Lab (now the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory [CSAIL]) with John McCarthy and was a member of the 
Media Lab from its founding in 1985. As Meredith Broussard says, “Look 
behind the scenes at the creation of virtually any high- profile tech project 
between 1945 and 2016, and you’ll find Minsky (or his work) somewhere 
in the cast of characters.”57 As famous as MIT was for its research, it 
equally prided itself on its self- perceived iconoclasm. As Broussard writes, 
Minksy’s lab was “where hackers were born. It was terribly informal.”58 It 
was vital to the reputation of many researchers within the AI Lab, and the 
Media Lab after it, that their work appear unconventional— a countercul-
tural and counterinstitutional ethos that bolstered the claims of revolu-
tionary potential connected with innovations in computing.59 In recent 
years, both CSAIL and the Media Lab have been tarnished by their long-
standing association with the convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, who 
provided both institutional funding and personal funding and organized 
fundraising for institutional research. Minsky also accepted funding from 
Epstein and organized academic symposia on his private island after his 
conviction in 2008.60
But these institutions were already accustomed to controversy. Even in 
the 1980s and 1990s, MIT, CSAIL, and the Media Lab had been cited for 
the mistreatment of women. In Karen Frenkel’s 1990 cover article for Com-
munications of the ACM, titled “Women and Computing,” she included 
anonymous quotes gathered from women computer scientists around the 
United States that detail experiences of harassment, abuse, and alienation. 
In one passage, a woman detailed her experience of choosing a proxy, a 
video test sequence, at MIT’s Media Lab:
“[In] The Garden [at MIT’s Media Lab] . . .  some faculty, students, and staff 
[chose] a test sequence from the film clip of the TV program ‘Moonlighting’. 
They were looking for a sequence of a few frames that had a variety of colors, 
textures, and camera motions, and that probably had human figures on it. 
On these strictly technical considerations, they chose a sequence in which, 
at the beginning, the camera focuses closely on the legs of Cybil Shepherd 
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as she walks away from the camera in a torn skirt. Subsequent frames show 
her walking flirtatiously past Bruce Willis, pretending to be angry at him but 
with a small, triumphant smile on her face. . . .  Women must deal with these 
pictures of women as test objects, as pictures to be used over and over again, 
long after their anger has worn off.” 61
It is remarkable how well this person’s description foreshadows Munson’s 
description of the Lena image from six years later— the way that it speaks 
to the repetitive injuries of using compulsory test images and the way that 
it captures the effects of one’s embodied labor being tuned to an unwanted 
proxy. As much as it foreshadows Munson’s comments, however, it is the 
twisted mirror image of the origins of the Lena image; while the man who 
digitized the Lena image, Sawchuk, claimed that the selection of the cen-
terfold grew out of boredom with his existing batch of test images, this 
woman at MIT must deal with the tedious repetition and the perennial 
objectification of women’s bodies. As image proxies have to be seen as typi-
cal representations of the world of images, the selection of an image that 
carries the signifiers of sexualized and gendered violence echoes the banal-
ity of such texts in the larger domain of popular cinema and television— as 
a proxy, it doesn’t just index the world of pop culture media, but also the 
taken- for- grantedness of images of abuse.
The correspondent’s description of her work in the Media Lab expresses 
the anger of being forced to select a sexist video clip. But it also describes 
the routinized violence of using the clip repeatedly as a necessary and 
assumed practice on the job. Such accounts are important testimonies that 
expose the nonspectacular ways that shared injustice must be mediated. 
Here too, the politics of standing- in are activated, as witnesses can speak 
to and speak for absent others. “Witnessing,” following Carrie Rentschler, 
is a form of participation in others’ suffering.62 In “The Aptness of Anger,” 
Amia Srinivasan describes “affective injustices” as a special kind of injury 
“where victims of oppression must choose between getting aptly angry 
and acting prudentially.” 63 These affective injustices, where one must curb 
one’s anger out of a fear of appearing too “emotional,” constitute a form 
of doubled, unrecognized harm. The testimony of the researcher at MIT, 
like those of other contemporaneous accounts, speaks directly to the felt 
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experience of affective injustice: the injustice of lacking control over one’s 
working environment or the knowledge infrastructures of one’s discipline, 
and the felt incapacity to do anything about it.
The concluding statement, that this labor will continue “long after 
their anger has worn off,” demonstrates the untimeliness of unrecognized 
injustice: if your work has always been tuned to the stuff of prototypical 
whiteness and sexualized objectification, when would it be timely to be 
angry? Affective injustice is not evenly felt; it is more likely to be felt by 
those whose anger is seen as unreasonable or inapt. Affective injustices are 
more likely to be treated as legitimate complaints if they are voiced by 
people whose subjectivity is associated with rationality, not by “the sort of 
person who is not already stereotyped as rageful, violent, or shrill.” 64 In the 
context of the campus politics of the 1980s and 1990s and the reaction-
ary politics of those in positions of power, who often refused even minor 
demands for change, we can see how the labor of working with unjust 
proxies for the world out there persists long after the moment of acute 
anger.
Chapter 3 documented the institutional, cultural, and technical con-
text of the digitization of the Lena image, and the role that human actors 
like Lena Forsén play in embodying proxiness; meanwhile, the discussion 
here has marked another crucial period in the image’s history by placing it 
within the larger context of computer science and engineering in the 1990s. 
This period was marked by its attention to the structures of inequality that 
perpetuate discrimination and abuse within institutions, and also by the 
resistance to these structures undertaken by activists, students, teachers, 
and those simply fed up with the status quo.
Accounts like this one from MIT speak to the embodied labor of 
working with proxies within a larger institutional context of mistreatment 
and misrecognition. How is a researcher, a student, or a fellow teacher to 
understand their role in the workplace in such moments? It is also worth 
remembering that when controversies and scandals erupt, there is often an 
attempt to claim that things used to be different, the culture of the time was 
less enlightened, and things have changed now. This is usually an attempt to 
disavow the political demands of minoritized and marginalized people. But 
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these scandals erupt because of the bonds of culture, the chains of iteration 
and reiteration that perpetuate norms. It is true (but not an excuse) that the 
problem is cultural— that certain thoughts are used to think others— but 
it is the power to create those connections, to insist on particular forms of 
culture that is so firmly entrenched. It’s the inescapability of the network 
of cultural connections that makes it nearly impossible for the powerful to 
imagine a different way of doing things.
As Kenneth Burke writes, in an appropriately visual metaphor, “A way 
of seeing is also a way of not seeing— a focus upon object A involves a 
neglect of object B.” 65 For him, ways of seeing and not seeing are learned, 
trained, and practiced. They come to seem natural, even valorized, as pro-
fessional ways of enframing the world. Building on a term first coined 
by Thorstein Veblen, Burke calls these ways of seeing/not seeing, “trained 
incapacities.” 66 He adds that “one adopts measures in keeping with his 
past training— and the very soundness of this training may lead him to 
adopt the wrong measures.” 67 In other words, trained incapacity is not an 
unwanted side effect of proper training; rather, it is a way of understanding 
properly trained actions from a different perspective. This is precisely the 
problem that David Munson diagnosed in 1996 when he wrote, “We may 
even devise image compression schemes that work well across a broader 
class of images, instead of being tuned to Lena!” The Lena image is an 
instrument that tuned the professional vision of image researchers to a 
circumscribed world of digital images, and it also changed the ways that 
engineers experienced their profession.
The other story here is one of historical exclusion, a story where women 
had little capacity to shape computer science as a discipline, were limited in 
shaping the media environment of their workplaces and classrooms, and were 
excluded when men repaired the instrumental value of the Lena centerfold by 
rejecting claims of its unjust use. The Lena image was what Luce Irigaray calls 
the “target, object, and stake” of a masculinist discourse.68
The routines of professionalization in digital image processing required 
workers to choose images as proxies, to potentially favor certain kinds of 
images, and to reproduce those images with as much regularity as possible— 
building up the known catalog of possible image transformations. Through 
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this process of constant reproduction, the image hardened as both a shared 
reference point and a useful set of test data. Understanding this repetitive 
labor as a manifestation of trained incapacity is one way of accounting 
for the selection and maintenance of the Lena image as a stand- in for the 
objectification and sexualization that suffused lab environments.
AFTERLIVES
Something changed in 2018, when scientific and technical journals finally 
started to ban the use of the Lena/Lenna image. We return to the pages of 
Optical Engineering, where the journal’s editor stated, “As of 1 July 2019, 
SPIE journals and books will no longer consider new submissions containing 
the Lena image without convincing scientific justification for its use.” 69 In 
Nature Nanotechnology, a similar note said, “We no longer consider submis-
sions containing the Lena (sometimes ‘Lenna’) image.”70 The Optical Society 
and the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics also banned the 
image’s use. Each of these statements claimed that this was a collective and 
deliberative decision and noted that the image had served as a standard for 
forty- five years. They also tied their decisions to a desire to create more hospi-
table environments for women to become computer scientists and engineers. 
Like other proxies, which gained coherence and usefulness through reuse, the 
Lena image persisted for decades as a shared reference point. But ultimately, 
it was political demands, not formal ones, that sunk it. Beyond just a wink-
ing reference to insiders, the image accrued a wider reputation as an icon of 
misogyny and misrepresentation within the world of computer science and 
its allied fields. What began as a campaign to end the use of the image in 
the 1990s culminated in a documentary, Losing Lena (2019), featuring Lena 
Forsén herself and supported by the “Code Like a Girl” campaign.
The image lives on, however. In the HBO comedy series Silicon Valley, 
the protagonists, a start- up with an enviable compression algorithm, com-
pete against their main antagonists, a powerful Silicon Valley firm called 
Hooli. Hooli has both bottomless funds and an abiding grudge against the 
start- up. The two sides meet in the finals of a Valley competition, pitting 
their compression algorithms against one another. Hooli’s chief executive 
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officer (CEO) stands in front of the crowd, and in the familiar bravado of 
the Valley’s product showcases, proceeds to compress an image more effi-
ciently than ever before (figure 4.3). That image is the Lena image.
Earlier in the series, the start- up’s leader sits at his desk, trying to think 
his way out of a stymying compression problem. Deep in thought, his head 
is framed facing a now- familiar sight: the Lena image is pinned to the wall 
next to his desk. The image is there when the young, aspiring engineer 
needs inspiration, and it is there when the behemoth corporation needs 
to assert its unrivaled mastery: in the visual culture of Silicon Valley (and 
Silicon Valley), the Lena image is both muse and model.
Its status as an icon of the image processing profession has prompted 
a range of responses. In addition to appearing on Silicon Valley and in 
Figure 4.3
In this scene from the HBO series Silicon Valley (2014), the fictional Hooli CEO demon-
strates how the company’s compression algorithm would take the original Lena image (top 
panel) and convert it into more compressed data (bottom panel). Photos: Dylan Mulvin.
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poetry,71 the Lena image appears in art works, reenactments, 3D render-
ings, icons in Apple’s App Store, and video art pieces.72 This is not surpris-
ing. As recurs frequently with proxies, people will often find and use these 
common reference points as the basis of artistic creation (see chapter 6). A 
video artwork by Jamie Allen with the unfortunate name of Killing Lena 
shows the image undergoing repeated compression. Like a photocopy of a 
photocopy, the image slowly disappears in a cloud of pixelated noise while 
Roberta Flack’s “The First Time I Ever Saw Your Face” plays.73
The history of the Lena image shows how the process of proxification— 
the transformation of a centerfold into a test image— is porous, as the test 
image carries the traces of its institutional and cultural milieu. It also shows 
how these traces leave indelible marks. Throughout the 1990s, the image’s 
origins and continued use were liabilities that brought it into focus as an 
artifact of the field’s larger structures of discrimination and objectification. 
The work of animating proxies— from their production to their continued 
use— is inescapably embodied. Test images capture the cultural work of 
models who perform as stand- ins. In being coopted into the history of test 
images, Lena Forsén’s labor became the labor of vicarity— standing in for a 
world of images, faces, and skin. But the cultural work surrounding proxies 
also extends to the moment that this labor is leveraged, like the moment 
when image engineers walked into the SIPI laboratory and either tore or 
folded a Playboy centerfold to fit it with a scanner; the conditions of proxy 
labor also extend to the malaise of using a staid set of test images, as well 
as to the alienation of compulsory engagement with sexist and objectifying 
instruments. Proxies live through the bodies of their users.
Proxies for the world out there don’t just form the foundation of a 
discipline, but also themselves are in need of maintenance and repair and 
are susceptible to contestation. For it to stay usable, someone had to crop 
the Lena centerfold to cleanse it of its soft- core origins, someone else had 
to circulate the image to turn it into a commonplace object, and someone 
(indeed, many someones) had to use and cite it. In the making of stan-
dards, cropping, circulation, and citation all become kinds of repair and 
maintenance. These social acts shape and maintain proxies in ways that 
lend them credibility and allow them to retain legitimacy.
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Our media technologies are built on standards, and our standards 
in turn are built of the materials that standard makers use. The history 
of proxies like the Lena image, however, tells us that our standards are 
made to work in the world, but they are made to work for only some 
people in some ways. Objects do not simply appear and centerfolds do 
not simply appear on analog- to- digital scanners. To appear, an object needs 
time, circumstance, and purpose.74 Test images appear because their users 
want to forecast what they think their publics and their machines will see. 
They imagine how we will see— whether it’s the automated detection of 
tanks, nontanks, or centerfolds, test images foresee one version of things to 
come. We know that our ways of seeing are learned, that human vision is 
trained.75 We also know that computer vision is trained. The Lena image, 
as an early digital test image and a product of the material life of hetero 
desire, serves as a familiar icon of both these processes.
There is a difference between what we know and what we see. The 
myth of computer vision and digital image processing is that they are the 
same thing— that a computer or an algorithm might “see” in an objective 
way, unalloyed by human perception and prejudice. Yet these techniques 
function through specifically chosen and programmed preconditions. The 
history of the Lena image tells a story about humans caught up in data. 
It’s an entangled tale of gender, sexuality, race, and power: the power to 
choose test media, to inscribe new techniques of vision, and to dictate a 
new vocabulary of seeing. But it also tells a history of resistance to that 
structure of vision, and it demonstrates that the meaning of a standard is 
never fully determined.
5 LIVING PROXIES: THE STANDARDIZED 
PATIENT PROGRAM
To train medical professionals in proper care, the standardized patient pro-
gram uses actors to simulate illness and disability. Once given an assign-
ment, the “patients” are interviewed and examined by medical trainees 
seeking to be nurses or physicians, who try to diagnose the performers. 
The entire process is monitored, and the trainees are evaluated on their 
methods, the accuracy of their diagnoses, and the compassion that they 
demonstrate during their interactions with the standardized patients (SPs).
In a radio profile of an SP based in Los Angeles, the host captures the 
program through an analogy: “Like the nude model in art class, or the 
customer at the beauty school salon, [the SP] is a human learning tool.”1 
Similarly, Janelle Taylor quotes a typical speaker at an SP conference: ‘‘this 
is a technology from my perspective. Whether you’re using a person, or 
a computer program or a mannequin, it’s all part of the continuum of 
simulation.’’2 Living human bodies, behaviors, and biographies complicate 
these analogies between life models, mannequins, tools, and technologies. 
This is because— to dispute the previous statements— people will always 
resist attempts to make them into simple tools and technologies. SPs offer 
their bodies as stand- ins for a world of potential bodies, performing their 
humanity while simultaneously acting as if they are sick or disabled. But 
their bodies linger, and the standardized patient program must creatively 
manage the overlapping humanities of those who act as proxies and the 
people for whom they stand in.
The standardized patient program is part of a shift in medical train-
ing toward the clinical performance of care and the standardization of 
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the “emotional labor” of medical professionals.3 Today, every physician 
in the United States and Canada, whether trained nationally or interna-
tionally, must complete an exam called an Objective Structured Clinical 
Examination (OSCE) based on SP interactions.4 Medical licensing and the 
possibility of standardized medical care now hinge on a bureaucratically 
administered system for training actors to embody scripted roles, simulate 
disease, and perform as disabled.
Proxies are relational artifacts, meant to bind institutions and disciplines to 
shared reference points. They animate the work of culture that uses things— or 
people— to think other things. We’ve seen how proxies, from the most basic 
pieces of metal in the metric system to the stuff of a male- dominated image 
lab, are porous, leaky, and unstable. All of these issues threaten the long- term 
viability of proxies and, with them, the knowledge infrastructures of these 
institutions. The history of proxies is as much that of their selection as of their 
maintenance, upkeep, and repair. The history of the standardized patient 
program, accordingly, is a particularly thorny one.
This story of proxification traces the way that human bodies— in all 
their leakiness and porousness— have been trained by a medical establish-
ment to act as relational instruments. SPs are meant to stand in for the 
experience of illness and disability in order to encode a form of medical 
care that lives up to the standards and expectations of the profession. The 
program began as a way of imagining a better relationship between physi-
cian and patient, and it continues as a way of simulating those relation-
ships in the reproduction of medical and caregiving norms. By simulating 
doctor- patient interactions, the standardized patient program is meant to 
train people in the embodiment of illness in order to compel physicians to 
embody proper doctoring. This relational dynamic, for which there could be 
no computerized or written substitute, makes human proxies invaluable in 
the standardization of care.
This chapter has a number of goals. First, it conveys a brief history 
of the standardized patient program as it took root in the United States 
and Canada— its transition, over a few decades, from a curiosity into an 
entrenched aspect of medical education and accreditation. Second, it paints 
the standardized patient program as a bureaucracy that relies on human 
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beings who can act as faithful, consistent, and trustworthy proxies for the 
pain and suffering of others. Third, and finally, it shows how all the cultural 
practices surrounding proxies, including the use of fixed points, the ritual-
ized performance of embodied gestures, the vesting of particular materials 
as stand- ins, and the inescapable regimes of data hygiene, apply when the 
target of standardization shifts to human bodies and human interactions. 
In addition, this chapter charts a novel process of measuring, quantifying, 
and standardizing affect and care in the late twentieth century. Such efforts 
take place within a larger context of the quantification of emotion, affect, 
and care, as well as the development of new, intricate relationships between 
measurements and feelings.5
A NEW STANDARD
Between the 1970s and 2000s, medical educators in Canada, the United 
States, and Great Britain adopted a greater performance- based framework 
in training and accrediting physicians, and the standardized patient pro-
gram is just one example of this process. This period was also characterized 
by the influence of medical educators trained in psychometrics, which has 
led to more emphasis on “standardization, reliability, and validity in assess-
ment.” 6 This shift in emphasis was also compelled by the rise of a patient 
safety movement, an increase in malpractice lawsuits filed against Ameri-
can physicians, a perceived increase in medical errors, and a decrease in 
patient satisfaction with care.7 A shift to a performance- based framework 
demanded a new standard— and corresponding simulations— that could 
be used to evaluate any physician who wanted to work in the United States; 
today, OSCE testing with SPs is currently centralized in five US cities, and 
exams are given every workday.8 This new licensing requirement emerged 
from a belief that it was financially and ethically necessary to supervise the 
diagnostic skills and affective care of physicians.
The use of SPs dates to 1963, when a physician, Howard Barrows, and 
a medical education researcher, Stephen Abrahamson, at the University 
of Southern California (USC)— the same campus where, exactly a decade 
later, the Lena image would first be digitized— were looking for a way to 
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train and compare third- year medical students’ interactions with patients. 
Barrows and Abrahamson were working in a context where little attention 
was paid to the training of “bedside manner” and patient compassion. A 
contemporary test of bedside manner was scrapped by the National Board 
of Medical Examiners in 1964, when it was revealed that the evaluation 
results were as random as chance.9 Early adopters of Barrows’s standard-
ized patient program, who used it as a supplement to their gross anatomy 
classes, claimed to view the SPs as “bridging the gap between cadaver anat-
omy and the anatomy of the living human being.”10
Barrows was a young physician in USC’s Department of Neurology, 
and his collaborator, Abrahamson, was the school’s director of the Division 
of Research in Medical Education. They published their first paper on the 
use of SPs in 1964 under the title “The Programmed Patient: A Technique 
for Appraising Student Performance in Clinical Neurology.”11 Over the 
years, the techniques that Barrows and Abrahamson developed evolved 
from using the term “programmed patients” to “simulated patients” to, 
finally, “standardized patients.”12 The change in name does not indicate 
a drastic change in either methodology or the demands placed on the 
actors involved. However, the choice of which of these words to use— 
“programmed,” “simulated,” or “standardized”— says something impor-
tant about proxies: they are programmed objects meant to simulate an event 
for the purpose of standardization. By ultimately calling the proxies SPs, 
however, the process is actually reversed: they are standardized instruments 
meant to program medical students in proper behavior through simula-
tion.13 The Canadian psychometrician Geoffrey Norman, who coined the 
term “standardized patient,” did so for this exact reason: he wanted a term 
that captured the “technique’s strongest features, the fact that the patient 
challenge to each student remains the same.”14
THE SCENARIO
Standardized patient programs use a preplanned set of scenarios, within 
which SPs embody fictional patients with symptoms, past behaviors, and 
a set of questions to ask their trainee physician. There are several variations 
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on what a trainee may be asked to do, but in general, they will enter the 
scenario as if it were a normal clinical exam. The trainee may be asked to 
take the patient’s history, perform a physical exam, and try to form a work-
ing diagnosis. Throughout the scenario, they are meant to gather informa-
tion while expressing proper compassion toward the SP. Study guides for 
physician trainees universally emphasize the importance of being polite, 
gentle, and presenting a neat and clean appearance. Almost every guide 
begins with a reminder to trainees not to forget to wash their hands.
Trainee physicians encounter SPs in a circumscribed scenario: they 
enter a room and are either alone with the SP, watched on a closed- circuit 
television (CCTV) system, or perform in front of colleagues and teachers. 
They encounter the bodies of the SPs via their sight, hearing, and touch 
and all of these senses help build a network of inferences, analogies, experi-
ences, and likenesses. In The Birth of the Clinic, Michel Foucault describes 
the logic of this kind of encounter as a product of the eighteenth- century 
emergence of a “clinical” or “medical gaze,” and with it a shift to the pri-
macy of the physician as the locus of knowledge about disease. The clinical 
gaze centers the physician’s understanding of symptoms as a “combinative 
study of elements,” by which a series of symptoms would add up to a 
diagnosis of a distinct disease.15 A principle of analogy (the conditional as 
if of a patient’s history) displaced the patient’s own perspective and recodes 
the body as a constellation of information in a series of patterns. As Hsuan 
Hsu and Martha Lincoln describe: “Facilitated by the medical technolo-
gies that frame and focus the physicians’ optical grasp of the patient, the 
medical gaze abstracts the suffering person from her sociological context 
and reframes her as a ‘case’ or a ‘condition.’”16 The standardized patient 
program could not operate without the deep, institutional, and infrastruc-
tural normalization of the clinical gaze. As a simulation meant to train the 
physician in apprehending a probable diagnosis— whether or not the disease 
actually exists in the person— it operates on the logic of a case study, where 
patient descriptions situate their bodies on a graph of similarity to other 
bodies.17
To generate the SP scenario, medical educators first develop a profile 
of a case study using a template and then distribute patient scripts to the 
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actors. For the medical educator who prepares it, the patient template takes 
the form of a lengthy document that can cover everything from demo-
graphic descriptors of the SP, like age, gender, race, sexuality, and physical 
description, to a detailed account of the SP’s complaint, wardrobe, back-
ground, and affect.18 For the patient, the details of the script can vary. The 
example shown in figure 5.1 is an excerpt from the “Patient Behavior” sec-
tion of an SP script template. The section provides the range of dimensions 
for the patient’s emotional state and how that state should present in body 
language and facial expression. The template is meant to program, as much 
as possible, the basic contours of the interaction, such that the responses 
of the physician- in- training can be judged both qualitatively and quantita-
tively against other trainees.
In turn, a template produces a script for SPs to follow. The “Back Pain 
Script” shown in figure 5.2 includes basic demographic details with added 
identifying information, including education, employment background, 
Patient Behavior: 
Affect: (check all that apply) 
 [ ] relaxed  [ ] cooperative [ ] pleasant [ ] confident
 [ ] uncooperative [ ] hostile  [ ] demanding [ ] preoccupied
 [ ] anxious [ ] fearful [ ] apprehensive [ ] sad
 [ ] listless [ ] sad [ ] withdrawn [ ] other________ 
Body Language:
 [ ] relaxed [ ] withdrawn [ ] defensive [ ] uncomfortable 
 [ ] anxious [ ] fearful [ ] nervous [ ] other________ 
Facial Expression: 
 [ ] relaxed [ ] tense [ ]  worried [ ] irritated
 [ ] other________ 
Eye Contact:  
 [ ] normal eye contact [ ] looks away frequently [ ] no eye contact 
Figure 5.1
An excerpt from the “Patient Behavior” section of an SP script template. Excerpted from 
a training document from the University of Texas Medical Branch’s resources for medical 
educators.
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and possible stressors like feeling overworked. The “Scenario” and “Patient 
Profile” are written in the second person, “you.” The Profile describes how 
the performance should unfold from the perspective of the performer. SPs 
are given a list of questions that they should expect to hear and the answers 
they should give to each. These range from questions about specific ail-
ments and pains (“Q: Where is the pain? A: Lower back, especially left 
side and left leg”) to questions about the patient’s history, background, 
and typical behavior (“Q: Alcohol? A: Socially, one or two glasses of wine 
a week”).19 SPs are coached in how to embody these scripts and how to 
express their symptoms through their bodily comportment and reactions 
to physical examination. By memorizing, internalizing, embodying, and 
in turn exhibiting the details of their personae, SPs leverage their relation-
ship to actual patients and create continuity between textbook knowledge, 
simulations, testing environments, and actual doctoring.
The scenario often begins with the trainee performing a standard 
history- taking. When they do so, the SP leverages an analogic relationship 
with actual illness through the performance of a life marked by experiences, 
Back Pain Script 
(Nancy Owens, Age 44) 
Chief Complaint: “I’ve had some back and leg pain and want help for it.” 
Identifying Data: College-educated accountant; workload stressful at times; married, one child, 
good home life. 
Scenario: Your low back/left leg pain began about three months ago. You had a similar problem 
during the last few months of your pregnancy (your child was born seven years ago), but then 
none until three months ago. You consider yourself an athlete and can’t run due to pain and 
intermittent numbness and tingling (“pins and needles” feeling) in the left leg.
Patient Profile: Concerned/anxious about this problem. You are in pain during the interview, 
but it is tolerable. Sitting is very uncomfortable, so shift around after several minutes. Bend 
forward slightly when sitting (put hands under knees—having knees higher than pelvis feels 
better). When walking, do so slowly with pelvis tilted forward. You have slow movements, with 
some stiffness in your back. Standing tolerance is 10–15 minutes. You bend over and rotate 
slowly. If asked to lie down, bring your knees up and flatten your back for comfort.  
Figure 5.2
The beginning of an SP brief for a “back pain” patient, excerpted from a training document 
from the Baylor College of Medicine.
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routines, and behaviors that can be called up to corroborate their symp-
toms and to form a complete picture of a person in need of medical care. 
This performance of experience is meant to render their bodies as readable 
through a theater of transparency. In the words of Rachel Hall, the theater 
of transparency is a “mode in which the citizen’s episodic affirmations of life 
and futurity are rehearsed, compelled, enacted, repeated, and confirmed.”20 
The only difference here is that the citizens in question are stand- ins for the 
lives and futures of others.
Together, the actor, template, and script create a controllable, rela-
tively repeatable scenario against which medical students can be evaluated. 
The same scenario can be repeated and used to test the variability in stu-
dent knowledge, empathy, and skill. A final piece of paperwork is used to 
record judgments of the physicians- in- training: the Master Interviewing 
Rating Scale (MIRS) is one tool used to score up to twenty- seven features 
of the interaction, beginning with the trainee’s introduction and progress-
ing through such factors as how the trainee elicits information about the 
impact of the illness on the patient’s family, the trainee’s demonstrated 
empathy, and their acknowledgment of the patient’s cues (figure 5.3).21
A standard uses the stuff of the local and the specific to code and 
compel behaviors in the future. The standardized patient program takes 
this logic to its extreme, using the bodies, voices, and physical responses of 
actors, the predictable and scriptable formulas of templates, and the ideol-
ogy of psychometric testing to create an idealized version of how medical 
ITEM 17 – EMPATHY AND ACKNOWLEDGING PATIENT CUES 






The interviewer uses 
NURS (name, 
understand, respect, 




The interviewer is 
neutral, neither 




No empathy is 
demonstrated. 
The interviewer uses 
a negative emphasis 
or overly criticizes 
the patient.  
Figure 5.3
Excerpt from the MIRS showing how to score a trainee on their demonstration of empathy. 
The scores run from 5 (highest) to 1 (lowest), and there are descriptions of how to score for 
each number on the scale.
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care ought to be delivered. The purpose of improving these interactions is 
not only to improve the bedside manner of would- be physicians, but also 
to improve the overall care of patients. Activist and patient movements 
to gain recognition for suffering, patient safety, and equity in care have 
all demonstrated that the emotional and affective tenor of medical care 
improves patient outcomes and a patient’s willingness to access care in the 
future.
SIGNALING THE BODY IN PAIN
The standardization work involved in the SP program relies on a belief 
that we can communicate our pain or suffering through language and 
representation— that there are media for expressing and recognizing suffer-
ing. This is evident in the ways that the standardized patient program relies 
on semistructured encounters where patients share their symptoms and 
histories. But if the communication of pain were easy, then the standard-
ized patient program wouldn’t exist. In reality, the expression of one’s pain 
and the recognition of that pain by others are both complex, interpersonal 
events that can be easily overwhelmed by social expectations, prejudices, 
and the noise of mediation.
In her groundbreaking work The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry examines 
the difficulty of expressing pain and the obstacles that exist to finding gen-
uine sympathy for another person’s suffering. To be in pain, Scarry argues, 
is to have certainty, but to hear of another person’s pain is to have doubt. 
This gap between certainty and doubt is further obstructed by the fact that 
pain often also inhibits expression, either because pain itself is debilitating 
or because it “resists verbal objectification.”22 Not only is another person’s 
pain fundamentally inaccessible as a physical phenomenon, the ways that 
we normally bridge intersubjective gaps are not readily available in the 
case of pain. Language and other forms of symbolic representation do not 
convey either the intensity of pain or its felt immanence. Finally, Scarry 
argues that because pain is often ineffable and there are limited outlets for 
its representation, there are few ways of achieving political recognition for 
it.23 The result is a circular reaffirmation of pain’s loneliness— the person in 
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pain is certain of their experience but lacks any recourse for gaining com-
passion and recognition.
For Scarry, the only path to validating another person’s suffering is for 
that experience to be objectified (i.e., turned into a common object of anal-
ysis) and lifted into a world of shared symbols and representations in a man-
ner that retains a definite reference to the human body. Pain needs media. 
Once materialized and tethered to a shared understanding of embodied 
experience— that is, mediated— pain can be acknowledged, validated, and 
attended to.24 Any attempt to alleviate or remedy pain faces a series of gar-
gantuan tasks: bridging the intersubjective gap between feeling pain and 
having that feeling understood, having pain validated through symbolic 
representation, and achieving political recognition that can provide the 
grounds for ongoing and future recognition and remedy. The capacity for 
someone to clear these hurdles is also encumbered by the uneven distribu-
tion of recognizability. Gendered, raced, and stigmatized forms of injury, 
disability, and pain face greater obstacles to recognition and acceptance 
and demonstrate that the gains in intersubjective understanding are always 
contingent.
> > >
Medical systems have many tools for trying to bridge the intersubjective 
gap between patient and physician. There are tools for quantifying pain, 
for narrating or describing it, and for gauging an appropriate clinical treat-
ment for it. These tools vary by discipline, region, and practitioner, but 
each seeks to do what Scarry describes and to mediate between a person 
who is suffering and a person who may be able to alleviate their pain. 
Widely used instruments for describing and quantifying the subjective 
experience of pain ask patients to give a rating to their pain (“on a scale of 
1 to 10”) or to rely on a standardized vocabulary to characterize pain. The 
widely used McGill Pain Questionnaire dates from the 1970s, contempo-
raneous with the standardized patient program, and sorts descriptions of 
pain into three categories (sensory, affective, and evaluative) and rates each 
sensation on a scale of intensity. Ronald Melzack, who originally developed 
the questionnaire, provided it as a means for transforming the experience 
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of pain into information that “can be treated statistically.”25 To put this in 
the terms that Scarry sets out, instruments like the McGill Pain Question-
naire can transmute the ambiguity of another’s pain into a statistical regu-
larity, placing the subjective experience of a stranger on a grid of patterned 
normativity.
Scarry’s approach is a humanistic and philosophical one. But sharing 
one’s pain and accepting another’s pain are processes embedded in social 
and historical milieus. They are processes marked not only by an intersub-
jective gap, but by institutions built on norms and standards that accord 
different bodies more or less legitimacy in their expression of pain. Even 
with tools to represent and measure pain, there is inequity in the recogni-
tion of suffering.26
In 2016, researchers at the University of Virginia published a study 
in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences entitled “Racial Bias 
in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations, and False Beliefs 
about Biological Differences between Blacks and Whites.” The authors 
show that among white- identified laypersons, medical students, and medi-
cal residents, there were widespread false beliefs about the experience of 
pain among racially coded Black patients and white ones. Among the lay-
persons, 73 percent ascribed to at least one false belief about the biologi-
cal difference between Black and white people, including that “Blacks age 
more slowly than whites,” “Black people’s blood coagulates more quickly 
than whites’,” and “Blacks’ skin is thicker than whites’.”27 Among those 
with some medical training, 50 percent of their participants still ascribed 
to at least one false view. And among those who were medically trained, 
false beliefs about pain reception correlated with biases in their treatment 
recommendations.
In other words, among a statistically significant segment of the sample, 
medical students and residents (1) had false views about biological differ-
ences among Black and white people, (2) ascribed “fantastical” attributes 
to Black patients, and (3) were less likely to follow an accurate treatment 
recommendation for Black people suffering pain.28 As the authors of the 
study note, their work takes place in an American medical system that has 
inherited reified racial differences that propagate both a false human racial 
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taxonomy and a false view of Black bodies as being more resilient: “beliefs 
about biological differences between Blacks and whites— beliefs dating 
back to slavery— are associated with the perception that Black people feel 
less pain than white people, and also with inadequate treatment recom-
mendations for Black patients’ pain.”29
Throughout the history of the United States, a belief in the racial 
peculiarities of white and Black people has been used as a justification for 
slavery, torture, and medical experimentation premised on a cultural view 
of the Black body as resilient and physically predisposed to withstand pain. 
Activist and social justice organizations like the Black Lives Matter move-
ment have had to work to gain recognition for the particular suffering 
of Black bodies (hence the erasure of that specific pain expressed in the 
antislogan “All lives matter”) within a system that forecloses the possibility 
of such recognition. Within white supremacist systems, the denial of pain 
suffered by people of color is a strategy to actively delegitimate the politi-
cal demand to reckon with the history of colonial and settler exploitation 
and ongoing forms of acute structural violence, and a refusal that some 
kind of reparations ought to be paid.30 As the University of Virginia study 
makes clear, this history has a subtler cost: the ongoing misrecognition of 
felt pain within medical establishments. A person seen as Black is less likely 
to receive necessary medical care or relief if their pain and suffering are not 
recognized.
One of the mechanisms of white supremacy is the way that it has 
paradoxically secured a position of dominance within institutions through 
the pretext of nonwhite resilience. The history of scientific and medical 
research in the Global North is marked by dehumanizing and eugenicist 
projects and devious experiments on the bodies of Indigenous people and 
people of color. From the moment of settler dispossession up through the 
twentieth century, as Harriet Washington documents in Medical Apartheid, 
the history of the United States is marked by medical experimentation on 
the bodies of minorities. Studies like the Tuskegee experiments— which 
allowed syphilis to develop untreated in the bodies of Black men, without 
their knowledge or consent, all in the name of research— are outrageous 
violations of personal sovereignty. But as Washington’s history makes clear, 
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the episodic nature of white outrage at such events masks the longstanding 
continuity that has entrenched medicine as a white- serving institution and 
bred a well- earned distrust of the profession among nonwhite patients.31
We must situate the widespread denial of Black pain among medi-
cal professionals as a continuation of this history, as a manifestation of its 
banality. We must also not ignore the fact that Black pain is not mono-
lithic or itself a natural category of suffering. So- called Black pain is an 
intersectional and relational concept and a narrative of experience within 
institutions built on white supremacist precepts: women, mothers, the 
economically oppressed, Indigenous, queer, disabled, and gender noncon-
forming individuals are much more likely to be denied necessary medi-
cal care or to suffer nonconsensual medical interventions.32 The denial of 
Black pain is a white supremacist excuse for the objectification of human 
bodies in medicine and science, and it erases human vulnerability to struc-
tural harm. Angelique Davis and Rose Ernst refer to this process as “racial 
gaslighting,” by which they mean the “political, social, economic, and cul-
tural process that perpetuates and normalizes a white supremacist reality 
through pathologizing those who resist.”33
The denial of Black pain is part and parcel of a white supremacist 
society in which marked minorities are more likely to suffer harm, all while 
the harming entity simultaneously claims that the minority is less likely 
to feel pain. The most widely held false belief among the medical students 
studied by the researchers at the University of Virginia was the belief that 
Black bodies have thicker skin. It is a literal manifestation of the fantasy 
that Black bodies are naturally built to withstand structural and literal 
abuse. The fantastical capacity ascribed to Black bodies to withstand pain 
is dehumanizing twice over: they categorize a racialized body as superhu-
man (abnormal) while materially narrowing the options for remedying the 
actual harm that is suffered.
The standardized patient program was developed in the 1960s in a 
moment when physician attention to the affective dimensions of their 
work was an afterthought. It became an entrenched part of medical train-
ing as these dimensions, as well as their standardization, gained recognition 
as both socially and medically efficacious. But the program continues to 
158  Chapter 5
operate within an institution that propagates widespread disparities in care 
and narratives about racialized bodies that deny their subjective experience 
of pain. As Scarry argues, any person seeking to communicate their pain 
faces a double bind— being certain of their own pain while responding to 
the doubt and skepticism of their audience. Overcoming this bind within 
the medical establishment is a process that relies on the standards of medi-
cal history- taking, symptom- reporting, and a duty of care. But the stan-
dard is not enforced equally. The credibility of another’s pain is established 
through medical rituals formed within institutions built on discriminatory 
practices. The playacting of SPs needs to be appreciated within the con-
text of racialized violence and the failure to accept some bodies in pain as 
legitimate.
NOT NOT SICK: THE SUSPENSION OF DISBELIEF 
IN  STANDARDIZED PATIENT SCENARIOS
In Barrows and Abrahamson’s first published description of the standard-
ized patient program, they write:
The concept of the “programmed patient” involves the simulation of disease 
by a normal person who is trained to assume and present, on examination, 
the history and neurological findings of an actual patient in the manner of an 
actual patient. This person is then used as the subject for clinical testing of 
student performance.34
What we see in this distillation of the standardized patient program is the 
way that normalcy is an imagined canvas for abnormality. Barrows and 
Abrahamson make a number of assertions about the feasibility of standard-
izing human performances and creating an emotionally charged exchange. 
The first is the notion that a person could be “programmed.” The second 
is the suspension of disbelief that this work requires: suspension on the 
part of the actor and the physician- in- training. Barrows and Abrahamson 
address this suspension head on in their original description: “The student 
is informed that this is a simulation but that he is expected to treat the 
subject as he would a patient.”35 Encoded in the basic instructions is a 
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productive fictionalism, in which all parties act as if it were the real thing 
in order to encode the promise of a better encounter in the future.
Finally, the simple declaration that the patient would be a normal per-
son, trained to assume and present the characteristics of an actual patient, 
delineates a presupposition that there are “normal” and “diseased” people 
and that the former can learn to be like the latter with enough coaching. 
Erving Goffman describes “we and those who do not depart negatively 
from the particular expectations at issue” as “normals.”36 The standardized 
patient program appears to uphold such a distinction and to take Goff-
man’s typology even one step further. Whereas “normals” are those people 
who can pass without stigma, the standardized patient program uses this 
apparent normalcy as the basis for creating a dependable and reproducible 
appearance of illness. Through the process of producing a new standard of 
care, the program reinscribes a binary division of human bodies as either 
normal (disease and disability free) or abnormal. In the attempt to codify 
an understanding of bodily difference, the program begins with a normate 
template of human well- being beyond which all maladies can be codified 
and pathologized. The normate, following Rosemary Garland Thomson, 
designates the “veiled subject position of cultural self, the figure outlined 
by the array of deviant others whose marked bodies shore up the normate’s 
boundaries.”37
Many standardized patient programs seek out actors whose bodies are 
not clearly marked by actual impairment or disability. In doing so, these 
putatively normate bodies become doubly significant: the healthy actor 
is always already capable of embodying the signifiers of illness through 
trained simulation (i.e., they are people), and they are free of the overde-
termining noise of illness and disease (i.e., they are “normal”). Their power 
resides in a suspension of disbelief in a person’s ability to shift to the simu-
lation of impairment, illness, and disability without permanently embody-
ing that social position— to live as the embodiment of the as if.
To put it in the terms of proxies and their maintenance, SPs can signify 
clean, hygienic versions of test data that can be used for the measurement 
of physician performance and that are preferred over the uncleansed and 
unpredictable embodiments of people living with actual illness, socially 
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coded as disabled, or both. To understand these interactions and the use 
of actors in the simulation of illness and disability, we have to understand 
how medical institutions reinforce a system of compulsory and prototypi-
cal able- bodiedness and able- mindedness that relies on a medical and social 
understanding of disability.38 To quote Lennard Davis, “the very concept 
of normalcy by which most people (by definition) shape their existence is 
in fact tied inexorably to the concept of disability, or rather, the concept of 
disability is a function of a concept of normalcy. Normalcy and disability 
are part of the same system.”39
Disablement and impairment are relational experiences, contingent 
categories, and cultural artifacts that emerge from the interaction of bod-
ies, identities, discourses, built environments, and the politics of medicine 
and state control.40 Disability activists and scholars have often fought the 
medicalized descriptions of people’s bodies that categorize, essentialize, and 
individualize them according to diagnostic criteria. The medical model of 
disability, it is argued, has historically been a tool of oppression and exclu-
sion that is tied to forced institutionalization and a generalized view of 
“disability” as a medical problem and personal tragedy.41 As a remedy to 
the medical model, many have advocated for a social model of disability 
proclaiming that disability ought not to be treated as an individualized ail-
ment, but rather as a shared, social process of disabling. To put it simply, 
the medical model insists that disability resides in a person’s body while the 
social model insists that the problem lies in society; the social model “is a 
deliberate attempt to shift attention away from the functional limitations 
of individuals with impairments onto the problems caused by disabling 
environments, barriers, and cultures.” 42 The social model draws a distinc-
tion between “impairment” and “disability,” wherein many people might 
have a range of impairments, but only some people will be categorized as 
“disabled.” Hence, for most people in the Global North, moderate near-
sightedness is not disabling because corrective lenses are widely available 
and there is little stigma about wearing glasses or contact lenses. On the 
other hand, many people with paraplegia will experience the world as dis-
abling given the lack of accessible buildings and transit systems, widespread 
discrimination, and threadbare social welfare programs. The social model 
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treats disablement as something that happens when society has failed to 
adapt to an impairment.
Although the social model has found purchase with many activists, 
academics, civil society, and some medical institutions, some argue that its 
distinction between impairment and disability is itself too rigid. By distin-
guishing between impairment as a description and disability as a social dis-
advantage, critics argue that the social model risks its own essentialization 
of impairment as an objective phenomenon that rises to the level of the 
social only when it becomes a disability.43 Such a distinction risks arbitrary 
exclusions of people— for instance, those with chronic illness or chronic 
pain— for whom the label of “disability” might offer political potential and 
collective belonging.
As an alternative, Alison Kafer offers a political- relational model of dis-
ability as one that builds on social and minority understandings of disability. 
A political- relational model is attuned to the “failures and omissions of the 
built environment” that create more frictions for some embodied disposi-
tions than for others.44 But the political- relational model goes further— it’s 
an attempt to pluralize the meanings and experiences of bodily instability, 
to unsettle the certainties of the medical and social models, and to refuse 
the depoliticization of disability. Kafer insists that disability must be under-
stood as relational, meaning that a disability is experienced not in isolation, 
but rather through relationships: this includes the constitutive relation-
ships that one has with the meaning of ability/disability, with family and 
friends, and with strangers.45 Together, these relationships ripple out, and 
the social effects of stigma, discrimination, love, support, and compassion 
can fortify, twist, attenuate, and rend our shared networks of experience.
The standardized patient program is a technology built into the education 
and accreditation system of the medical profession and— more important— it 
is a crucial piece of the emotional infrastructure of medical work. It is also 
founded on the idea that illness, pain, and suffering enter the medical estab-
lishment through a relational encounter. The encounter is the meeting place, 
threshold, and exchange point between the world out there, as the messy world 
of personal, idiosyncratic experience, and the one in here, where knowledge is 
systematically organized. The SP encounter takes the form of an improvised 
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though structured dialogue, through which one party comes to appreciate 
the nature of another’s embodied experience and places it within a system 
of knowledge that recodes experience as diagnostic data. The entire encoun-
ter is held up by another form of relationality, the suspension of disbelief, 
which must be upheld by both parties, or else the whole interaction would 
capsize.
If another’s pain is fundamentally unknowable then all empathy relies 
on some dimension of shared suspension: I trust you to relay your pain; 
and you trust me to believe you. The standardized patient program, then, 
is a form of relational training— a way of building up a chain of social 
relationships that might bring another person relief from suffering. It’s a 
way to practice diagnosing by sifting through the information provided by 
the “patient,” as well as a way to practice a willingness to believe, to trust 
another’s experience as a valid report of their pain and suffering. While we 
might focus on the embodied experience of the actors in these scenarios, a 
political- relational approach to impairment and disability should equally 
attune us to the ways that the SP scenario is meant to entrain the disposition 
of a physician to the culturally unexpected experience of real compassion.
> > >
In The Empathy Exams, Leslie Jamison describes the kinds of maintenance 
and hygiene that she and her fellow SPs undertake between simulated 
examinations:
Between encounters, we are given water, fruit, granola bars, and an endless 
supply of mints. We aren’t supposed to exhaust the students with our bad 
breath and growling stomachs, the side effects of our actual bodies.46
SPs use these practices of upkeep to conceal and mask the parts of their 
bodies that would interfere with the encounter— body parts that would 
introduce noise into the media setting of the scene. This is a textbook way 
of controlling the variables in a testing scenario— of highlighting only the 
parts of the body and the emotional exchange that are supposed to be 
examined. It is also another example of the manual, embodied, and rou-
tine forms of data hygiene that workers in standardization processes use to 
163  Living Proxies
maintain their test data. Instead of an ether- alcohol solution used to wash 
a kilogram or the folding/tearing of an illicit image examined in preceding 
chapters, the “data set” for an SP is an organic, living person. And while 
Jamison notes that she and her fellow participants are given water, food, 
and mints, the responsibility of upkeep falls to each actor to maintain their 
body as a canvas for testing the variability of physician performance.
Louise Aronson, a physician and educator, says that she has “often 
heard from students that the greatest challenge of standardized patient 
exercises was the suspension of disbelief. The most vociferous complained 
that circumstances so contrived couldn’t possibly test them on actual prac-
tice skills.” 47 As Aronson concludes, however, immersion in the scenario 
is possible for her— as an experienced physician— through the practiced 
execution of a kind of labor that she is accustomed to performing:
As my own encounter began, I could see their point. Yet soon thereafter, 
with patient and student fully immersed in their roles, I couldn’t help but 
behave— and respond— much as I would in so- called real life. There was arti-
fice but also familiar work to be done.48
All attempts to build a standard around a proxy require a suspension of dis-
belief. Proxies are contrived— arbitrary, but precise— samples of the world 
that are provisionally treated as good enough stand- ins. They are make-
shift, but they are necessary just the same. And so we suspend our incredu-
lity to get our work done. With enough repetition, this suspension can take 
on the appearance of naturalness, or even objectivity. As Aronson says, the 
familiarity of a routine patient interview covers for the artifice of the proxy 
patients. The SP scenario needs to hold together just long enough for the 
necessary data to be gathered: the trainee determines an actor’s history, and 
the medical educators evaluate the trainee’s performance.
As consumers of media, we are accustomed to the generic conven-
tions that establish suspensions of disbelief: the markers, frames, contexts, 
and affective investments that we bring to cultural texts to let ourselves be 
sutured into their artifice. In theatrical settings, the capacity to suspend dis-
belief is an ideal that must be upheld by both performers and audiences. In 
An Actor Prepares, Constantin Stanislavski quotes his director as describing 
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“the test” of a successful performance as the “art of living a part.” 49 This 
oft- repeated slogan of so-called method acting refers to the ways that an 
actor embodies an experience as theatrical reality. Within a scene, the emo-
tional experience is real even if the scenario itself is contrived. It is possible, 
however, to see this technique of living a part, of suspending disbelief, as 
a theatrical trick to achieving and expressing verisimilitude, and to view it 
as a larger cultural technique for producing and verifying knowledge. It is 
also possible to see it as constitutive of the very practice of being a doctor.
In a popular manual for physicians, titled Proper Doctoring, published 
in 1984, near the end of his career, the British cardiologist David Mendel 
writes, “Although a sound knowledge of the facts is essential, a good doc-
tor differs from a bad doctor more by his attitude and craftsmanship than 
by his knowledge.”50 Mendel’s tract is composed of a series of doctoring 
precepts that he compiled throughout his career. The focus of his advocacy, 
however, is the “much- maligned bedside manner.”51 For Mendel, a prop-
erly honed bedside manner, and by extension a properly honed doctor, are 
a result of training and practice in the art of playing a doctor. Under the 
section “The Need for Role- Playing in Medicine,” he writes:
Doctors vary in the extent to which they act. Some ham it up. Others are to 
the manner born, and practice their art without artifice. Some confine their 
role- playing to their work; others never stop acting. Doctors range from the 
saintly and perceptive who do not need to play- act, through to the horrid and 
insensitive, who may neither realize, nor care, how beneficial a role could be.52
Mendel lays out a method, echoing Stanislavski’s, for routinely inhabiting 
the role of “doctor” until the role feels natural. In this, his analogies are 
mainly theatrical. For instance, he writes in the section on “Rehearsing 
your role”:
The role of doctor, like the role of Hamlet, is not one which you can leap onto 
the stage and perform. In order to play Hamlet, as distinct from watching 
him, which anyone can do, you have to examine each word, each phrase, and 
take it all in the context of the whole play. . . .  So you go on stage, knowing 
your role, knowing what you want to achieve— the perfectly treated patient— 
and you have to use a lot of learned techniques to achieve that end.53
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What Mendel sees in the practice of proper doctoring is not a distinction 
between performance and objectivity, but the weaving of the two: the nec-
essary acceptance that one’s diagnostic is mediated through the relational 
encounter with a patient. The interface of the exam is always theatrical, and 
for both patient and doctor, its repertoire is learned through the coding of 
practiced gestures and speech.
> > >
In reenactment, there is often a fear that the theatrical rendition of an event 
will be either too real or not real enough. In the case of the former, there is 
the danger that reenactors will forget that they are involved in a practice of 
make- believe; in the latter, there is the danger that they won’t give them-
selves over to the performance, that it will seem phony. Rebecca Schnei-
der describes the friction of this relationship as a “queasy portal,” through 
which performers can momentarily forget their embodied time and place. 
In her interviews with historical reenactors, Schneider says, “The differ-
ences or the lack of differences between faux and real might not necessarily 
be failures or threats.”54 There is no guaranteed meaning tied to the failure 
to delineate reality from reenactment; there is no strict hierarchy between 
“real” and “pretend” to which performers aspire. Instead, Schneider says, 
there are moments “when some things, like reading, or even modes of criti-
cal thinking or patterns of analysis, become habit- memory, they are skills, 
fully learned, available to call up as research tools or artistic craft.”55 For 
reenactors of the US Civil War, this form of habit- memory can be a way of 
encoding the traumatic memory of the past through performance. These 
are ways of animating collective, cultural forms of remembrance that can 
be recalled through the scripting of gesture.
Reenactment can also be a way of warding off an unwanted reality. 
Schneider’s reenactors perform historical battles to reanimate a remem-
bered moment in a controllable way. For many of her informants, perfor-
mance is not (or not only) a proxy for a desired past, but a proxy for an 
unwanted future: by performing now, in this way, we will know how it felt 
then, and we will be able to prevent its recurrence. Performance as proxy, 
then, can act as a historical prophylactic, averting historical recurrence 
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through an affective awareness written in gesture, costume, and real- time 
recreation.56 But, it is, of course, both: Civil War reenactors might claim 
that their practice helps to prevent the recurrence of another bloody war, 
while in reality, they spark nostalgia for an antebellum, slave- owning 
South— calling forward the very resentments and violence that fueled the 
war in the first place.
SPs are not reenactors in the same sense as those who portray Civil 
War battles. There is no famous diagnosis of gangrene or Tourette syn-
drome to which actor and physician aspire. Instead, they play at a more 
general enactment, through a pursuit of a likeness to a generic or typical 
medical interaction. To do this, however, they need to walk the same line 
as historical reenactors. The roles that medical students and actors play in 
SP encounters operate in an agreed- upon realm of make- believe in which 
they are both “not actors” and “not not actors,” what Richard Schechner 
describes as the “liminal realm of double negativity that precisely locates 
the process of theatrical characterization.”57 The unpredictability of human 
interaction is both the reason for the use of SPs and the reason that their 
status as fixed points is inherently unstable.
Critics of SPs claim that too much emphasis is put on simulation in 
medical education at the cost of experience with “actual patients,” which 
threatens to make “simulation doctors” instead of actual ones;58 and advo-
cates of SPs claim that actual patients are too idiosyncratic and vulnerable, 
while computer simulations are too inert.59 The implication is that SPs 
exist in a hierarchy of experiential value, somewhere below actual patients 
and above computer simulations. For the training and evaluation of phy-
sicians, however, the hierarchy is reversed: computer simulations would 
give the greatest amount of reproducibility across student encounters, and 
real patients the least. SPs, therefore, are a compromise between the rival 
commitments to verisimilitude and reproducibility that all proxies must 
negotiate.
Like some Civil War reenactors, however, simulated patients have a 
prophylactic function. Their use in the training of physicians is meant to 
achieve a standard of care that is both medically efficacious and compassion-
ate. Just as some of Schneider’s performers cite the embodied experience of 
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war reenactment as a kind of memory- making in defense of repetition, SPs 
create a buffer between trainee physicians and the more vulnerable bodies of 
actual patients. An awkward touch, an inappropriate question, or an incred-
ulous tone of voice— SPs must intercept these faults and blunders of incipi-
ent doctors, including all the gestures and attitudes of miscaring that can 
produce discomfort or manifest as a disbelief in another’s pain and suffering.
> > >
Suspension of disbelief would not be necessary, however, if students were 
interacting with people who were actually experiencing the symptoms they 
described. Yet while patient interaction is a crucial part of a physician’s 
training, it is not a viable means of comparing students. In SP scenarios, 
the embodiment of a simulated disease is a trained technique as well as a 
method for creating standardized tests. Simulation is a means of modeling 
behavior that always serves two purposes: to train individuals and groups in 
embodied habit- memories, while still providing officials with information 
and observations from a controlled test. Standardization works by scaling 
up from a controlled test to an actual implementation.
According to Barrows’s original explanation of his program, from 
1968, SPs offered many advantages over actual sick people and cadavers, 
the only two alternatives that were suggested at that time (the text that fol-
lows is paraphrased except where quoted). SPs are preferable because:
• They save embarrassment.
• The patient does not fatigue.
• “All necessary aspects of disease complications and prognosis can be 
freely discussed in front of the simulated patients without concern for 
their reaction to such information.”
• The diagnosis is invented by the examiners before the examination can 
begin, so a controlled evaluation of the student is possible.
• The same clinical problem can be repeated to many examinees.
• The trained SP can report “objectively on the student physician’s skills.” 60
By 1993, at a point when the standardized patient program was growing in 
popularity and Barrows was less defensive about its virtues, he gave these 
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same reasons: SPs were ready and available whenever an instructor needed 
a patient, they could be used repeatedly, and they save the patient from 
mistreatment (but he doesn’t specify what costs there might be to the mis-
treatment of SPs). But in 1993, Barrows added an interesting argument in 
favor of SPs: “The standardized patient is prepared for students to perform 
inadequately and is prepared to be used as a teaching and assessment tool. 
You have no concern about the student’s making inappropriate remarks in 
the teaching situation or using poor examination techniques.” 61
Barrows was addressing fellow physicians, so the shift to the second 
person is telling, as it comes at the exact moment when he is highlighting 
the instrumentalization of patient bodies in terms that reflect their status 
as living people with sensitive bodies. “They” (in contrast to “you”) are 
prepared to assume the status of a tool. This instrumentalization, this lack 
of concern about inappropriate remarks or poor examination techniques, is 
entirely a consequence of transforming living people into workable proxies. 
The process relies on the consistent and reliable reuse of SPs, but achieved 
without the erasure of what makes each person’s body an idiosyncratic 
entanglement of experiences, memories, and feelings. It cannot work with-
out suspending disbelief at the irreducible difference between one body 
and another.
In her ethnography of SPs, Taylor describes the authority of “presence” 
that the SP achieves by being both “real” and a “simulation”:
Simulation generally is distinguished by the premise that suffering is not 
present— it may be there, or then, but it is not here- and- now, and that is what 
makes the SP performance a ‘‘safe’’ learning environment for the student. At 
the same time, however, everyone I have spoken with agrees that the presence 
of the SP as an actual person is crucial to these performances, and is what dis-
tinguishes them from other forms of “mere” simulation.62
These are the paradoxes of proxies that are at once meant to be stand- ins 
for real- world situations and yet still be usable. Actual embarrassment or 
actual pain would make the simulation untestable or unreproducible, but 
what is being tested, in some ways, is the ability of a physician- in- training 
to manage the patient’s emotional response to a diagnosis. SPs must be 
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trained to react in ways that would imply the possibility of feelings like 
embarrassment, shock, or shame, while guaranteeing that those feelings 
will only be performances.
As Tobin Siebers discusses, the performance of disability by nondis-
abled actors is a way of sanitizing lived experience for a potentially uncom-
fortable audience by reassuring them that the person is really all right. It 
also rerenders the disability as a performance, turning a person’s lived expe-
rience into signifiers of virtuosic impersonation: “the audience perceives 
the disabled body as a sign of the acting abilities of the performer— the 
more disabled the character, the greater the ability of the actor.” 63 By dis-
articulating bodiness (being human) from bodily particularity, practitio-
ners claim that SPs save both patient and student the embarrassment of 
vulnerability— the vulnerability of sharing one’s pain and the vulnerability 
of being a novice professional. But they also treat disability as superficial— 
something to be worn— and an experience that can be made transparently 
accessible.
The standardized patient program, using the logic of testability, operates 
with a logic of prototypical able- bodiedness. Like the prototypical white-
ness of test images, which treat white skin as the default and nonwhite skin 
as a special case, the program begins with the “able” and “healthy” body as 
the unmarked default condition, upon which illness and disability can be 
layered. For medical educators, the widespread use of able- bodied actors 
to perform illness and disability works to foreclose vulnerability and to 
make the entire scenario a low- stakes affair. It also mirrors a widely discred-
ited technique for building sympathy for disability by having able- bodied 
people try to navigate the world blindfolded, in a wheelchair, or otherwise 
impaired.64 For SP educators, the low stakes of disability masquerade and 
simulation open up possibilities for using SPs to combat other problems. 
This is because, as Barrows long argued, SPs are transitional aids; bridging 
the world of simulation with the world of lived reality. The nature of this 
transition can be varied. It can mean the honing of skills and knowledge, 
but it can also mean the recalibration of empathy and prejudice.
In one study in Germany, involving thirteen SPs and 200 medical stu-
dents, researchers had the SPs wear “obesity simulation suits.” 65 The aims 
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of the study were twofold: to elicit from the students accurate body mass 
estimates; and to measure the prevalence of antifat stigma. By the authors’ 
own metrics, the study was a success. Not only did the students accurately 
predict the range of body mass index scores, the encounter demonstrated 
that there were widespread antifat attitudes. The masquerade became a teach-
able moment, free of real vulnerability. The obesity suit, overencoding the 
body of an SP, transformed a real medical stigma into sanitized data. The 
authors describe the strengths and limitations of the study as follows: “The 
study was conducted only in a simulated environment and not with real 
patients with obesity.” 66 The argument implicit here is that no vulnerable 
people were harmed in the production of the data, though vulnerability and 
harm were modeled and measured. The standardized patient program became 
a kind of machine, able to model and simulate prejudice, and while doing so 
create usable data. But to do so, embodiment must be turned into spectacle.
A number of standardized patient programs have begun to make an 
active effort to incorporate people living with disabilities into their corps of 
SP actors. At the Tufts University School of Medicine, for example, medi-
cal educators employ patients with disabilities as SPs and equip them with, 
for instance, a complaint about shoulder pain. Shoulder pain is specifically 
chosen for its banality: “It is not only a common problem for all adults, 
but it has particular implications for patients with physical disabilities, as 
many are critically dependent upon shoulder function.” 67 In designing the 
scenario, the educators chose not to inform the students that their SPs 
would have a disability. In their reasoning, “the interaction would be more 
realistic, and they (the students) would have an opportunity to grapple 
with their own reactions, including their biases, in a setting that closely 
resembles actual practice.” 68 What is remarkable about the Tufts case is not 
only the use of SPs with disabilities, but that the “reveal” in the scenario 
plays on the expectation that typical SP encounters will not use actors living 
with a disability. Like the obesity study in Germany, it uses the encounter 
as a provocation, to elicit stigma and reflection. Unlike the obesity study, 
it relies on both the vulnerability of people living with disabilities and the 
potential for embarrassment on the part of students.
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There is a risk in dismissing the theatrical elements of knowledge pro-
duction and the ways that knowledge is secured through ritual as somehow 
giving lie to the process. That is to say that the purpose of unearthing 
proxies and their rituals is not to highlight moments of fantasy and make- 
believe as inherently deficient; the fact that proxies are in widespread use 
does not mean that we can unlock the contrivance of scientific and techno-
logical meaning- making by simply showing proxies to be artificial. It is true 
that these systems rely on contrivances, but that is not what makes them 
susceptible to critique. There is no “mere” theater. Instead, there is only 
a deeply interwoven set of techniques of embodiment and technologies 
of memory that tie together action, word, setting, and practice to form a 
context in which things can be made discernable, measurable, and judged.
MODELS, PATIENTS, AND MODEL PATIENTS
Barrows’s first SP was a twenty- two- year- old woman named Rose McWil-
liams, whom he met through USC’s Art Department, where she worked 
as an artist’s model. According to Barrows, McWilliams was coached to 
“have a paraplegia, bilateral Babinskis, dissociated sensory loss, and a blind 
eye.” 69 She was soon joined by a second SP, Lynn Taylor, who was another 
model. Initial responses to the standardized patient program were harsh; 
few physicians outside of USC thought that the project was viable. The 
program was maligned for its proximity to Hollywood, its reliance on a 
vapid form of performance, and the artifice of simulating disease.70 These 
criticisms were often attached, in particular, to the women working as SPs, 
whose well- honed work as professional performers brought them into the 
medical establishment as programmable patients.
In 1965, in the early stages of the program, the Associated Press learned 
of Barrows and Abrahamson’s work and syndicated a story in several papers. 
In the San Francisco Chronicle, the headline read “Models Who Imitate 
Patients: Paradise for Medical Students” (figure 5.4); in the Los Angeles Her-
ald Examiner, “Hollywood Invades USC Medical School”; and in Newsday, 
simply “Model Patients” (figure 5.5 shows a drawing and caption from the 
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story). The story, as it was rewritten from a wire report, always began the 
same way: “Scantily clad models are making life a little more interesting for 
University of Southern California medical students,” and then went on to 
describe Taylor as “a shapely brunette” and McWilliams as “the blonde.”71 
SPs echo, therefore, the pattern that the history of test images set forth: 
women’s sexualized bodies are folded into a technical bureaucracy and a 
technique of knowledge formation, which both renders them as objects of 
analysis and erases their labor as stand- ins.
Figure 5.4
An artist’s interpretation of a headline, image, and caption from a San Francisco Chronicle 
article (September 28, 1965). The caption reads, “The Easy Way to Learn Medicine.” The 
image portrays one of the original standardized patients, Rose McWilliams, with Howard Bar-
rows and one of his medical students. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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Figure 5.5
An artist’s interpretation of an image and caption from a Newsday article (September 28, 
1965) about SPs, also showing McWilliams, Barrows, and Goodman. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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Like the Playboy that was supposedly lying around a digital image 
processing lab (discussed in chapter 3), ingenuity is understood through 
the instrumentalization of a female model’s body. The origins of the Lena 
image are recounted as the confluence of boredom, innovation, and hap-
penstance. This is repeated in the account of SPs and the way that having 
models ready- at- hand at USC (on a campus famous for its ties to the enter-
tainment industry) was narrated as a fortunate coincidence. In neither case 
do the makers of these standards take credit for seeking out women’s bodies 
as templates. Instead, the disavowal is in part what allows this process to 
reoccur throughout history and across disciplines. If accepting responsibil-
ity for using women as test instruments threatens in some way the techni-
cal process that those bodies enabled and provokes a confrontation with 
the forces of desire, sexualization, or even an unjust power differential, then 
the originators need some way to shore up the technical aspects of their 
choice as a means of distancing themselves from the cultural implications.
By all evidence, the Associated Press account was not the story that 
Barrows sought to tell about his new program. He saw the use of the art 
department as a canny strategy to harness existing university resources. In 
a handbook that he produced for interested educators in 1971, Barrows 
reaffirmed his commitment to this method: “If I were to start a program 
elsewhere, my first move would be to inquire at the local drama depart-
ment or a local amateur or professional acting society as to whether or not 
there would be potential interest [in being an SP].”72 He is quick to deny 
the claim that his program is unduly indebted to its proximity to Hol-
lywood. He says that during a sabbatical year at McMaster University, in 
Hamilton, the “Steel Mill Capital of Canada,” he relied on “a housewife” 
who “became one of the most effective and versatile simulators with whom 
I have worked.”73
Barrows’s advice to others hoping to establish their own standardized 
patient programs is to seek out a facility for SP work wherever it could 
be located: “Do not ever ignore interested technicians, secretaries, house-
wives, and so on. Motivation is the real key.”74 These suggestions expose 
an implicit gendering of SP labor. The instructions, with a certain level of 
frankness, are addressed to medical professionals whose expertise attunes 
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them to “housewives” and “secretaries” who might have interest in SP 
work. Just as, in the history of the Lena image, a Playboy centerfold was 
ready- at- hand to become a test image, the women in Barrows’s world are 
a ready set of model patients, already stand- ins. Meanwhile, all the images 
of USC medical students in the early days of the program depict men, and 
the early models were all identified as women. Although contemporary 
standardized patient programs seek out a more diverse cohort of actors, 
the origins of the program are thrown into sharp relief: women possess an 
immanent instrumentality that can be used by physicians (men) and edu-
cators (also men) who should be ready to take advantage of it.
> > >
As the standardized patient program grew, the range of people who would 
become actors also expanded. SP work now lends itself to a wide array of 
potential actors, as physicians need training across a broad range of bod-
ies, demographic attributes, and personality types. But the labor of being 
an SP is also often most amenable to a worker with already precarious or 
intermittent work. Who can be a proxy is partly determined by who has 
the time and needs the money to learn the techniques of embodied illness 
and disease. Theater departments and local theater companies are a ready 
resource for acting ability, but as Barrows’s list of other possible actors— 
“technicians, scientists, housewives”— indicates, financial need is also a 
good motivation, and flexible working hours are an added bonus.
What Barrows foresaw was that SP jobs could be part of a person’s pool 
of possible “gig work” assignments. In his 1993 summary of the benefits 
of the standardized patient program, he wrote that SPs were preferable to 
real patients because they were always available (“Unlike real patients, the 
standardized patient can be available at any time and available in any set-
ting”) and their service is transactional (“The standardized patient is paid 
to be examined over and over again by numerous students”).75 The so- called 
gig economy is often ascribed to the twenty- first century (in the Global 
North) and the deindustrialization of labor forces, in which an increasing 
number of people piece together a living through many part- time, non-
permanent positions and full- time employment becomes more rare (along 
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with benefits like a pension, disability and parental leave, and sick time). 
SP work in the 1960s and 1970s was imagined as part of a person’s piece-
work assemblage of jobs, and SPs are drawn from pools of people just 
making do. For professional or amateur actors, SP work is a supplement 
to their intermittent work and often described as a way of honing and 
sharpening their performance skills.76 For everyone else, SP work is a way 
of instrumentalizing something that everyone has: a body that is always 
ready to be medicalized.
The work of SPs is vital to how physicians are trained, in a standardized 
way, and licensed as professionals. Their work is infrastructural and enacted 
through their bodies and performances, employing their status as living 
people, able to stand in for others. To understand what it means to per-
form infrastructural labor as an SP is to understand the ways that the work 
is rewarded, is regarded as a form of employment, and (possibly) reflects a 
relationship to notions of professionalization and expertise. Rose McWilliams 
and Lynn Taylor, the first SPs, were paid 45 dollars an hour in 1965 (approxi-
mately 370 dollars an hour in 2020). According to the reporting at the time, 
this was the fee that they normally charged for modeling work.77 This pay 
treated their professional skills as models as transferrable to their work as 
model patients and as equally worthy of remuneration. Today, SPs make 
an average of 15 dollars an hour, though they can earn as little as 7 dollars 
and as much as 25 dollars.78 In general, more experience does not lead to 
more pay. However, invasive exams do earn more— on average 40 dollars an 
hour— though one report notes that working as an SP for breast and vaginal 
exams can earn as much as 55 dollars an hour because these patients “are also 
instructing students how to perform them.”79
Figure 5.6 shows a fee schedule from the University of South Florida, 
readily obtained from the Health Sciences Center’s website.80 By looking 
at the entire one- page document, we can see an encapsulation of the stan-
dardized patient program, how the program is presented to prospective 
SPs, and the ways that it presents a hierarchy of expertise, which follows 
an axis of bodily invasiveness. The form begins with a title that is imme-
diately asterisked: in reading the heading, potential SPs should also note 
that all their encounters may be observed and/or audio- or video- recorded. 
STANDARDIZED PATIENT ACTIVITIES AND PAY SCHEDULE  **
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER
Interviewing only
Students will learn or be evaluated on communication skills, interpersonal skills, and history 
taking. SPs will either “play” themselves (no training) or take on a role (requires training). 
No physical examination will be involved. Activities may be one-on-one with the student or in 
a small group setting.
 •  Interviewing only        $7.00/hr
Target students: Year 1 and 2—medical (Physical Diagnosis-PD)
Physical Examination only (no breast, pelvic, or rectal exams)
Students will learn or be evaluated on physical examination skills. SPs will be in patient gowns 
and students will perform the physical exam by touching the skin. Training is required when 
there are particular elements of the physical that a SP must record and/or when there are 
symptoms that must be simulated.
 •  Physical Examination only       $10.00/hr
 •  With breast exam        $5.00/hr (additional)
Target students: Year 1 and 2—medical (Profession of Medicine, and PD)
Focused History and Physical (no pelvic or rectal exams)
Students will learn or be evaluated on their interpersonal skills and their ability to obtain a 
history and perform a physical examination that revolves around a specific medical complaint 
(cough, fatigue, etc.). The students generally spend less than 15 minutes at a time with the SP. 
SPs are almost always trained to a specific medical script and physical presentation.
 •  Requires training and student evaluation      $15.00/hr
Target students: Year 3—medical (Clinical Performance Examination-CPX)
Comprehensive History and Physical (no pelvic or rectal exams)
Students will be evaluated on their ability to obtain a comprehensive history and physical 
examination.  Generally, SPs will also evaluate the students’ interpersonal and communication 
skills, as well as examination technique and sequencing. The students generally spend at least 
30 minutes, and up to 1 hour, with the SP.   
 •  Requires training and student evaluation     $20.00/hr
 •  Does not require training or student evaluation    $15.00/hr
 •  With breast exam        $5.00/hr (additional)
Target students: Year 2 and 4—medical (PD and Videotaped History and Physical Program)
Special Physical Examination Consultants
Students will learn examination techniques from faculty clinicians and then perform the exam 
themselves. On occasion, the SP will function as a model for evaluation of student technique by 
a chaperone. 
 •  Female breast examination (no SP teaching or student evaluation) $15.00/hr
 •  Pelvic examination         $35.00/hr
 •  Male rectal and prostate examination; including penile        
           and testicular examination       $35.00/hr
Target students: Year 2 and 3—medical (PD and Clinical Clerkships)
Training
 •  Training (payment for training will be discussed prior to beginning the programs and 
     is subject to the discretion of the Program Coordinator)   $10.00/hr
+All encounters with students may be observed directly or video/audiotaped—a consent form is required.
**All pay rates are subject to change at the discretion of the Office of Curriculum and Medical Education.
+,
Figure 5.6
Fee schedule for SP work from the University of South Florida Health Sciences Center.
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Observing, and potentially recording, SP encounters are key elements of 
making testable interactions.
The remainder of the form proceeds through an increasingly intimate 
menu of possible interactions. It begins with “Interviewing only,” in which 
SPs may be able to “play” (put in scare quotes in the original) themselves 
or a character, and then proceeds to “Physical Examination Only” and 
“Focused History and Physical,” which combines the first two stages while 
homing in on a particular ailment, and then continues to “Comprehen-
sive History and Physical,” which lasts up to an hour. The list ends with 
“Special Physical Examination Consultants,” which is an opportunity for 
SPs willing to train in receiving breast, pelvic, and prostate examination 
(including penile and testicular examination).
The ladder of possible encounters includes a great deal of nested infor-
mation. At each rung, the document notes whether the SP will require special 
training or preparation to participate. For instance, at the “Focused History 
and Physical” level, SPs may be trained to act out a specific ailment, and at 
the next stage, SPs can be asked to evaluate students in their “interpersonal 
and communication” skills. Each level also increases in hourly pay as SPs 
are asked to do more, be more trained, or permit greater amounts of physi-
cal touch and bodily investigation. SPs at the entry level are paid 7 dollars 
an hour, but SPs at the comprehensive level can be paid 20 dollars an hour 
if they are prepared to evaluate the students, and an additional 5 dollars an 
hour if they will permit a breast exam.
This document demonstrates how the line between “make- believe” 
and the actual lived boundary of a person’s body must be inscribed in the 
management of proxies. It shows how an SP is both not a patient and not 
not a patient. The more invasive examinations are accorded more pay not 
only because of their potential effects on the actor’s body, but also because 
of the expertise that this invasiveness elicits— an expertise tied to living and 
sensing in that actual body. Regular SPs are coached not to give physicians- 
in- training any advice during the examination, since it’s beyond the scope 
of their assignment and any advice they gave would taint the exam results. 
But SPs who opt for invasive examinations are an exception; they are often 
expected to coach students in practice scenarios because they are the only 
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ones who can be sure if invasive procedures “feel right.” Expertise and 
bodily sovereignty are aligned in this case, which only emphasizes how 
much they can be severed in the case of typical SP scenarios.
In the process of legitimating standardized patient programs, the work 
of simulating disease and disability has been transformed from a profes-
sional skill (that of modeling) to a low- wage, part- time job, with little to no 
prospects for a raise or advancement, and one in which a person’s value as 
a resource is tied to their bodily affordances and trainability as a performer. 
Temple University’s guide for aspiring SPs notes that most of their actors 
earn less than 2000 dollars per year from their work.81 And Temple’s pro-
gram is the rare case where guidance is provided.
As SP education expanded and gained legitimacy, it needed to do so 
through the logic of standardization. The standardized patient program 
needed to be reliable, verifiable, and reproducible, which meant that SPs could 
be only one node in the evaluation system. By treating SPs as amateurs, the 
process also minimizes their role in evaluating physicians. When McWil-
liams and Taylor first began as SPs, Barrows gave them the responsibility of 
recording what transpired with the student. While SPs still complete ques-
tionnaires after their interactions to record their experiences, the weight of 
the evaluation falls on educators, through one of a few standardized evalu-
ation templates.82 Some standardized patients have also demanded more 
input in evaluating student physicians on the grounds that their subjective 
responses to trainee physicians, as well as their implied resemblance to any 
potential patient, give them special authority to speak for patients more 
generally.83 Meanwhile, standardized patient program coordinators must 
intervene when SPs appear to overstep their roles, like when an actor pro-
vides “feedback that seems to tread into the domain of medical expertise.”84 
SPs who demand more say in the evaluation of students are negotiating for 
greater power over their own representation in a standardization process.
When bodies are treated as proxies of physical and affective measure-
ment, standardization will necessarily require political negotiation over 
who has the power to access and describe those measurements. SP demands 
for more input in the evaluation of trainees must be folded back into the 
knowledge infrastructures of the medical system, in which the cooperation 
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of these actors is necessary to maintain a coherent pedagogical appara-
tus. As Greg Downey writes, “workers formally or informally engaged in 
complex information labors . . .  are continually re- embedded in each new 
round of the knowledge infrastructure.”85 These particular workers hold 
tremendous power because of their capacity to leverage their real bodies to 
become proxies for anyone’s potential maladies.
IMAGINING NORMAL
In a training video produced by Barrows in 1988, he demonstrates the 
steps involved in developing an SP encounter. The video, entitled Acute 
Paralysis of Both Legs in a Young Woman, shows how a physician should take 
a patient’s history and conduct a physical exam.86 For the performer, Bar-
rows describes the development of the case, the dress rehearsal, and the final 
encounter. He instructs the young woman about how to simulate paralysis. 
When he pokes her leg with a sharp pin and asks her, “Do you feel that?” 
she is expected to say “Feel what?” instead of “No.” The “No” would betray 
the artifice of the scenario— an indication that she is suppressing her actual 
sensation for the purpose of simulation. Instead, verisimilitude is achieved 
through a total denial of sensation: “Feel what?”
It is telling that Barrows would use paralysis (and specifically numb-
ness) as a template for training SPs, as it clearly demonstrates the bifurcated 
identities that SPs must occupy when their bodies are both scripted and 
lived in: the SP feels the pinprick but must comport herself as if she does 
not. This is the embodiment of as if, acting as a present surrogate for an oth-
erwise absent Other. At the end of his interaction with the actor, Barrows 
simply asks, “Can you conceive of all of this happening to you?”87 Barrows’s 
question is a final attempt to make sure that the act of imagination that the 
SP participates in will accord with the experiential reality of the encounter.
By breaking the world into manageable chunks, standard makers must 
make certain decisions about how best to represent the world. These choices 
about the best way to represent the world for the given task take the form of 
proxies, which are used to build and maintain standards and have real effects 
on their representational and distributive capacities. SPs have the potential to 
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irritate the smooth production of a standard of care on the very terms of this 
proxy logic. A person cannot be a simple, manageable chunk of the world, 
and SP encounters are highly scripted because their manageability is threat-
ened by the possibilities of improvisation and the idiosyncrasies of a person’s 
body and temperament. Moreover, SPs betray the always- performative sepa-
ration of the world out there and the world in here. While they are employed 
as supposedly normal people play- acting as ill, they also have their own, 
unique, leaky bodies that breach the membrane between the testing scenario 
and the outside world. In the history of proxies, the viability of a standard 
is endangered when its representational capacities are called into question or 
when the functional separation of inside and outside breaks down. SPs are 
special because they work only through their capacity to bridge both inside 
and outside.
The standardized patient program is partly a technique for helping train 
doctors to see patients as more than a history of symptoms, and instead to 
engage them as agents of their own care. Standards operate through norma-
tive conceptions of how the world ought to operate. The hope for more 
humane medical care or of more empathetic medical professionals is an opti-
mistic fantasy that needs to be encoded in new standards and norms. As these 
norms, standards, and procedures play out, they will do so, partially, through 
the bodies of SPs who are trained and practiced in the art and technique 
of remembering a history that isn’t theirs, possessing symptoms that aren’t 
theirs, and responding to the probing questions and hands of doctors- to- be 
in ways that are sympathetic to the many and varied patients out there. SPs 
have an impossible but necessary task to stand in as proxies for all of us. 
Although the standardized patient program relies on a suspension of disbe-
lief, it is based on a certain fact: everyone will need care at some point in their 
lives, and everyone deserves empathy and recognition of their pain.

6 CANNED CHANCE: METHODS FOR  
FOLLOWING INFRASTRUCTURE
Stories about proxies are full of acts of concealment, erasure, and dis-
avowal. The stories in this book are suffused with attempts to mask the 
arbitrary decisions and protocols that make standardization possible and 
make infrastructures persist. They are also full of stories of the spectacu-
larity of proxies: people observed the bombing of Yodaville from grand-
stands and highly aestheticized images of these trainings circulated online; 
the International Prototype Kilogram (IPK) was consecrated in a ritualis-
tic burial; the Lena image became an icon, its own proper piece of auratic 
media, far beyond its original purpose; and standardized patients have been 
used frequently in film, television, and literature to mock the peculiarity of 
medical education. But the spectacularity of proxies contributes to their con-
cealment by affirming that these things, these places, and these people are 
special— they are vested with the power to stand in for the world. They are 
our chosen delegates.
To varying degrees, the concealment of standards is what makes them 
ordinary, what helps a standard integrate with infrastructure, and what 
allows infrastructure to operate unperturbed. The study of proxies, then, is 
the study of the basic conditions of infrastructure, the labor that it takes to 
make and maintain infrastructural conditions, and the process of repairing 
and recuperating those conditions when they inevitably break down.1 This 
approach to proxies, standards, and infrastructures provokes a necessary 
question: what tools or techniques are available to uncover this process? Or, 
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to put it bluntly: how do we make infrastructures into objects of analysis, 
and what is at stake if we do?
In this final chapter, I want to sketch out some of the ways people 
have turned infrastructures into objects of analysis and suggest how a theory 
of proxies, as well as a process for tracing proxies, can supplement these 
existing strategies. As a coda to the preceding chapters, I want to offer 
that researching and writing the biographies of proxies can constitute a 
technique for getting at the lifeworlds and poetics of infrastructural think-
ing. In approaching infrastructure in this way, I want to propose three 
complementary ideas: first, that the concealment of infrastructure (includ-
ing standards) is an ongoing and always partial process; second, that trans-
parency is a political claim, not an ontological status of infrastructure; and, 
third, that based on the context, various tools and techniques can be used 
to map the relational and political dynamics of infrastructure. Following 
from these ideas, I explore two prominent and conspicuous techniques for 
mapping infrastructures and standards— the ironic repurposing of stan-
dardization in artistic practice and the revelatory promises and techniques 
of critical infrastructure studies— both of which rely on a promise that they 
can expose the taken- for- granted.
It is “a joke about the Meter,” responded Marcel Duchamp when asked 
to comment on his artwork 3 stoppages étalon (3 standard stoppages), shown 
in figure 6.1.2 In this work, Duchamp measured three meter- length pieces 
of string, dropped them onto a canvas from 1 meter above, and traced the 
twisted and sloping lines they created. These outlines reconfigured a mea-
surement unit, the meter, as three slouchy lines, and Duchamp used these 
shapes as templates for three drafting straightedges, the objects displayed 
in 3 stoppages étalon. In his Box of 1914, Duchamp included fragmentary 
comments about the artwork, describing it as a distortion of standardized 
measurements:
The Idea of the Fabrication
– If a straight horizontal thread one meter long falls from a height of one 
meter onto a horizontal plane distorting itself as it pleases and creates a 
new shape of the measure of length.
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– 3 patterns obtained in more or less similar conditions: considered in their 
relation to one another they are an approximate reconstitution of the mea-
sure of length.
– The 3 standard stoppages are the meter diminished.3
Duchamp later named this process “canned chance.” 4 In fact, 3 stoppages 
étalon is representative of a familiar trope from the interwoven histories of 
standardization, measurement, and artistic experimentation. If Duchamp’s 
3 stoppages étalon is a joke about the meter, what’s the joke about? First, the 
International Prototype Meter was the basis of all length measurements in 
the metric system when Duchamp created his artwork. It was, by all appear-
ances, the opposite of a piece of string dropped “as it pleases.” Instead, the 
Meter was a piece of platinum- iridium forged to be durable and stable— to 
mutate as little as it pleased. All proxies live in things— metal, paper, pixels, 
or flesh— and the exchange of a metal alloy for household string is a joke 
about the durability of proxies, a joke about the theater of objectivity, and 
Figure 6.1
Marcel Duchamp, 3 stoppages étalon (3 standard stoppages) 1913– 1914, replica from 1964. 
©Association Marcel Duchamp/ADAGP, Paris and DACS, London 2020. Photo: ©Tate.
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a joke about the fantasy of authority attached to sturdy stuff. Making the 
Meter out of platinum- iridium invokes a fantasy of timelessness and the 
notion that the materiality of a proxy will live up to its (supposedly) invari-
ant reference points.
Standards are, to play off of Duchamp’s terminology, canned decisions 
about how to represent the world in a limited fashion; standards put a lid 
on a lengthy and necessarily cultural practice of choosing workable seg-
ments of the world. The official Meter, the subject of Duchamp’s joke, was 
based on a fraction of the Earth’s meridian, compiled during seven years of 
painstaking measurement of the French landscape during the peak of post- 
Revolutionary turmoil.5 The International Prototype Meter, like its sibling 
the IPK, was a materialization of the highest aspirations of Enlightenment 
ideals. Accordingly, Duchamp’s second joke is at the expense of French 
Enlightenment idealists, who could just as easily have saved the seven years 
of trouble by dropping a piece of string on a canvas. Standards, as this book 
describes, are enacted through strict protocols and rituals for creating sys-
tems of communication and coordination through the sharing of proxies. 
Proxies, as samples of the world out there, become stand- ins for how things 
might work. But 3 stoppages étalon turns the process on its head. Instead 
of choosing a proxy as a fixed point and establishing a repertoire to main-
tain it, Duchamp created a small- scale ritual to maintain a random set of 
points. The joke is on the theater of objectivity: there would be no need to 
shore up the legitimacy of a proxy if it were never intended to be legitimate 
in the first place.
Duchamp’s last joke concerns the fact that standards use traceable ref-
erences to maintain order and create usable systems. The metric system 
works with very few errors because its references are accessible, reproduc-
ible, and guaranteed through a network of linkages that can be traced to 
the system’s bureaucratic home in France. The nested and internetworked 
dependability of standards is what makes them infrastructural.6 That is to 
say that standards work as the conditions of operability for other systems 
(e.g., the standards that make up networked computing allow applications 
to work across devices; the standards that make up the highway system 
allow any street- legal car to use it). Standards use fixed points so that each 
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subsequent operation built on that standard doesn’t need to reperform the 
labor of fixing points. If every time someone wanted to build a house, they 
had to get the architects, engineers, contractors, and inspectors to agree 
on length standards, building would take a lot longer. In fact, this was the 
case at one time. Prior to standardized units of length, traveling masons 
involved in cathedral construction in the twelfth century used adjustable 
templates to format their tools to each town’s local measurements using, 
among other things, pieces of string reminiscent of Duchamp’s stoppages.7
In 3 stoppages étalon, Duchamp’s final product is a series of three 
straightedges that likewise are templates: representational technologies 
that materialize a process in a physical artifact. Like the standards that the 
artwork is intended to lampoon, 3 stoppages étalon uses a ritual to create 
its proxies. Although each Meter- proxy captures a different moment in 
the fall of the string onto the canvas, and their differences to one another 
demonstrate the ridiculousness of the exercise, they nonetheless evoke the 
ways that standards operate as “recipes for reality”:8 begin with a method 
for fixing points; use those points to create proxies; and use those proxies 
to create new objects, systems, and expressions. Thus, 3 stoppages étalon is 
a useful way to expose the logic and idealism of standardization. Among 
its many jokes, the artwork prods the performative and ritualistic labor that 
goes into transforming the arbitrariness of standardization into the appear-
ance of objectivity.
Duchamp was not the first (and far from the last) artist to use the tools 
of standardization and infrastructuralization in his work. Such tools make 
attractive subject matter for artists because they embody a simplified for-
malism in which representation is reduced to elementary lines, shapes, and 
colors. The inclusion of common measurement tools in creative works also 
can be a way of signaling to a spectator a common way of seeing things. 
In Renaissance painting, artists were trained to use a familiar repertoire of 
stock objects that would allow viewers to gauge how accurately the artist 
had reproduced a particular perspective: “A painter who left traces of such 
analysis in his painting was leaving cues his public was well equipped to 
pick up.”9 These stock objects varied by locality but often relied on the 
knowledge of common containers: barrels, sacks, and bales. In this way, 
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they foreshadowed contemporary proxies like the Lena image, which can 
be used to benchmark individual talent and the efficiency of an algorithmic 
process, or other, standard three- dimensional (3D) digital objects like the 
Stanford bunny and the Utah Teapot.10 The Utah Teapot, also known as 
the “Newell Teapot,” is a 3D representation of a Melitta teapot— a sample 
of domestic hardware meant as a stock object for testing a program or a 
user’s abilities, and easily recognized by other users. It was one of the first 
of such objects, and it frequently appears in computer- animated media as 
a winking nod to knowing insiders.11 While Duchamp could turn to the 
metric system and tweak its arbitrariness with aleatory play, and Renais-
sance painters could invoke standard objects to cue perspectival awareness, 
contemporary art is similarly festooned with standard measurement tools. 
Contemporary artists frequently demonstrate their familiarity with more 
recent common items used in the testing and calibration of codecs, file 
formats, and standards.
In her video installation How Not to Be Seen: A Fucking Didactic Educa-
tional .MOV File, the artist Hito Steyerl begins with a handheld resolution 
target, a test image, and poses holding it in a fashion reminiscent of the 
Shirley cards discussed in chapter 3.12 The video proceeds through other 
resolution targets used by the US government and military in the calibra-
tion of spy satellites since the 1950s. The image in figure 6.2 depicts one 
of these resolution targets, a tri- bar test image in the California desert. The 
targets have fallen into disrepair, with grass and trees sprouting through 
the concrete— a visual reminder of the porousness of proxies. Steyerl’s 
work ties together several of the threads discussed throughout this book. It 
brings us full circle from the visual and experiential stand- in of Yodaville, 
presenting yet another materialization of the military imaginary and its 
apparatuses for controlling space through surveillance. The fact that the 
targets are themselves objects of fascination for contemporary artists also 
foregrounds the theatrical and mediatic potential of proxies, which always 
exist as unsettled instruments— at once operating as objects of measure-
ment and props in a theater of objectivity.
The April 2006 cover of ArtForum (figure 6.3) features a photograph by 
the artist Christopher Williams— a reproduction of a Kodak Shirley card. 
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The artwork, with the unwieldy title Kodak Three Point Reflection Guide © 
1968 Eastman Kodak Company, 1968 (Meiko laughing), Vancouver, B.C., April 
6, 2005, is a staged reenactment of the now- familiar genre of the test image. 
The Museum of Modern Art describes the work as “[sending] up the aesthetic 
conventions of photographic representation.” Like Duchamp’s 3 stoppages 
étalon, this work is meant to transform the “invisible” standard of representa-
tion into an aestheticized object and turn the format of photography into an 
object of critical appraisal.13
In 2005, Julie Buck and Karin Segal mounted an exhibit at Harvard’s 
Sert Gallery titled “Girls on Film,” which displayed film control strips, 
including many so- called China Girl images (the show was written up 
in the Harvard Gazette under the headline “A Bevy of Unknown Beau-
ties”).14 For the 2012 Whitney Biennale, the artist Lucy Raven contributed 
a much- heralded series of works titled “Standard Evaluation Materials,” 
which included a set of film projector calibration images and speaker test 
tones, accompanied by a public lecture about contemporary test films used 
in digital projector calibration.15 The infamous phrase discussed in chapter 3 
and used by the Kodak executive to describe new film stock that could 
Figure 6.2
A tri- bar resolution target from the 1950s, used to calibrate satellite imaging technology. 
The target is located near Cuddeback Lake, in the Mojave Desert, California. Photo: ©CLUI. 
Courtesy of the Center for Land Use Interpretation.
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“photograph the details of a dark horse in low light” (coded language, as 
Lorna Roth argues, for the film stock’s capacity for representing the skin of 
people of color) became the title of a photography exhibition by the art-
ists Adam Broomberg and Oliver Chanarin. In staging this exhibition in 
Toronto, they mounted Shirley cards on billboards throughout the city.16 
As Robin Lynch argues, the interplay of technological appropriations of art 
and artistic appropriations of technical materials can be read in some ways 
as an implicit attempt to bridge the two cultures that supposedly divide the 
human and the scientific. However, any such attempt is never guaranteed; 
it is subject to the power dynamics of representation, the gendering of 
technical disciplines, the instrumentalization of women’s bodies, and the 
use of racialized prototypes.17
Figure 6.3
An artist’s interpretation of the April 2006 cover of ArtForum magazine, featuring a represen-
tation of a Kodak test image, or Shirley card. Image: R. R. Mulvin.
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These are just the beginning: proxies, standardized instruments, and 
the application of tacit knowledge of commonplace objects are recurrent 
themes in the history of art and attest to the inseparability of all three.18 
Like Duchamp tweaking the metric system’s performative objectivity, the 
use of a proxy as the basis of artistic expression is nothing short of a rite of 
passage for these materials. The Lena test image has not only appeared in 
HBO’s Silicon Valley, as discussed in chapter 4, but has also been the sub-
ject of poems, reenactments, and video art. Artists like Trevor Paglen and 
Luke DuBois have used different versions of the image and the centerfold 
in recent years, with DuBois even receiving a cease- and- desist letter from 
Playboy for his artwork.
If there is an overemphasis on visual proxies in this book, that shouldn’t 
be taken as an indication of their exclusive role in artistic appropriation. Test 
sounds also are featured frequently in artwork; for instance, the Suzanne 
Vega song “Tom’s Diner,” which was used in many tests of what would 
become the MP3, became material for artwork by Ryan Maguire.19 Stan-
dardized patients are also a popular topic in television, film, and journalism, 
appearing as comic relief in episodes of both Seinfeld and ER. Moreover, 
standard- makers are often eager to reappropriate their own proxies. The 
first standardized patient, Lynn Taylor, was painted by Phyllis Barrows, the 
wife of Howard Barrows (she was apparently in a class where Taylor mod-
eled). Later, in 1997, Howard Barrows used the painting in a special issue 
of the medical journal Caduceus, on a topic called “Simulation in Medical 
Education.”20 The examples here demonstrate the fluid movement of prox-
ies between different domains of cultural expression.21 
Proxies are not simple instruments used in the standardization pro-
cess: rather, they are cultural artifacts used by people steeped in culture, 
and through reuse, proxies become new materials for creative expression. 
The dynamic interaction of creative and technical expression is never unidi-
rectional, and this demonstrates the impossible task of fully separating the 
technical life of proxies from their affective, creative, and embodied dimen-
sions. As the Lena image indicates, and examples like “Tom’s Diner” cor-
roborate, standard- makers are not isolated from the culture at large. They 
are workers, and consumers, embedded in their own cultural milieus and 
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their proxies are suffused with the cultural work of analogy and adhesion: 
they allow us to think through things to make new connections.
One of the goals of this book is to show how the nodes in the circuit 
of culture (identity, production, representation, regulation, consumption) 
could be expanded to include standardization, which is interlinked with 
every one of these other nodes. 22 The identities, consumption practices, 
and practices of representation of the people who work in the standardiza-
tion process bear directly on the standards they create. Examples of this 
include the suturing of soft- core porn into the basic visual architecture 
of the internet and the scripting of embodied performance of disease and 
disability into the standardized patient program. This is not a novelty of the 
twentieth century. Standards have always soaked up the world around them. 
They tell stories about how to represent the world and in turn crystallize an 
abstracted version of the world that they set out to represent. Throughout 
this book, I have relied on an artist to represent certain artifacts of the world 
surrounding proxies: diagrams, images, video stills, and journal and maga-
zine covers have each been reproduced and reinterpreted by hand. These 
works are meant to underline the contingent connection of proxies to their 
claims of verisimilitude— or the realishness of proxies. In addition, the illus-
trations are meant to foreground the manual and embodied labor of making 
and maintaining proxies that lies at the heart of the histories in this book.
A turn toward materiality within media and infrastructure studies 
has often implied a turn away from the cultural and representational— as 
well as the assertion or implication that we can study one without the 
other.23 As the histories of proxies demonstrate, however, even the most 
basic standards and infrastructures, including the measurement standards 
of the metric system, are always built through cultural, representational, 
and embodied practices. They are thoroughly material and technological, 
but these practices never escape the human work of bringing the world into 
representational comparison. Artistic practices can provide an avenue for 
exposing the logics and inner workings of standards and infrastructures; 
but they also highlight the flows of texts, images, and cultural detritus that 
circulate more widely, and they expose any strict division between the cul-
tural, the technological, and the scientific as always fictional.
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THE TRANSPARENCY HYPOTHESIS
Where artists use ironic recontextualization to tweak the deadpan serious-
ness of standards and infrastructures, scholars of infrastructure have often 
used the inevitable breakdown of all technologies to expose how such sys-
tems work. The argument goes as follows: whereas infrastructure is typically 
a ground on which other things figure, a breakdown turns that ground into 
a figure for analysis. Within a growing body of work at the intersections of 
standards, infrastructure, media, and technology, scholars use this widely 
accepted premise to expose the givenness of standards, infrastructures, 
norms, platforms, and other related phenomena. This work depends on a 
transparency hypothesis to argue that these objects of study deserve atten-
tion in part because they are taken for granted.
The most complete articulations of the transparency hypothesis are 
put forward by Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star and their collabora-
tors. Bowker’s 1994 introduction of the very popular and useful method of 
“infrastructural inversion,”24 which tasked researchers with looking to the 
embedded infrastructural preconditions that make science and technology 
possible, was followed in 1996 by Star and Karen Ruhleder’s now- canonical 
definition of infrastructure.25 Their definition is used by many scholars 
focused on the problematics of infrastructure, and it is often invoked as the 
basis for a new kind of “infrastructure studies.”26 Among the most cited 
and repeated features of infrastructure that Star and Ruhleder defined is the 
manner in which infrastructure is embedded, invisible, and revealed only 
when it breaks down. They write: 
• Embeddedness. Infrastructure is “sunk” into, inside of, other structures, 
social arrangements and technologies;
• Transparency. Infrastructure is transparent to use, in the sense that it does 
not have to be reinvented each time or assembled for each task, but invis-
ibly supports those tasks; [ . . . ]
• Learned as part of membership. The taken- for- grantedness of artifacts and 
organizational arrangements is a sine qua non of membership in a com-
munity of practice. [ . . . ]
• Becomes visible upon breakdown. The normally invisible quality of work-
ing infrastructure becomes visible when it breaks; the server is down, the 
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bridge washes out, there is a power blackout. Even when there are back- up 
mechanisms or procedures, their existence further highlights the now- 
visible infrastructure.27
These features of infrastructure are recapitulated regularly wherever infra-
structure is said to “exist in the background,”28 where “science and media 
become transparent when scientists and society at large forget many of the 
norms and standards they are heeding,”29 where platforms are described 
as “whatever the programmer takes for granted when developing,”30 and 
where comparisons are made between the relative transparency of infra-
structure to other conditions of social life: “software code . . .  is much less 
visible than law.”31 There are many more examples that repeat this familiar, 
powerful refrain: like breathing warm air onto a cold window, we might 
convey some shape of ignored, overlooked, and unseen objects. This is a 
powerful gesture, and one that accorded some measure of legitimacy to a 
nascent, interdisciplinary field.
The transparency hypothesis works in concert with a turn toward 
materiality and an analytic rematerialization of information technologies 
that were mistakenly or misleadingly described as immaterial for a gen-
eration or more. In massive, networked, digital communication systems, 
where control and resistance are exerted at the level of infrastructure, a 
realignment of investigatory interests is especially necessary. A new align-
ment should not, as the argument goes, focus exclusively on the surface 
content of communication technologies and media, but rather on the 
conditions that make communication technologies and media possible. 
Such work is conscientious in its unearthing and exposing of standards, 
infrastructures, and technologies; many of these objects were ignored and 
were, practically speaking, invisible to the kinds of investigations that were 
normally regarded as legitimate.
Another complication comes from the contradictory meaning of “trans-
parent” in different contexts. In infrastructure studies, it has come to mean that 
something escapes attention, is ready- at- hand, or can be taken for granted. In 
institutional discourses (like those of the state, the corporation, or the univer-
sity), “transparency” has the opposite meaning: it is a name for the exposure 
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of processes, data, and practices that are otherwise considered to be hidden; 
or it can be the claim that particular processes, like those surrounding Big 
Data, artificial intelligence (AI), or behavioral tracking, will expose otherwise- 
hidden laws of social life. Calls for greater transparency are often calls for 
exposition, for making the secret public. But we all know from experience in 
these institutions that claims of offering greater transparency from political, 
corporate, or university actors are often attempts to control and manage over-
sight of their operations. Limited transparency, as much as total concealment, 
can be a tool of obfuscation. Hence, promises from tech companies that they 
will make their decision- making processes more transparent are an attempt 
to immunize themselves against other claims made against their business and 
labor practices.32
Likewise, in recent years, researchers have used “fairness, account-
ability, and transparency” within AI and machine learning as benchmarks 
of algorithmic in/justice— though these terms too have been coopted by 
the very institutions they were meant to question. As Mikkel Flyverbom 
argues, these negotiations over transparency and concealment are not zero- 
sum struggles, but rather a part of a larger social practice of “managing 
visibilities.” In managing visibility, organizations wield transparency as a 
resource to be employed in negotiations over power and control, and in the 
formation of organizational identities.33 What this leads us to conclude is 
that transparency is a political claim, a discursive resource, and a relational 
tool that gets instrumentalized in the struggle over boundaries and claims 
for justice and accountability.
Instead of seeking to expose the transparent, this book approaches 
standards and infrastructures as technologies that undergo constant, yet 
always partial, concealment. Concealment is treated here as a repetitive and 
reparative process. This is most obvious in the ways that the IPK underwent 
cleaning, and more subtle in the ways that image engineers responded to 
criticism of the Lena image from fellow students and coworkers. If, by defi-
nition, infrastructure is invisible— with infra referring to its occupation of 
a level below the readily perceptible— there is perhaps no good to be gained 
from upending a solid etymology. Yet, as Lampland and Star stipulate, it 
196  Chapter 6
is “good infrastructure, by definition [that is] is invisible.”34 And here we 
should pause in order not to let the word “good” slip by because a distinc-
tion between what is seen as good infrastructure and what is seen as bad 
infrastructure ought to pique our interest. The experience and appreciation 
of infrastructure will vary by any number of sociodemographic conditions, 
including location, age, ability, and access to alternative systems. For thirty 
years, there has been an “infrastructure crisis” in the Global North.35 If we 
are in a constant state of crisis about our basic infrastructure, then is any of 
it good, and by extension, invisible?
The term “infrastructure” as a category of critical analysis and as a 
category of social experience was always meant to be relational.36 Critically 
gazing at the flows and barriers of infrastructure ought to prioritize the 
perspectival and social aspects of what makes a way of doing things seem 
transparent for some people at some times, and impossible for other people 
at other times.37 As Kregg Hetherington puts it, the transparency of infra-
structure is dependent on a “geography of uneven development.”38 This is 
clear for anyone who can’t take infrastructure for granted, for whom break-
down is a fact of life, or anyone who lives in a place that is singled out as a 
target of neocolonial development.39 As Gabrielle Hecht shows us, infra-
structures have uneven “valuation/waste dialectics” that permit the making 
of modernity’s scales.40 We must understand the ideology of infrastructure- 
as- taken- for- granted as the dream of frictionlessness, the dream of handi-
ness, and the dream of development.41 This means that we have to account 
for the ways that infrastructure’s promise is an always unfulfilled assurance 
of modernity, that things can always get better.
Transparency has politics. Sometimes things are hidden from view 
because they are repugnant or unjust.42 Sometimes they are hidden because 
revealing them would expose an underlying exploitation. Drawing together 
the transparency of the clear glass skyscrapers of Toronto’s modernist archi-
tecture with Canadian government claims to truth and openness, Jas Rault 
argues that settler colonialism operates through colonial “tricks of trans-
parency,” and an “architecture that means to feel like a natural, inevitable 
and inescapable environment.” 43 Armond Towns argues that the manner 
in which infrastructures are discussed as taken for granted throws into 
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relief how Black bodies are treated as always ready- at- hand resources and, 
in being treated as such, rendered invisible.44 Rachel Hall teaches us how 
to view airport security through a theater of transparency, showing that 
it is unevenly enforced on racialized bodies.45 For some, transparency is a 
threat; for others, it is a promise that one might be able to take the condi-
tions of their lived environment for granted. Infrastructure is never only a 
system of substrates; it is always a means of distributing and redistributing 
security, access, recognition, and the conditions of making do.
SEEKING TRACES
As this book has described, things, places, images, and people undergo 
many forms of maintenance, repair, and transformation to allow them to 
continue functioning in their capacity as the material and representational 
underpinnings of infrastructure. All these acts of erasure, concealment, and 
suspended disbelief are relational, provisional, and contingent, and they are 
meant to manage the visibility of knowledge- making practices.46 Think of 
the keepers of the IPK washing away the cylinder’s contamination and the 
way that they consecrated the IPK by burying it with paperwork; think of 
the ripping or tearing of the Lena image and the stories that those engi-
neers told for how and why they ripped or tore or folded the image just 
so; think of the standardized patients suppressing their actual bodies (via 
breath mints, granola bars, and other means) to highlight their simulated 
diseases and disabilities; think of the doctors playacting until it seems all 
too real because their careers depend on it. Proxies are crucial to the mak-
ing of standards and infrastructures, and they too operate only within orga-
nizational practices of managed visibility.
So, how should we study things that are meant to be invisible if we 
cannot or will not wait for their breakdown- induced inversion? The art-
ist, scholar, and writer Ingrid Burrington provides a handbook for seeing 
and understanding the internet infrastructure in New York City, which she 
describes as “hiding in plain sight.” 47 In Networks of New York, she has cre-
ated a field guide for deciphering the insider codes of urban architecture, 
including the cable markings, manhole covers, surveillance cameras, and 
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antennae that saturate a city landscape but mostly go without notice. For 
Burrington, uncovering the black box of technology does not require spe-
cial access, but rather a way of seeing and a particular positionality:
The trick of how to see the internet isn’t tech know- how or gaining access to 
secret rooms. It’s learning what to look for and how to look for it. Learning 
how to see and pay attention to the fragmented indicators and nodes of net-
works on any city street is also a process of learning how to see and live within 
a world full of large, complicated systems.48
Using hand- drawn sketches, Burrington’s brilliant field guide turns the 
opaque internetworks of concealed infrastructure into type- images like 
those of a bird- watching or tree- spotting guide. It converts the impenetra-
bility of infrastructural semiosis into a pocket- size glossary of infrastruc-
ture’s plumage, all without the need for breakdown. Her approach bridges 
the artistic representation of standards and infrastructure and the excava-
tory impulse of infrastructure studies.
If artistic appropriation and infrastructural inversion are techniques 
for defamiliarizing technologies that are taken for granted, then this book 
builds on these techniques. Proxies and their protocols (including data 
hygienics, instructions for performance, declarations about their accor-
dance with the natural world, and so on) need constant attention and that 
attention leaves a trace. Through the process of writing a history of a proxy 
it is possible to follow how things, places, and people are turned into repre-
sentations of the world and function as the necessary fictions of knowledge 
systems. To study infrastructure through its material assemblages, proto-
cols, performances, documents, and embodiments is to understand how 
infrastructure works and is made to drift from view. But this book has 
aimed for something else, too: to account for what is excised, what is made 
a remainder of the process of creating a proxy. It has done so as a matter 
of justice and equity and as a matter of exposing the representational and 
world- making limitations of infrastructures.
As standard- makers expanded the ambit of phenomena that they might 
standardize, they were both driven and accompanied by a widening scope 
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of things that seemed measurable. Thus, this book traces a filament of stan-
dardization throughout the long twentieth century, from basic measure-
ment units to the standardization of digital images to, finally, the attempt 
to standardize medical care through the use of human actors employed as 
test patients. These histories both add to an understanding of how stan-
dards and knowledge infrastructures developed and give us an understand-
ing of who works to make standards possible. These cases were also chosen 
because they left behind a body of evidence that tells us something about 
how proxies are chosen and maintained through the routines, rituals, and 
embodied performances of scientific and technical labor.
My research took me to the sites of official standardization and its 
histories: the Library of Congress, National Archives, National Library of 
Medicine, and National Institute of Standards and Technology; but it also 
led me to the less official places where the traces of standardization reside: 
countless hours spent reading digitized reports about image processing, fol-
lowing the message board discussions of standardized patients, navigating 
to photography sites where people exchange test and calibration images, 
and fruitlessly trying to get permission to see the IPK. It involved a dozen 
different borrowers’ cards, a documentary regime that could attest to my 
identity,49 and at each, a different set of embodied techniques for creating, 
requesting, or making scans and photocopies to produce my own set of 
traces and linkages between objects, people, and places. These are part of 
the embodied experiences and routines of archival work.
Where Carolyn Steedman describes the “dust of an archive” and the 
specific form of possession that haunts the historian, we might add to that 
dust the sad sandwich or premade burrito that we lug through humid Wash-
ington on our way to College Park, or the eerie loneliness of the picnic bench 
at the National Library of Medicine.50 The burrito of the archive is the topic 
for another day, but these practices extend the larger world of proxies and 
their traces to mundane routines and protocols, the forms of access we can or 
cannot acquire, and the makeshift infrastructural labor of research.
> > >
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Proxies are clarifying: their creation, maintenance, and use illuminate the 
connective tissue between the people, objects, and protocols that make 
infrastructure vibrant. The process of following proxies centers on the 
cultures that surround technical and scientific knowledge production. It 
trains a gaze, or a perspective, on the articulation work that everyone must 
perform.
In the final days of this project, I found myself re- creating 3 stoppages 
étalon. I stood with Lewis Bush in his backyard and tried to drop some 
string onto pieces of cardboard that Lewis had lying around his studio (see 
figures 6.4 and 6.5). The string was twisted from being stored in a ball, 
and the wind carried the string away from the cardboard. It took many 
attempts. I have to confess that I had to move much closer than a 1- meter 
height to get a usable shape. It was a reminder of the contours of proxies: 
the embodied labor, the communities of practice, the makeshift material-
ity, the haphazard interventions of place and circumstance.
Figure 6.4
The author in the process of creating a standard stoppage. String and pen on cardboard. 
Photo: Lewis Bush.
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Proxies are real things, real places, real people; but they are also always 
memories of a world gone by and forecasts of a world to come. While 
they appear durable, they are porous, flexible, and, finally breakable. The 
proxies in this book are not unique, but they are stickier than some, hav-
ing picked up the traces of the places where they’ve traveled.51 The cases 
given here map a way of studying stand- ins as the pragmatic and practical 
artifacts for representing the world and the assumptions that are made of 
that world.
This book began with a simple question: to whom or to what do we 
delegate the power to stand in for the world? Some of the answers to this 
question have included cities in the American Midwest, shipping contain-
ers in Arizona, pieces of metal in France, centerfolds in Los Angeles, and 
medical actors anywhere. But these were only starting points. A concern 
for the cultural labor of standing in also demands that we ask: To whom 
do we delegate the power to choose stand- ins? And, finally, for whom do 
these delegates stand in? These final questions, which underlie the histories 
Figure 6.5
“Three More Standard Stoppages.” Cardboard. Dylan Mulvin and Lewis Bush (2020). Image: 
Lewis Bush.
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throughout this book, attune the analysis to the conditions in which proxy 
work happens, the injustices of representation and performance, and the 
labor politics of standing in. Our references shape who we are, how we 
think, how we communicate, and how we build shared worlds. It is no 
surprise that when these references take the form of recognizable objects, 
places, or people, they are often enchanting. When viewed from afar, or 
askew, the particular enchantment of, say, a piece of platinum iridium can 
appear ridiculous. Or, seen from another standpoint, the power to choose 
a centerfold to act as a stand- in for the world of images loses its aura. 
Instead, it appears as the manifestation of the constitutive injustices of 
visual culture.
Proxies are in operation in all places where communities of practice 
share representations of the world to form a common understanding. So 
let this be an invitation to you to take stock of the common reference 
points of your own knowledge infrastructures: the examples, prototypes, 
and stand- ins of a world out there. Our shared references may be the mate-
rial through which we think and make new connections, but they are never 
permanent. The cultural work of standing in takes form in the “ritualized 
repetition of norms” that produce and stabilize difference, and encode it 
in the materiality of culture.52 Our identities, our bodies, our worlds are 
formed through the ways that norms persist, and the labor of creating and 
maintaining technology is one way that norms are encoded in the infra-
structure of everyday life. Our proxies are cultural, and at the same time as 
they shape the infrastructures through which culture circulates, they will 
be reshaped by the ebbs and flows of power and the demands for more 
just representation. The purpose of cataloging these proxies is to show how 
practices of standing in, as well as the work of embodiment, representation, 
and memory, impinge directly on the capacity for people to navigate insti-
tutions and achieve recognition within systems not of their own making.
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